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Stellingen 
1. De stelligheid waarmee macro-economische voorspellingen worden 
gepresenteerd staat vaak in schril contrast met de betrouwbaarheid 
van deze voorspellingen. 
2. Studenten in de economie kunnen meer inspiratie opdoen door van 
Keynes te lezen dan door over Keynes te lezen. 
3. Het beleid inzake het verminderen van handelsbelemmeringen tegen 
export van ontwikkelingslanden dient meer afgestemd te worden op 
de exportbehoefte van ontwikkelingslanden dan op de gewenste bescher-
ming van eigen produktie. 
4. De levensvatbaarheid van een uitgebreide E.G. is onder meer afhan-
kelijk. van een politieke aanvaarding van agrarische inkomensverschillen 
die ontstaan zijn door verschillen in economische efficiency. Een eerste 
stäp in de richting van deze acceptatie is de recente consensus om 
output subsidies aan kwantitatieve bovengrenzen te binden. 
5. Popper's adagium, dat een theorie die veel uitsluit waardevo 
dan een die weinig uitsluit maar vaker bevestigd wordt, lijkt bij veel 
maatschappij-wetenschappelijk onderzoek een ondergeschikte 
spelen. 
6. De invloed van een aantal specifieke eigenschappen van de E.ngelse 
taal op Wittgenstein's latere denken inzake begripsvorming zcu een 
nadere Studie verdienen. 
7. "Gesundes Volksempfinden" is gevaarlijk als enige bron van 
maar de huidige Nederlandse strafrechtpleging lijkt deze bron 
te veronachtzamen hetgeen kan leiden tot rechtsvervreemding. 
,0 
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geheel 
8. Het is eenvoudiger een xenofobe politieke stroming te verocrdelen 
dan de oorzaken ervan weg te nemen. 


9. Wanneer de huidige criminaliteit een toenemende functie is van jeugd-
werkloosheid en politioneel personeelstekort, dienen met meer spoed 
en creativiteit extra vacatures bij de politie vervuld te worden door 
werkloze jongeren. 
10. Groepsbesluiten zijn door compromis - inflatie vaak minder intelligent 
dan individuele beslissingen. Een consequentie hiervan voor het over-
heidsbeleid zou kunnen zijn dat, binnen de grenzen van democratische 
contrôle, besluiten zoveel mogelijk door één verantwoordelijk persoon 
genomen worden. 
R.A. Bosch 
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Introduction 
This study on the economics of agricultural subsidies consists of two 
Par t s . 
In the first Par t I have reviewed and analysed the comprehensive 
but hi ther to sca t te red l i te ra ture on the subject. 
The second par t contains the findings of an empirical study on agri-
cultural subsidies in the Caribbean carried out by the author from 
April 1982 to March 1984. 
I am great ly indebted to Prof. Dr. F . P . Jansen who read the earlier 
drafts thoroughly. 
His invaluable suggestions have considerably improved the quality 
of this work. 
As far as the empirical study is concerned I was greatly aided by 
Mrs. M. Maharajh, Mr. H. Maharaj and Prof. Dr. G. Schieffer. They 
assisted me in the supervision and organisation of data collection. 
I was also for tunate in obtaining frequent counsel from Mr. D.I. Field 
in organising and analysing the data on dairy farming. 
The Depar tment of Agricultural Economics of the University of the 
West Indies was most helpful in providing the necessary facilities 
for the administration of the collection of a large amount of farm 
data . 
Finally, I wish to express my grat i tude to Mr. F . B. Lauckner. He 
ensured tha t my substantial requests for computer facilities were 
fulfilled efficiently despite the limited resources a t his command. 
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SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
PART ONE 
1. Agricultural subsidies have been defined as a government induced 
change of re la t ive prices of goods, services and factors of produc-
tion in the agricultural sec tor . These agricultural pr ice changes 
may result from a large number of different government measures 
varying from direct cash t ransfers to government t rade policy. 
Workable definitions have been derived by a further classification 
into specific categories of agricultural subsidies. 
2. Agricultural subsidies have been considered to be economically 
justified when under a system of laissez-faire public welfare de-
c reases . 
They have been defended on th ree grounds, viz. the exis tence of 
domest ic distort ions, pr ice instabili ty, and the infant-industry a r -
gument . 
3 . Domest ic distortions like monopoly power, pollution and other ex-
terna l i t ies , can theoret ical ly be overcome by a subsidy policy in 
the direction opposite to the distort ion. 
4. Large pr ice f luctuations of basic foodstuffs have a de t r imenta l 
impact on the economy. Conversely, minor pr ice variations a re 
needed for profit maximization and for at tuning supply to demand. 
The principal problem in designing an appropriate agricultural pr ice 
policy is how to prevent large pr ice fluctuations without undercut -
ting the function of pr ice as a marke t signal. 
5. The infant-industry argument can not be adequately defended on 
theore t ica l grounds as developed by Mill, Bastable, Kemp and Meade. 
In accordance with modern equilibrium theory, protect ion has to 
be based on the exis tence of dynamic internal economics, i .e . the 
net positive diffuse impact on welfare s temming from the learning 
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process of the industry under protect ion. 
6. Subsidies do not only have the desired effects . Suboptimal behaviour 
by subsidized agents often leads to welfare losses. Also, welfare 
in non-subsidized sectors may decline because of a reallocation 
of resources towards the subsidized sectors . 
7. In theory, the distorting and inter-sectoral impact of agricultural 
subsidies can best be ascertained by the use of macro-economic 
models. Total impact analysis, however, has not been very succes-
ful so far, mainly because of the data required. 
8. The est imation of welfare effects of agricultural subsidy programs, 
notably for developing countries, has mostly been based on part ial 
equilibrium analysis. The est imation of elast ici t ies and changes 
in economic surplus is of g rea t analytical value, because it provides 
answers to ex-ante questions about who will benefit most from 
the subsidy, and how cost-effect ive the subsidy will be in raising 
farm output. 
9. The inaccuracy in approximating welfare changes by changes in 
economic surplus is an increasing function of the proportion of 
individual income spent /earned with respect to the commodity or 
group of commodities in question, the magnitude of the (induced) 
price change, the interdependency of the goods that are added 
up in the surplus measure, and the proportion of the value of the 
commodities concerned as compared to tota l GNP. 
10. Direct farm income subsidies a re more geared to relieving the 
symptoms rather than the basic causes of income inequity. 
If, however, the major political objective is to guarantee farmers ' 
incomes, direct farm income subsidies seem to be most appropriate 
since such a policy is less distorting and much cheaper than a policy 
tha t guarantees income by direct farm input or direct farm out-
put subsidies. 
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11. Direct farm output subsidies, studied within a partial equilibrium 
framework, are either indirect money transfers (i.e. taxes) from 
consumers to farmers without additional welfare losses to consu-
mers, or direct money transfers from consumers to farmers or 
government with additional welfare losses to consumers. 
12. Generally, it will be uncertain whether farmers will benefit from 
farm output price stabilization, whereas it is probably true in 
most cases that consumers will suffer a welfare loss from such 
a policy (provided we are not dealing with major price fluctuations 
of basic foodstuffs). 
13. It has been suggested that the establishment of active sales agen-
cies and a thorough analysis of markets in developed countries 
by experts from developing countries may form a better means 
of boosting farm exports than the imposition of farm export subsi-
dies. 
14. When direct farm input subsidies are not accompanied by improved 
farm technology, the resulting shift in farm output supply will 
be nothing but parallel and likely to occur at net social cost. 
15. Farm input utilization is determined by a large number of different 
factors affecting the farm input demand and supply side, whereas 
a farm input subsidy only affects a few of these factors, and to 
some degree in an unpredictable way. 
PART TWO 
16. The empirical estimation of welfare effects of agricultural sub-
sidies is extremely difficult when a large number of subsidy pro-
grams is being implemented at the same time. Hence, an optimal 
determination of the subsidy mix in terms of cost-effectiveness 
in meeting the objectives is feasible only when the total number 
of support measures is limited. 
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Another reason for starting on a small scale with agricultural 
subsidy programs is that most new subsidy programs suffer from 
administrative problems in their initial stages. 
These infant disease costs can be minimized by allowing subsidy 
programs to benefit as much as possible from the experience gained 
in earlier subsidy programs. 
17. The determination of the optimal subsidy mix in a dynamic context 
requires adequate subsidy statistics. Therefore, it is advisable 
to allocate part of the subsidy budget to the collection and organi-
sation of subsidy statistics. 
18. The empirical study of farm labour distortions in Trinidad and 
Tobago has shown how a distinction between distorted and undis-
torted farm production could be made with the help of estimated 
production functions. 
19. It has been argued that agricultural subsidy programs can be succes-
ful only if farmers are maximizing their profits and hence respond 
logically to induced changes in relative prices. A practical method 
to test price-responsiveness, with the help of cross-section data 
only, is the normalized restricted profit function (NRPF) approach. 
20. A serious limitation to the NRPF-approach is that this method 
cannot be applied when agricultural prices are fixed. It must be 
noted that if farm prices are fixed, an optimal response to sub-
sidies is doubtful anyway. 
21. Elasticities indirectly derived from the NRPF are more reliable 
than those that are directly obtained from single-equation pro-
duction functions. 
Nevertheless, the signs and relative magnitudes of the various 
elasticities of either approach may match. 
22. The empirical analysis shows that farm input subsidies had no 
15 
impact on input utilization of crop farmers. Apart from monopoly 
power in farm input supply, four fundamental administrative defects 
causing this program failure were identified. 
23. In the ex-ante analysis of a fertilizer subsidy it was estimated 
that the shadow price of saving foreign exchange by subsidizing 
locally produced fertilizer only, would have been relatively high. 
7k. The computed analysis of production value into a price and a vol-
ume component concerning temporary crops, has provided support 
for a price stabilization program beneficial to farmers. 
25. The concept of guaranteed threshold prices has been introduced 
in the ex-ante analysis of farm output subsidies. A sensitivity ana-
lysis within a partial equilibrium framework has been employed 
to determine the relative cost-effectiveness of different anti-distor-
tive guaranteed threshold price programs. 
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PART ONE 
THE CONCEPT OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 
17 
CHAPTER 1 
A DEFINITION OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 
1.1 Subsidies as a Government Induced Change of Relative Prices 
of Goods, Services and Factors of Production 
Agriculture today is supported by governments almost everywhere. 
Experience shows that agricultural subsidies, once established, 
are not easily removed when the initial reason for their establish-
ment no longer exists. Vested interests tend to develop quickly. 
This phenomenon has sometimes resulted in excess capacity, 
e.g. in the E.E.C. and the U.S.A. When excess capacity, induced 
by subsidies, results in decreasing world market prices, farmers 
elsewhere may press for similar support measures from their 
own governments. Agricultural subsidies in one country, induced 
by agricultural subsidies abroad, may finally lead to world-wide 
protectionism. Keeping in mind the prevailing balance of payments 
situation" in many developing countries, many governments may 
consider the imposition of trade barriers to be cheaper (at least 
in the short run) than a further increase in their agricultural 
expenditure. 
Against this background it is easy to see that international orga-
nisations dealing with trade and development are showing an 
(1) 
increasing interest in the various types of agricultural subsidies. 
It indicates the importance of a consensus or the need for a 
common denominator on this mat ter . In other words: a definition 
of agricultural subsidies. 
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For analytical purposes too we need a better definition than the 
ones that are, either explicitly or implicitly, commonly used. 
The general idea one has of subsidies, is that they involve (real) 
money transfers from one group in society to another, in particu-
lar from tax payers (via the government) to designated groups 
in society, either businesses or private households. This common 
notion of subsidies, applied to the agricultural sector, neither 
provides a firm basis for international comparison, nor serves 
an analytical purpose. 
(2) 
The 'Joint Economic Committee' which studied the federal 
subsidy programme in the U.S.A., defined subsidies as public 
sector rewards that directly change relative prices in the private 
sector. Prest considers this new concept, for which we are much 
indebted to C.S. Shoup, member of the Joint Economic Committee 
(3) 
(JEC), as the least unsatisfactory definition of subsidies. 
Let us enquire into this JEC-definition of subsidies before we 
start to determine its applicability to agricultural support mea-
sures. 
According to the JEC-papers relative prices in the private sector 
apply to prices of goods and services as well as to rewards of 
factors of production (i.e. capital and labour). Income effects 
alone (increased consumption because of an increase in real income 
but no change in relative prices) constitute an indirect effect 
and income and substitution effects (the latter: increased con-
sumption because of a change in relative prices but no increase 
in real income) constitute a direct e f f e c t . ^ 
In our opinion, this distinction between direct and indirect, is 
a weak point in the definition. 
f*f) 
Generally speaking it can never be easy to apply Slutsky's equa-
tion, which analyses the demand change induced by a price change 
into two separate effects, the substitution effect and the income 
effect, to a real world situation where prices can change every 
second and decisions on resource allocation can be taken every 
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minute. 
Perhaps this arbitrary distinction between pure income effects 
on the one hand and income and substitution effects on the other 
enhances the general applicability of the definition but one could 
also argue that a change in relative prices induced by income 
effects as a result of government support measures should not 
be excluded in advance. 
For instance, a general income allowance (hence no subsidy accor-
ding to the JEC-papers) could, depending on the distribution of 
incomes and elasticities of demand with respect to the various 
income-categories, entail substantial changes in relative prices. 
We prefer to use the definition that subsidies are payments other 
than those which would normally be paid for the goods, services 
and factors. ^ 
Hence subsidies in our definition are government induced changes 
of relative prices. ^ 
Of course, it may not be always possible to ascertain the price 
that would normally be paid. 
We feel however, one should not try to define an economic concept 
only in such a way that one can work with the definition. An 
alternative approach would be first to at tempt a general defini-
tion of the concept of subsidies and then analyse it into categories. 
A Classification of Subsidies 
On the basis of our general concept of subsidies many classifi-
(7) 
cations could be thought of. 
Since our principal objective is to sharpen our perception of the 
nature of subsidies, hence to facilitate both international compa-
rison and economic analysis, we opt for an instrumental classifi-
cation. 
Largely in accordance with the 3EC-study we distinguish five 
categories of subsidies, viz: 
(i) direct cash transfers 
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(ii) provision of cheap credit 
(iii) 'benefit in kind' subsidies (sales by government at lower-
than-market prices) 
(iv) purchase subsidies (purchases by government at higher-than-
market prices) 
(v) regulatory subsidies -fiscal (e.g. taxes and tax concessions) 
-monetary (e.g. rate of interest) 
-legislative (e.g. land tenure regulations) 
-foreign trade directed (e.g. rate of ex-
change, trade barriers). 
Subsequently we want to distinguish between direct sector sub-
sidies and indirect sector subsidies or inter-sector subsidies. 
The economy of a society can be divided into the agricultural 
sector and the non-agricultural sector, for convenience sake called 
the industrial sector. 
We define direct agricultural subsidies as subsidies affecting farm 
input prices, farm output prices and farm income without having 
a direct impact on other prices. Conversely, indirect agricultural 
subsidies are either subsidies affecting prices in both sectors 
simultaneously (agriculture and industry), or subsidies first affec-
ting prices in industry which in turn have an impact on agricul-
tural prices. 
A third distinction we wish to make is related to the analysis 
of subsidies. 
A subsidy must have an impact on market prices. This impact, 
or the difference between the ex-ante price and the cum-subsidy 
price, is referred to as the incidence of the subsidy. 
The private and public costs and benefits of a subsidy are referred 
(9) 
to as the effects of the subsidy. 
1.3 The Incidence of Direct Agricultural Subsidies^ ^ 
1.3.1 The Incidence of Direct Farm Income Subsidies 
Direct farm income support is government intervention in agri-
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culture to modify the distribution of farm incomes other than 
by farm output - or farm input support. 
Of course, when dealing with low-income countries with a large 
rural society this type of farm support can only be applied to 
a fairly limited extent. 
For instance in the E.E.C. we have examples of direct cash trans-
fers to so-called hill-farmers. 
Other possibilities are income tax concessions or reduced national 
insurance contributions^ ^ for specified groups of farm households. 
Either approach is a pecuniary support measure. Therefore it 
always causes a non-zero incidence (i.e. change of farm labour 
reward). By definition these support measures are to be identified 
as agricultural subsidies. 
1.3.2 The Incidence of Direct Farm Output Subsidies 
Direct farm output subsidies are perhaps the' most commonly 
applied agricultural support measures. It appears that three general 
classes can be distinguished, namely: 
(i) direct measures to raise or stabilize farm output prices 
(ii) direct farm import restrictions 
(iii) direct farm export support measures. 
(i) The incidence of Direct Measures to Raise or Stabilize Farm 
Output Prices 
These support measures entail in principle a non-zero incidence 
on farm output prices. Hence they are also considered to be agri-
cultural subsidies. 
Unlike the case of direct farm income support the magnitude 
(12) 
of the incidence is often unknown because the direction of 
price changes is dependent upon various factors. 
First, an increase in farm output prices may bring about many 
interacting supply and demand responses subject to the correspon-
ding elasticities. 
Secondly, supply may move along the supply function or the supply 
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function itself may shift to the right. In the latter case the price 
incline permits improved efficiency. Subsequently, the long-run 
effects of increased supply may in turn entail a lowering of prices. 
Thirdly, when dealing with foodgrains price support measures 
have a further differential impact because of the distributional 
effects on income and employment. 
Generally speaking, it is easier to ascertain the incidence of pe^ 
(13) 
cuniary measures , than the incidence of non-pecuniary me-
thods. ( 1*> 
For the purpose of international comparison the relative level 
of subsidization can sometimes be approximately calculated by 
the amount of direct governmental costs. In many cases, however, 
for example a guaranteed price system without deficiency payments 
from the government, the consumer pays for the greater part 
of the subsidy (vide chapter 3). 
In other cases farmers may 'subsidize' themselves for instance 
by the creation of stabilization funds by farmers' organizations. 
(ii) The Incidence of Direct Farm Import Restrictions 
Direct farm import restrictions are tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to farm import trade. 
•In principle they result in a non-zero incidence on domestic and 
import prices. 
However, here too the magnitude of the incidence can be quite 
difficult to ascertain. 
First, it must be noted that trade restrictions are sometimes 
by-passed because of administrative inefficiencies. 
Secondly, the organisation of the trade (ex ante marketing margins 
as compared to the height of the tariff barrier, degree of monopoly 
and separation between import and domestic trade) plays an impor-
tant role in determining the incidence (and effects). 
Perhaps zero incidence is easier to disprove with respect to a 
tariff than in the case of a non-tariff import restriction. 
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The latter may range from quotas to severe quality control measu-
res. 
(iii) The Incidence of Direct Farm Export Support Measures 
Direct farm export support is a form of government intervention 
to raise farm prices of export commodities. Hence, it entails 
in principle a non-zero incidence.^ ^ 
1.3.3 The Incidence of Direct Farm Input Subsidies 
Direct farm input support measures can best be subdivided in 
two general categories. 
The reason is that we have farm inputs for which a ready (inter-
national) market price exists (e.g. fertilizers, seed, machinery, 
land) on the one hand and farm inputs that are, firstly, connected 
to regional or national circumstances and, secondly, hardly traded 
through private channels (e.g. education, infra-structure) on the 
other. 
Hence, we wish to distinguish: 
(i) direct support measures for farm inputs with a ready market 
price 
(ii) direct support measures for farm inputs without a ready 
market price. 
(i) Direct Support Measures for Farm Inputs With a Ready Market 
Price 
This type of support is a form of government intervention to 
reduce the price of farm inputs for farmers and thus, in principle, 
a direct agricultural subsidy. To mention a few: cash transfers 
to farmers subject to the purchase of inputs; input subsidies 
in kind; reduction of indirect taxes and import duties; agricultural 
land tenure legislation; and provision of preferential credit to 
farmers. 
The estimation of the incidence of this type of measure is highly 
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dependent on the input supply market as well as the administrat ive 
framework involved. 
(ii) Direct Support Measures for Farm Inputs Without a Ready 
Market Pr ice 
The public provision of these farm inputs may increase the econo-
mic efficiency of farm production. 
The corollary is tha t an eventual non-zero incidence of these 
direct support measures will only occur indirectly in the long 
run (e.g. changes in land prices due to irrigation works, changes 
in fert i l izer prices due to extension of, and education in, their 
use). 
In consequence, it will be even more difficult to ascer ta in the 
allocation and magnitude of these incidences than in the cases 
we discussed previously. 
Since the distorting impact of these public support measures 
is assumed to be less than tha t of the subsidies we discussed 
above, these measures seldom cause disturbances in international 
t rade relat ions. 
For completeness sake we wish to describe briefly the four most 
common categories of public support for farm inputs without 
•a readily ascer ta inable marke t pr ice . 
A. Reduction of Agricultural Risks 
Neither farm income subsidies, nor farm output subsidies, nor 
farm input subsidies (i) can sufficiently p ro tec t farmers against 
production failures resulting from unavoidable disasters such as 
adverse weather conditions or unexpected wide-spread diseases. 
Especially in developing countries where profits a re often modest 
or non-existent , risks impose severe barr iers to the adoption of 
new farm technologies. 
Commercial insurance companies a re for obvious reasons generally 
not in teres ted in offering insurance against 'normal ' premium 
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rates to farmers in developing countries partly because of the 
incidence of fraud (the insured consumer has some control over 
the probability of the event in question), the lack of information, 
and the low standard of organisation and administration (difficul-
ty of loss adjustment). The history of agricultural insurance has 
also shown that in the early stages of agricultural development 
(e.g. the U.S.A. and Canada in the inter-bellum) only the govern-
ment is willing to offer insurance to farmers. These arguments 
also imply that there is no market for agricultural insurance in 
developing countries. 
B. Technological Development and Agricultural Education 
Many authors have stressed the importance of research and educa-
(16) 
tion . Technology, to some extent, can be transferred inter-
nationally and thus has its market price. Local support for improved 
varieties, fertilizers and equipment for which a ready market 
price exists, must therefore be classified as a clear-cut agricul-
tural subsidy. 
Most technological development and agricultural education, how-
ever, has to be regarded as long-term and price-neutral. There 
is a long time from fundamental research (research centre, uni-
versity) via applied research (co-operation of research centre 
and university) to newly adopted farming systems incorporating 
yield-increasing technologies that ensure optimal conservation 
of resources and high productivity of labour, land and other farm 
capital. 
C. Land Improvement and Water Management 
Land improvement and water management often involve large 
scale projects like the construction of dams and irrigation works. 
Here too, we are dealing with support measures without a ready 
world market price, which are, in principle, price-neutral. After 
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the completion of such a project, both the price of land and 
(farm) income levels may have risen. These long-term effects 
a re generally wide-spread. 
Generally speaking, the costs a re easier to compute than 
the benefi ts . 
Only in case of small scale projects do the benefits cause 
regional divergences in income. Sometimes, the government 
imposes additional taxes on the areas tha t have been bene-
fited. Quite often, large scale projects a re combined with 
the agricultural subsidies we described above. Whenever 
possible these more c lear-cut subsidies (easier assessment 
of a non-zero incidence) should be separated in the appraisal 
of a p r o j e c t / * 7 ^ 
D. Improvement of Agricultural Infrastructure 
Agricultural infrastructure can apply both to physical infra-
s t ruc ture (for instance: roads, public ut i l i t ies , s torage facili-
t ies , harbours, public t ransport , e tc .) and institutional infra-
s t ruc ture (for ins tance: extension, organisation of the market , 
legislation, e tc . ) . Infrastructural improvements often comprise 
subsidy e lements which are more evident, for example dispari-
t ies in public t ransport costs . 
Again, in order to render an international comparison of agr i -
cultural subsidies more feasible, these more evident subsidies 
have to be distinguished from the infrastructural programs. 
The Incidence of Indirect Agricultural Subsidies 
We s ta ted earl ier tha t indirect agricultural support measures 
result ei ther from general policy measures or from policy 
measures which initially change relat ive prices in non-agricul-
tural sectors (for convenience sake: industrial subsidies). 
The principle is the same as in previous sections. ; When pay-
ments concerning the agricultural sector differ from those 
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in the absence of these indirect agricultural support measures, 
the measures a re to be identified as indirect agricultural 
subsidies. 
It will immediately be clear tha t the empirical proof of both 
the causal relationship and non-zero incidence is not easy. 
The field of indirect agricultural subsidies is in principle in-
finite. 
We would need an input-output model which showed in detai l 
all d i rect and indirect effects of adjustment policies on all 
economic agents in society. From such a model we could 
in theory derive the effects on prices within the agricultural 
sector . 
Another complicating factor is tha t these policy measures 
a re not always meant to support agr icul ture . Nevertheless 
we feel tha t a brief discussion of indirect subsidies is indis-
pensable. 
First , we will highlight some major examples of general subsi-
dies affecting agricul tural pr ices . Then we shall make some 
brief remarks on the relationship between industrial subsidies 
and agricultural pr ices . 
1.4.1 Examples of General Subsidies Affecting Agricultural Prices 
Domest ic foodprograms 
Food or nutri t ional (school) programs, dependent on their 
s ize, may boost domest ic demand for agricul tural produce 
and hence affect re la t ive farm pr ices . 
Supply of domest ic resources 
A change in fiscal policy or legislation may a l te r prices of 
domest ic factors of production such as energy or fer t i le land. 
Also when the world marke t pr ice increases a t a fas ter r a t e 
than domest ic pr ices , problems in t rade relat ions may ar ise . 
A recen t example of this was the provision of local gas by 
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the Dutch government to farms and other businesses a t a 
(18) 
lower price than the world market price . 
Taxation policies 
A general income allowance or a reduction in direct taxes 
may, depending on the distribution of income and the income 
elast ici t ies for agricultural produce for various income c a t e -
gories, affect farm pr ices . 
Monetary policies 
A devaluation of the domestic currency may boost agricultural 
exports and raise local food prices accordingly. A revaluation 
may have opposite effects . A change in the money supply 
may affect in teres t r a tes which may in turn influence farm 
investment and hence a l te r farm prices. 
Trade policies 
The imposition of general t rade barr iers to save foreign ex-
change may a l te r agricultural prices in a number of ways. 
For instance, general t rade barriers may affect the supply 
of essential farm inputs as well as the competing supply of 
farm output . 
1.4.2 Industrial Subsidies Affecting Agricultural Prices 
Quite a few developing countries have tr ied to break the 
vicious circle of a stagnant low-income society with a large 
rural sector by putt ing the emphasis on industrial growth. 
A full discussion of the complex s t ructural relationship between 
the industrial and the agricultural sector in relation to indus-
(19) 
t r ia l policies would lead us beyond the scope of this sect ion. 
In cases where industrial policies have had a distorting impact 
on agricul ture we do be t te r speak of negative indirect agri-
cultural subsidies. 
Sometimes the impact varies in i ts incidence. A policy to 
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increase industrial wages may on the one hand boost demand 
for farm output and on the other hand divert labour and capi-
ta l from agricul ture to industry. 
In Argentina well-known industrial policies pursued in the 
1930's led in the first place to a decline in the tradit ional 
export sector . 
Also in other Lat in-American countries industrial policies 
(low farm-output prices (fixed levels) and rising farm input 
costs (forced utilisation of locally produced inputs and t rade 
barr iers to foreign input supply)) have had a de t r imenta l impact 
on agricultural pr ices . 
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NOTES 
1. Vide e.g. 'Subsidies in GATT', GATT-secretar ia t paper CG, 18/W/79, 
special distribution, 13 March 1984. 
2. Joint Economic Commit tee , 'The Economics of Federal Subsidy P ro -
grams ' , Staff Study and Par t s 1-6, 1972, 1973, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington D.C. 
3. Prest , A.R. 'How much subsidy? A Study of the Economic Concept 
and Measurement of Subsidies in the United Kingdom', The Inst i tute 
of Economic Affairs, 1974; and 'The Economic Rationale of Subsidies 
to Industries ' , in 'The Economics of Industrial Subsidies', papers 
and proceedings of the Conference on the Economics of Industrial 
Subsidies held a t the Civil Service College, Sunningdale, February 
1975, London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office. 
4. This analysis of a price change on demand was first made by Slutsky 
(1915) and la ter by Hicks and Allen (1934). 
5. OECD, 'Transparency for Positive Adjustment ' , Paris, 1983, p .15 . 
6. The notion ' rewards ' (vide JEC-definition) is not necessary e i ther . 
Taxes can also be perceived as a special category of subsidies. 
7. Pres t , A.R., 1974, op. c i t . , pp. 25-27. 
8. Our conceptualizat ion of regulatory subsidies is wider. In our in ter-
pre ta t ion a subsidy needs not to be a public reward. E.g. we include 
taxes and t rade barr iers . 
9. Vide chapter 3 . 
10. A non-zero incidence is crucial to the assessment of a presumed 
subsidy. Whether the established incidence distorts domestic or foreign 
economies will be discussed in chapter 3. 
11. It goes without saying that these types of income support hardly 
apply to low-income nations. 
12. Not to mention the difficulty to ascertain the incidence of a farm 
subsidy when this subsidy forms par t of a whole package of agricul-
tural production incentives. Quite often this is the case (vide Par t 
Two). Sometimes, if not often, it is even difficult to falsify a zero 
incidence. 
13. E.g. guaranteed price systems. 
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14. E.g. buffer stock policies or output regulations. 
15. The smoke-screen tha t surrounds the field of subsidization becomes 
even thicker when we think of the s ta t i s t ica l da ta requirements 
for the falsification of zero incidence. The principle is c lear : non-
zero incidence implies a subsidy. However, the point a t which one 
has to assume tha t the incidence differs from zero will often remain 
subject to a cer ta in degree of arbi t rar iness . 
16. A pioneer in this respect is T.W. Schultz. His emphasis on invest-
ment in human capi ta l has influenced many contemporary scholars. 
Vide: 'Transforming Traditional Agricul ture ' , New Haven, Yale Uni-
versi ty Press, 1964; and ' Investment in Human Capi ta l , The Role 
of Education and of Research ' , Free Press , New York, 1971. 
17. In financial appraisals, subsidies can be computed as a separa te i tem 
in the sources (like taxes in the uses) before the summing up the 
current or the cumulat ive surplus (deficit) (the l a t t e r equals the 
sum of the current surplus (deficit) and the opening cash balance). 
Vide e.g. 3.P. Git t inger 'Economic Analysis of Agricultural Pro jec ts ' , 
The Economic Development Inst i tute (EDI) of the World Bank, the 
John Hopkins University Press , Bal t imore, 1982, pp. 182-213. 
18. The Dutch government has never accepted tha t it was subsidizing 
Dutch glass house growers. In p rac t i ce , The Netherlands, the worlds 
second grea tes t exporter of agricultural produce,- was unwilling to 
risk a deter iorat ion in relat ions with her principal (i.e. E.E.C.) p a r t -
ners and promised to raise the domest ic pr ice of gas . 
19. Vide e.g. Mellor, J.W., 'The New Economics of Growth, A Strategy 
for India and the Developing World', Cornell University, 1976, Ch. 
VII. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 
Subsidies a re , in our opinion, economically justified when under a laissez-
faire policy public welfare decreases . Based on this principle we can 
distinguish three economic arguments for agricultural subsidy p rograms^ \ 
- the existence of domestic distortions in commodity and factor markets 
-agricultural pr ice instability 
- the infant industry argument . 
It will be clear tha t there a re also non-economic reasons for subsidi-
zing agr icul ture . These non-economic arguments sometimes stem from 
the political influence displayed by agricultural lobbies, or emerge 
from political beliefs (in a democracy) subject to the prevailing vo te -
maximization model. We must further bear in mind, that when genuine 
reasons for subsidizing agricul ture are predominantly political or social, 
the arguments nevertheless may be made (ex-post) on economic grounds. 
It may perhaps be trivial to s t a t e here that the importance of economic 
reasoning to policy making should never be exaggerated but it is not 
our intention to suggest here tha t social or political arguments a re 
always suspect . 
For instance, the political argument for self-reliance in the provision 
of food may be fully justified when there are serious doubts on the 
durability of established t rade relationships, even if trading par tners 
do possess a comparat ive advantage and imported food commodities 
a re much cheaper than locally produced food. 
The self-reliance argument may also be based on s t ra tegic considerations. 
Social arguments s temming, for instance, from an undesirable land-
pwner - t enan t s t ruc ture , or from a skew demographic distribution, 
may also be valid. 
Quite often, social, political and economical arguments a re in ter re la-
ted. 
viz.: 
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For example, when we a re dealing with equity objectives, e.g. a reason-
able income for the rural poor. 
In this study we wish to confine ourselves to general economic argu-
ments which can be se t t led both theoret ical ly and empirically (vide 
Par t Two). 
The economic justification for agricultural subsidy programs should 
be clear from a study of their cost effectiviness in at taining their 
objectives. 
The Existence of Domestic Distortions in Commodity and Factor 
Markets 
(3) 
For the theory of domestic distortions in commodity and factor mar-
kets we are great ly indebted to th ree Indian economists , viz: Bhagwati, 
tti) 
Ramaswami and Srinivasan 
In an earl ier paper ^ B h a g w a t i and Ramaswami showed tha t in the 
case of domest ic distortion a suitable subsidy policy on domestic p ro-
duction would be an optimum solution. The proposition tha t no tariff 
(or t rade subsidy) could exist tha t yields a solution superior to that 
(6) 
under free t rade was not valid. Kemp and Negishi have correct ly 
argued, tha t given the presence of distort ion, there is always a level 
of tariff (or t rade subsidy) which is superior to free t r ade , though 
not superior to the suitable subsidy on production. Fur thermore , Kemp 
and Negishi argued tha t a third proposition, tha t no production subsidy 
can yield g rea te r welfare than non intervention when the nation has 
monopoly power, was incorrec t as well . 
Bhagwati and Ramaswami accepted these objections and further gene-
ralised the argument , together with T.N. Srinivasan, in their second 
paper . Our analysis is largely based on this second paper . In addition, 
we will demonst ra te the various implications of their analysis in graphs. 
The general izat ion of the optimal policy under distortion in ei ther 
commodity markets or factor markets , is as follows: 
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Notation 
C p X. -consumption and domestic output, respectively of commodi-
ty i, i = 1,2 
U (cp -welfare function 
LK -marginal utility of commodity i 
DRS -social indifference curve depicting the marginal domestic 
r a t e of substitution in consumption 
DRT -production possibility curve depicting the marginal domestic 
r a t e of ^transformation in production 
FRT -international relat ive pr ice or the foreign r a t e of t ransforma-
tion depicting the marginal r a t e a t which a commodity (factor) 
can be transformed into another through t r ace . 
P c -equals DRS, rat io of the price of the first to that of the second 
commodity 
d X 2 
P t -equals DRT = -
Pj -equals FRT, only if no national monopoly power exists; rat io 
of the world price of the first to that of the second commo-
dity, tha t is, the average te rms of t r ade . 
The change in welfare due to a small deviation from a free t rade 
equilibrium is: 
U l 
dU = Uj dC{ + U 2 d C 2 = U 2 ( j j 1 dC{ + d C 2 ) . 
U l 
JJ~ = p c , is the marginal condition for util i ty maximization. Hence, 
dU = U 2 ( p c dCj + d C 2 ) = U 2 (p f dCj + d C 2 + (p c ~ p f ) dCj) 
= U 2 (d (pjCj + C 2 ) - Cldpi + (p c - p f ) dCj) . 
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Assuming equilibrium in t rade , PjC^ + C 2 = p^X^ + X 2 , then 
dU = IL, (d (p f Xj + X ^ - Cjdpj + <pc - p f ) dCj) 
= U 2 (pjdXj + d X 2 + (Xj - C L ) d P f + ( p c - p f ) dCj) 
dX_ 
= U 2 (dX 1 (P f + ) + (Xj - Cj) d p f + ( p c - p f ) dCj) 
= U 2 (dXL (p f - p t ) + (Xj - C j ) d p f + ( p c - p f ) dep. (1) 
We can distinguish four possible deviations from the optimum, i .e. 
DRS = DRT = FRT, viz: 
(i) DRS = FRT ^ DRT 
(ii) DRS = DRT £ FRT 
(iii) DRS h DRT = FRT 
(iv) DRT h DRS £ FRT 
The si tuation, where DRS = DRT = FRT, is an optimal equilibrium, 
because here the social indifference curve is tangent ia l to the relat ive 
pr ice line and tangential to the production possibility curve; in other 
words, the marginal r a t e of substi tution in consumption equals the 
re la t ive prices which are equal to the opportunity costs of production. 
Figure 1 depicts this optimum ^ \ 
0 INDUSTRY 0 INDUSTRY 
Figure 1 A) Optimum without Trade B) Optimum under Trade 
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The quanti ty of non-agricultural goods in figure 1 is measured along 
the horizontal axis and the quantity of agricultural goods along the 
vert ical axis. 
For all four deviations from the optimum, the derivative of the welfare 
(8) 
function is analysed. If this derivative with respect to a subsidy is non-
zero, then by continuity it is also nonzero for some finite interval 
for values of subsidies, which implies that welfare, U ( C j , C^}, can be 
raised by applying this subsidy. 
(i) DRS = FRT DRT 
This domestic distortion implies, tha t the opportunity costs of produc-
tion do not equal relat ive prices. In other words: the pr ivate cost 
of production is higher or lower than the social cost of production 
(market prices ^ shadow prices). Two a l ternat ive cases can be distin-
guished here, viz: a production external i ty (a) and a factor differen-
tial (b). 
(a) Production Externality 
Distortions in commodity markets with respect to agriculture are 
relevant to our problem. They comprise inter alia: 
-monopoly in farm inputs and farm outputs 
-monopsony power in farm outputs (a comparatively small number 
of middle men purchasing farm outputs find themselves often in an 
advantageous position vis-a-vis farmers) 
-external i t ies , e.g. concerning the environment (economies like mainte-
nance of the environmental equilibrium, and diseconomies like pollu-
tion, erosion and land clearing). 
Since DRS = FRT 4 DRT, we have p = p , dp = 0 (it is assumed that 
T C f f 
the country has no monopoly power) and p^f- pt-
Equation (1) reduces to dU = U^{dX^ (p^- p .^)) (2) 
If ( p f - p t ) 0, then dU can be raised by a policy that causes an increase 
in the production of Xj , ei ther by subsidizing the production of Xj, or by 
taxing the production of X„. 
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Xjhas to be decreased (in the geometr ic il lustration of figure 2 (a): 
a movement from Eq (Aut) to Eq (Aut)' along the curve of DRT), 
muta t i s mutandis, if ( p ^ - p t ) < 0 . Hence, a production tax-cum-subsidy 
policy is the optimum (as compared to laissez-faire) solution here . 
A factor tax-cum subsidy might change the volume of X j as well. 
However, since a factor tax-cum-subsidy will cause a change in the 
production of X j less direct ly, it is considered a second-best policy. 
(9) 
Finally a tariff v 'may also cause a change in the production of X p but 
since i t is uncertain whether this policy measure increases or decrea-
ses welfare it is regarded as a third-best solution. (In figure 2 
(b) and (c): a movement from Eq (Aut) with the possibility of t r ade 
in Eq* (Trade), , to Eq(Aut) ) ' , without the possibility of t r ade , along 
the curve of DRT). 
The situations of the optimum policy, a tariff (t) increasing welfare 
and a tariff (t) decreasing welfare, a r e depicted in figures 2(a), 2(b) 
and 2(c) r e s p e c t i v e l y . ^ ^ 
Figure 2 DRS = FRT h DRT Optimum Policy: Production Tax-Cum 
Subsidy (a), A Tariff Increases Welfare (b) and A Tariff 
Decreases Welfare (c) 
(b) Fac tor Differential 
This type of domestic distortion also appears to be re levant to our 
study of agricultural subsidies, in par t icular with respect to develo-
(12) 
ping countr ies . Hayami and Rut tan found tha t difference in physical 
inputs and human capi ta l a re the major sources of productivity gaps 
between countr ies . Differences between factor endowments a re some-
t imes caused by distortions in factor marke ts . Examples of this a re : 
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-factor price differentials (agriculture versus non-agriculture) 
-downward rigidity of wages 
-immobility of factors (viz: land and labour). 
The optimum policy (to laissez-faire) in dealing with distortions in 
factor markets is a factor tax-cum-subsidy in the opposite direction 
of the distortion, e.g.: an agricultural labour subsidy or an industrial 
labour tax (or, in prac t ice , policies probably easier to implement 
with similar contra-distort ion effects) . 
Here too, we have dU = U 2 (dX^ (p f - p t ) ) . The situation is virtually 
analogous to the one in (a). Thus we can follow, mutat is mutandis, 
the same argument. A tax-cum-subsidy on the use of the factor of 
production is the optimum policy, a tax-cum-subsidy on the production 
of X j the second-best policy, and again, a tariff because of its less 
direct and even to some extent , uncertain effect , the third-best policy 
to laissez-faire. 
Figure 3 shows that a production tax-cum-subsidy takes the country 
to i ts 'distorted ' production possibility curve DRT only, and that 
a factor tax-cum-subsidy, may push a country further up to its 'un-
distorted ' production possibility curve DRT' . 
X 2 
Figure 3 DRS = FRT h DRT Optimum Policy: Factor Tax-Cum-Sub-
sidy 
(ii) DRS = DRT h FRT 
This domestic distortion implies tha t neither the opportunity costs 
of production nor the marginal r a t e of substitution in consumption 
equal the relat ive pr ices . 
Since DRS = DRT 4 FRT, we have p c = p t = pf and dp f 4 0 (monopoly 
power). Equation (1) reduces to dU = U ^ * ! - C 0 d p f ' ^ 
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Hence a change of the re la t ive prices by means of a tariff (t) appears 
to be the optimum policy to neutral ise the pr ice distort ion. 
That the second-best and third-best policies cannot be determined 
in this si tuation may also be seen from the il lustration in figure 4 . 
FRTCI+O 
Figure ft DRS = DRT k FRT Optimum Policy: Tariff (t) 
(iii) DRS £ DRT = FRT 
A relevant example of this distortion is e.g. a bias in consumer p re -
ferences against agricultural commodities (suppose, consumers prefer 
coca-cola to milk, which does not result in a re la t ive pr ice change 
because of the re la t ive insignificance of their demand; heal th consi-
derat ions may incline the government to a policy of indirect taxes 
on coca-cola and a consumption subsidy on milk). 
Since DRS ^ DRT = FRT, we have dp^= 0 (no monopoly), p^= p t and 
PCJ£ p f . Equation ( 1 ) reduces to dU = U 2 ((p c ~ p f ) dC^) (4 ) 
Hence the optimum policy will shift (rotate) the consumers indiffe-
rence curve by means of a consumption tax-cum-subsidy. 
A tariff may also raise the country 's welfare and an induced shift 
in production from Xj to X 2 or from X 2 to Xj by a production tax-
cum-subsidy, may through its income effect , enta i l an improvement 
in welfare as well. 
4 0 
Figure 5 DRS h DRT = FRT Optimum Policy: Consumption Tax-
Cum-Subsidy 
(iv) DRT £ DRS £ FRT 
Excluding the case where DRT = FRT and assuming monopoly power 
we have p f ± p t , d p f 4 0 and p c = p f . Equation (1) reduces to 
dU = U 2 (dXj ( P f - p t ) + (Xj - Cj ) dp f ) (5) 
Hence the optimum solution is a simultaneous policy of a tariff (export 
subsidy) and a production tax-cum-subsidy in the case of a production 
external i ty or a factor tax-cum-subsidy in case of a factor differen-
t ia l . It will be clear that second or third best policies cannot be de ter -
mined in this si tuation. 
Figure 6 DRT 4 DRS t= FRT Optimum Policy: Simultaneous Tariff 
and Production /Factor Tax-Cum-Subsidy 
In figure 6 we see tha t , a tariff (t) causes a rotation of FRT in Eq( Aut ) 
making FRT (1+t) = DRS. Subsequently, a production/factor tax-cum-
subsidy entails a movement along DRT from Eq (Aut ) to Eq ( Aut) ' , thus 
decreasing the production of Xj and increasing that of X 2- In this new 
equilibrium, Eq (Aut ) ' , DRT = DRS = FRT (1+t). 
Trade can increase welfare more by pushing DRS' further from 0 
to DRS" in Eq( Trade ). 
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It must be noted that these theore t ica l results a re contingent upon 
the exis tence of a single equilibrium point . They may not apply to 
abnormal cases , e.g. fixed product pr ices , where multiple equilibria 
e x i s t . ( 1 3 ) 
Another important theore t ica l consideration is that resources cannot 
be t ransferred freely, which implies tha t a tax-cum-subsidy has to 
be studied in a dynamic contextP*^ 
Agricultural Price Instability 
The fixity of many farm inputs, notably of land and family labour, 
makes it difficult for a farmer to respond adequately to movements 
in farm prices (either input or output prices). This together with 
the well-known inelast ici ty of demand for most farm produce, like 
s taples , may lead to wide farm output pr ice f luctuations. 
(15) 
These pr ice fluctuations make farming a hazardous business. Even 
if a farmer could free himself from the above indicated inelast ici ty 
of supply (e.g. by means of an increased flexibility in util ization of 
farm inputs), he still would suffer from variations in weather condi-
tions, as well as from variations in other factors beyond his control 
(e.g. pes ts , diseases). These hazards a re always present in agricul ture 
and result in deviations from the equilibrium volume of farm output, 
and hence in pr ice instabil i ty. 
It must be noted tha t not all agricultural industries a r e subject to 
inelast ic supply and natural hazards . For example, pig farming, poul-
(16) 
try farming <and mushroom cultures sometimes form exceptions 
in this respect . On the other hand, (minor) pr ice variat ions may 
be an efficient instrument in at tuning supply to demand and vice 
versa. It can even be proven t ha t when the s t ruc ture of farm produc-
tion is not too rigid, profits a re higher under fluctuating prices than 
under s table prices (vide pp. 80-81). 
The s t a t e of farm technology is important in this respect . A more 
advanced farm technology enables the farmer to adjust production 
4 2 
to price movements be t t e r . 
The underlying factors causing fluctuations in farming income are 
i l lustrated in figure 7. 
If one observes carefully the simplified relationship between farm 
production, farm income and agricultural subsidies, as depicted in 
figure 7, one is given cause to wonder if agricultural price stabili-
zation policies are directed more towards symptoms than to the basic 
(17) 
causes of price and income instability. Firstly, farm income fluc-
tuations can be caused by five (not entirely independent) variables 
(vide fig. 7). 
Of these five variables only two (viz. input and output prices) a re 
directly influenced by subsidies. The variations in volumes of output 
(18) 
and input can easily affect the objectives of such price policies. 
Secondly, subsidies directed towards farm incomes do not guarantee 
tha t farmers will in fact invest more in farming. Farm investment 
is more likely to be a function of the profitability of farming than 
a function of (perhaps only temporary) income subsidies. 
market 
for 
farm 
outputs 
e.g. 
wheather 
diseases 
e.g. 
soil 
slope 
irrigation 
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for 
farm 
inputs 
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technology 
output input 
income prices yield acreage prices.. inputs 
con -
sumption 
V 
farm 
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1 - Farm output subsidy 
2 - Farm input subsidy 
3 - Farm income subsidy 
non 4arm 
investment 
Figure 7 Limitations of Agricultural Price Stabilization Policies 
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The principal problem in designing an appropriate pr ice policy is how 
to prevent large pr ice fluctuations without a t the same t ime undercut-
(19) 
ting the instrumental function of pr ice as a marke t signal. 
Large price fluctuations of basic foodstuffs have a de t r imenta l impact 
on the economy. 
The worst si tuation is when rising prices ref lect a serious shortage 
of basic food i t ems . In these c i rcumstances the whole economic and 
social s t ruc tu re is a t bay. 
Even when rising food pr ices a re less menacing, the impact on the 
economy can still be devastat ing since rising food prices bring about 
an upward pressure on wages in all industries and declining demand 
for all non-food commodit ies , regardless of the impact on income 
distribution. 
In other words: rising food prices may lead to smaller revenues a t 
higher costs . 
A proximate effect , inter alia, is an increasing unemployment r a t e . 
The general problem of pr ice instabili ty can manifest itself in the 
short t e rm and in the long t e r m / 2 0 ^ Short t e rm pr ice instabili ty, or 
seasonal price fluctuations, may lead to sub-optimal s torage plans 
and imperfect distribution pa t t e rns , which can also entai l wide spread 
adverse effects in the economy (particularly via changes in real income 
(21) 
and nutri t ional standards). 
A long run misallocation of resources (loans, fixed investments) can 
entai l production cycles . These production cycles mostly apply to 
perennial (export) crops because of the substantial t ime-lag between 
price-induced farm investment and ac tua l supply response. 
A declining trend in prices could lead to an e r r a t i c reallocation 
of resources in the agricultural sector , thus threatening future foreign 
exchange earnings. 
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In a stagnant agricultural sector based on traditional farm technolo-
gies (i.e. an extremely rigid production structure) prices will both 
f luctuate on a larger scale and more frequently than in the case 
of a more advanced technology. 
Many tradit ional low-income farm-households a re net consumers of 
foodstuffs. They often lack sufficient carryover stocks to compensate 
for years of heavy losses. 
Therefore, in these circumstances farm output prices which are too 
low may even worsen the situation by a migration to urban areas . 
Policies to reduce these wide and frequent price fluctuations in low-
(22) 
income countries must improve the s t a t e of technology. This will 
enhance production flexibility. Fur thermore a shift of production 
functions c rea tes carryover stocks for years in which there a re bad 
harvests . 
One problem is tha t this type of policy requires large investment 
(23) 
and long gestat ion periods (vide p.26). 
Meanwhile, acu te problems of high food prices or e r ra t ic re-allocation 
of resources in the agricultural sector have to be solved by short-
te rm subsidy programs like deficiency payments , buffer stocks or 
food aid. 
2.3 The Infant Industry Argument 
The infant industry argument , probably the oldest existing argument 
for protect ion, was forwarded in the 1840's by the German economist 
(24) 
and politician Friedrich List. The core of the argument implies 
that an industry cannot compete if it is too small. It has to be pro-
tec ted initially against competi t ion from abroad. This protect ion 
enables the. industry to develop economies of scale in production. 
Import restr ict ions can be removed when the infant industry has 
become fully developed. Since List, the argument has been accepted 
for a long period of t ime by many international t rade theorists . 
This general acceptance came under substantial pressure when J .E. 
Meade and M.C. Kemp published their new views on this economic 
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argument . Kemp part icularly disputed the Mill-Bastable dogma 
which implies tha t the protect ion of an industry is beneficial to society 
if it has passed Mill's and Bastable 's t e s t s . 
The tes t derived from Mill s t a t e s tha t infant industries must eventually 
be able to compete a t world market pr ices . Bastable 's t es t demands 
in addition tha t the future gains from the infant industry must compen-
sa te for the losses due to protect ion during the infant industry period. 
Kemp argued tha t there is no need for protect ion on the basis of 
these t e s t s alone since the costs in the learning (infant) period are 
more than offset by the profits the industry enjoys la te r . Kemp also 
found tha t a third condition should be fulfilled, i .e. the exis tence 
of external economies (the capi ta l marke t does not function properly, 
or investors a re not properly informed about the prospects of invest-
ments) . 
(26) 
T. Negishi convincingly disputes Kemp's and Meade's arguments . 
In his analysis, on which this section draws heavily, Negishi applies 
(27) 
the theory developed by Debreu. F i r s t ly , Negishi argues tha t t h e 
analysis of Kemp does not t ake account of changes in consumer sur-
plus resulting from the pro tec ted infant industry. Kemp's analysis 
loses i ts significance from the point of view of social costs and bene-
fits (i.e. welfare economics). Secondly, Negishi claims tha t protect ion 
can be beneficial even if no external effects exist . This second propo-
sition is based on the exis tence of dynamic internal economies, specifi-
cally in the indivisibility of factors of production which is inherent 
in the learning process of the infant industry. 
The core of Negishi's a rgument , viz. t he welfare gains from the dyna-
mic internal economics, can best be understood by giving a brief 
example . 
Suppose, a country wishes to become self-sufficient in the provision 
of vegetables , because the expensive imports of these perishable 
commodit ies (cooled transport) impose a constant drain on foreign 
exchange earnings. Suboptimal ecological conditions, however, hamper 
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an extension of tradit ional vegetable production. 
Against this background the country decides to s ta r t a hydroponic 
farm project . This type of farming, under plast ic cover, could enable 
farmers to control pes ts , diseases, soil erosion and cl imatic conditions. 
It would, however, be impossible for this farm to compete with fo-
reign suppliers a t current market prices unaided. Also, other vegetable 
farmers would only adopt hydroponic farming if the pilot-farm was 
proven to be financially viable. 
Therefore, the country chooses to impose (temporary) t rade barriers 
on a number of vegetables. 
The costs of this policy consist in the main of: a direct loss in con-
sumers ' surplus (increased prices of vegetables); inflationary pressures 
from these higher prices; possible t rade retal ia t ion; and the direct 
public costs of s tar t ing the project . 
This is the price the country pays for the experience gained in the 
pilot project . 
The learning process of the project contains the following elements : 
infrastructural facil i t ies, building of the covered farm, equipment, 
nursery, replanting, pest and disease control , monitoring the feed 
system, harvesting, grading, packing and market ing. 
The internal dynamic economics apply to the present and future dif-
fusive impact on welfare stemming from this learning process. Once 
the operation is brought under control , trained staff can be used 
to build, organise and monitor other hydroponic farms. 
All future hydroponic farms may benefit from this single experiment . 
The costs of the experience gained in the pilot project have to be 
put against the future welfare gains from the hydroponic vegetable 
farming sector . 
One final point is worth noting. In order to obtain maximum impetus 
and an optimal cost /benefi t ra t io , a country has to s t a r t on a small 
scale . 
In a single pilot project infant diseases can be overcome a t minimum 
cost . 
When several pilot projects a re s tar ted simultaneously however, 
infant diseases costs a re merely multiplied by the number of projects . 
Wl 
The formal proof of Negishi's propositions, albeit largely based on 
(non-empirical) equilibrium theory, is on our opinion too important 
to be omit ted in this sect ion. First we will introduce the notat ion. 
Subsequently, we will highlight the necessary and sufficient conditions 
(28) 
for his justification of the infant industry a rgument : 
Notation 
- - (29) 
(x, x ^ - consumption vector without infant industry 
(x, x*) - consumption vector with infant industry 
(y» "• input and output vector of other industries without 
infant industry 
(y, y*) - input and output vector of other industries with infant 
industry 
(p, p ^ - pr ice system without infant industry 
(p, p*) - pr ice system with infant industry 
(q, q ^ - vector of input and output of the infant industry prior 
to i ts development 
(q, q*) - vector of input and output of the infant industry under 
protect ion 
U - set of commodity vectors preferred or indifferent to 
(x, x*) 
Y - technologically possible set of (y, y*) 
Z - (U-Y); set of initial resources which makes consumption 
preferred or indifferent to (x, x*) possible if t he p ro-
duction is carr ied out properly 
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(c, c*) - vector of initial resources; p'c + p*'c*.$p'z + p * ' z* for 
any (z, z* ) eZ 
Q - technologically possible set of (q, q*) 
Necessary conditions for the protect ion of the infant industry 
Suppose tha t because of the infant industry the resources available 
to consumers and other industries change from c and c* respectively 
to z = c + q and z* = c* + q*. Such a change is desirable to the so-
ciety if (z, z*) tZ (Z is convex) and even preferable if (z, z*) belong 
to the inner points of Z. 
If we assume unchanged prices and if (z, z*) e Z, then 
p'z + p*'z* >, p'c + p*'c*, and thus p'q + p* ' q*£0 . 
Hence, if the growth of an infant industry is desirable, the industry 
must be profitable in the long run, thus max (p'q + p*'q*) > 0, subject 
to given prices (p, p*) and the technological restr ict ions q e Q, 
q*e Q*(qj). The condition B 'q + ~p*'q* > 0 implies tha t p*'q*>0, which 
in turn implies tha t q p q j . If the infant industry is to develop, i.e. 
if (c + q, c* + q*) e Z then there is a cer ta in minimum scale of pro-
duction in the period of i ts infancy. 
This implies, as Negishi argues, the necessity of the existence of 
some indivisible factor of production for the growth of the infant 
industry. The arguments below are based on the possibility of dimini-
shing costs due to the existence of such a factor . 
The infant industry has passed Mill's t es t if p * ' q * £ 0 . If also p'q > 0 
then the industry could have grown without protect ion since it is 
profi table as a pr ivate undertaking (this is the case emphasised by 
Kemp and Meade, with Bastable 's tes t being interpreted as p'q + 
p*'q* > 0). According to Negishi, typical cases of the infant industry 
a re such tha t p'q < 0 and p*'q* >, 0, the long run profit p'q + p*'q* 
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being ei ther positive (no need for protect ion) or negat ive . 
In the l a t t e r case and if the development of the industry is desirable 
to the society (i.e. (c, c*)iz), it will be clear tha t the industry cannot 
grow without p r o t e c t i o n / 3 ^ 
Sufficient conditions for the protect ion of the infant industry 
Since the set of vectors indifferent to or preferred to (x, x*) is deno-
ted by U, a sufficient condition for (x, x*)( U is p 'x + p* 'x*>p 'x +p*'x*. 
Using the equalit ies of supply and demand, this can be rewri t ten 
as p 1 (y + c) + p*'(y* + c*)< p ' (q + y + c) + p*'(q* + y* + c*). There-
fore the sufficient condition for protect ion is p'(y - y) + p*'(y* - y *) > 
-p'q - p*'q*. In other words, the infant industry should be promoted 
by protect ion if i ts loss during the infancy is less than p'(y - y) + 
p*'(y* _ y*). Negishi suggests that this tes t can be applied to indus-
t r ies located in the same country as the infant industry in question. 
The same type of argument can be put forward if the infant industry 
has monopoly power. Even then it might be possible tha t protect ion 
is theoret ical ly desirable. 
So much for equilibrium theory. Our main difficulty with Negishi's 
sufficient condition is tha t it requires full knowledge not only of 
the future prices of the commodities produced by the infant industry, 
but also of the prices of other industries. For p'(y -y) + p*'(y* -y*) 
has to be es t imated . Import restr ic t ions to foster agricultural produc-
tion in i ts infancy, by means of import substi tution, not only change 
the prices of the infant industry but change all pr ices . The new set 
of prices (p, p*) will not simply be the old prices plus tariffs . 
Substitution possibilities differ between goods and factors of produc-
(31) 
tion both on the demand and supply side. 
A final complication is, tha t t rade restr ic t ions which bring about 
a reduction in the demand for imports will have the effect of depres-
sing the equilibrium exchange r a t e (i.e.: the over-valuation of the 
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domestic currency). 
That the infant industry argument may apply in principle to the agricul-
tural sector in many developing countries may be admitted (potential 
economies of scale, existence of dynamic internal economies and 
substantial initial costs of technological development). Also, in cases 
where excess agricultural supply is dumped on the world market by 
affluent countries, developing countries are left with no other alter-
native than a policy of import restrictions. 
In the first section of this chapter we stated that, given the existence 
of a distortion, there always exists a nonzero second best tariff 
which yields an equilibrium superior to that of free trade. 
However, stringent conditions are, inter alia, that those who gain 
from the trade restrictions compensate the losers (I). Furthermore, 
the resources in the economy have to be reallocated smoothly to 
the new equilibrium. The latter condition demands a high degree 
of flexibility in economies. This is probably not the case in many 
developing countries. The (inflationary) costs that trade restrictions 
can impose in these countries, may very well offset the benefits 
of protection for the infant industry. 
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NOTES 
1. In order to be consistent with our definition given in chapter 1, 
the following is necessary. Agricultural subsidies as discussed in 
subsequent sections of this study do not apply in principle to negative 
agricultural subsidies, i.e. policy measures entailing a negative in-
cidence on farm output prices or a positive incidence on farm input 
prices (either direct (e.g. agricultural taxation) or indirect (e.g. 
resulting from industrial policies)). 
2. For a more extensive discussion on the self-reliance vide e.g. Galtung, 
J., 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', Journal of Peace Research, 
Nov. 1971. 
3. International distortions, like some features of multi-nationals, acid 
rain, and polluted international rivers, sometimes may also give 
scope for subsidies (notably tariffs). 
4. Bhagwati, J . e t al. , 'Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory 
of Optimum Subsidy: Some Further Results ' , Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 77, No. 6, 1969, pp. 1005-1010. 
5. Bhagwati, J . and Ramaswami, V.K., 'Domestic Distortions, Tariffs 
and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy', Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 71, No. 1, 1963. 
6. Kemp, M.C. and Negishi, T., 'Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the 
Theory of Optimum Subsidy' (Comment), The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 77, No. 6, 1969, pp. 1011-1012. 
7. As for the shape of the transformation curve vide Johnson, H.G., 
'Factor Market Distortions and the Shape of the Transformation 
Curve' , Econometrica, Vol. 34, 1969, pp. 686-698. 
8. For convenience sake, albeit not entirely consistent with our defi-
nitions, subsidies are meant to be positive subsidies and taxes negative 
subsidies. 
9. A tariff here can be either positive or negative; the notion is not 
consistent since we defined a tariff also as a subsidy, but it will 
be perfectly clear what we mean. 
10. Depending on the shape of the production functions and the welfare 
function. 
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11. It will be clear that the choice, of both the slope (and position) 
of FRT and the shapes of DRT and DRS, contains a substantial ele-
ment of arbitrariness. We emphasize therefore, that these geometric 
examples are merely illustrations. 
12. Hayami, Y. and Ruttan, V.W., 'Agricultural Development. An Inter-
national Perspective', The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1971. 
13. Bhagwati, J., et al., op. cit. p. 1006, implication of foot note 2; 
and Foster, E., and Sonnenschein, H., 'Price Distortions and Econo-
mic Welfare', Econometrica, Vol. 38, 1970, pp. 281-297. 
14. Lapan, H.E., 'International Trade, Factor Market Distortions, and 
the Optimal Dynamic Subsidy', American Economic Review, Vol. 
66, No. 3, 1976, pp. 335-346. 
AQ QUANTITY AQ QUANTITY 
Excess supply (AQ) under Excess supply (AQ) under 
elastic demand and supply Inelastic demand and supply 
16. Provided they are not trapped in cobweb-type price cycles. 
17. Vide also e.g. R. Fox, 'Brazil's Minimum Price Policy and the Agri-
cultural sector of Northeast Brazil', Research Report 9, Internatio-
nal Food Policy Research Institute, June 1979. 
18. In section 3.3.2.2 we will discuss an empirical instrument for deter-
mining if farm income fluctuations are due more to market failures 
than to fluctuations in production. 
19. A price policy always contains the danger of transmitting inappro-
priate price signals to farmers. Vide OECD, 'Positive Adjustment 
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Policies ' , Par is , 1983, pp. 67-72. 
20. Fox, R., op. c i t . , p . 43; Tomek, W.G., 'Stability for Primary Products : 
Means to What Ends' , Occasional Paper 28, Cornell University, 1969. 
21 . Berg, A., 'The Nutrition Fac to r ' , The Brookings Institution, Washing-
ton D.C., 1973. 
22. Here again the problem is a vicious circle: pr ice fluctuations increa-
se risk aversion, but risk-taking behaviour is needed (investment 
in new farm technologies) to reduce price f luctuations. 
23. Since the polit ical horizon of many governments does not reach 
over a long period of: t ime , most polit icians a re tempted to neglect 
these long-term programs and prefer to s t ick to the shorter run 
policies. 
Vide also R. Barker and Y. Hayami, 'Pr ice Support versus Input 
Subsidy for Food Self-sufficiency in Developing Countr ies ' , American 
Journal of Agri. E c , Vol* 58, No. 4, Nov. 1976, p . 617. 
24. List, F . , 'Das National System der 'Poli t ische Oekonomie' , Jena, 
1928. 
25. Kemp, M.C., 'The Mill-Bastable Infant Industry Dogma' , Journal 
of Poli t ical Economy^.Vol,.; 63, 1960, pp. 65-67. 
Kemp, M.C., 'The Pure_ Theory of International Trade ' , Prent ice 
Hall, 1964. 
Meade, J .E. , 'Trade anci Welfare ' , Oxford University Press , 1955. 
26. Negishi, T., 'Protect ion of the Infant Industry and Dynamic Internal 
Economy', Economic Record, Vol. 34, 1968, pp. 56-67. 
27. Debreu, G., 'The Coefficient of Resource Uti l izat ion ' , Econometr ica, 
Vol. 19, 1961, pp. 273-292. 
28. Vide also Negishi, T., 'General Equilibrium Theory and International 
Trade ' , North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1972. 
29. The vectors without (*) apply to the present , and the vectors with 
(*) apply to the future. 
30. Note tha t this holds independently of external i t ies . 
31 . For a general discussion on the differences between nominal and 
effect ive ra tes of protec t ion , vide: Corden, W.M., 'The St ructure 
of a Tariff System and the Effective Pro tec t ive R a t e ' , Journal of 
Poli t ical Economy, Vol. 74, June 1966. 
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This depression of the equilibrium exchange r a t e can be shown as 
follows: a country 's demand for foreign exchange (DD, D'D') is based 
on its demand for imports . The U.S.A.'s supply of dollars (SS) is 
based on the exchange r a t e : the higher the price of dollars, the 
cheaper the imports and the more dollars will be supplied. Import 
restr ict ions will cause a downward shift of DD to D 'D' . The result 
is the establishment of a new equilibrium a t P ' , with the depressed 
exchange r a t e and a smaller amount or foreign exchange 0 q 2 
supplied and demanded. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ESTIMATING THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURAL SUB-
SIDIES 
3.1 Partial versus General Equilibrium Analysis: Theoretical and Practi-
cal Implications 
In explaining the interact ion of demand and supply schedules Marshall 
largely applied par t ia l equilibrium analysis. Only isolated markets 
were analysed. It was assumed there was no inter-relat ionship with 
o ther marke ts . 
And, more impor tant , demand and supply schedules were fixed: 
'It is to be assumed tha t the general c i rcumstances of the 
marke t remain unchanged throughout this period (of analysis); 
t ha t the re is, for ins tance, no change in fashion or t a s t e , no 
new subst i tu te which might affect the demand, no new intention 
to disturb the s u p p l y . ' ^ 
Marshall 's major intention was to const ruct operat ional ins t ruments 
tha t could be utilized in empirical analysis. He believed tha t from 
a thorough understanding of individual marke t forces one could arr ive 
a t a comprehensive macro-economic t h e o r y . ^ 
Conversely, general equilibrium analysis applies to the study of the 
simultaneous operation of different marke t forces. In theory, this 
would render a far be t t e r approximation of real i ty . 
Macro-economic models have been used to evaluate the overall econo-
mic impact of policy measures . However, despite the d ramat ic improve-
ment in s ta t i s t ica l es t imat ion techniques, to da te ' to ta l impact ana-
lysis' has not been proved to be a very promising approach to subsidy 
appraisal . This phenomenon will be discussed below. On the other 
hand, we will point out how important it is to take account (as much 
as possible) of the general equilibrium implications of agricul tural 
subsidy programs. 
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A later sub-section is devoted to the gains and shortcomings of part ia l 
equilibrium analysis. 
3.1.1 General Equilibrium Implications of Agricultural Subsidies 
3.1.1.1 Limitations to the Use of Macro-Economic Models 
In 1979 the OECD-Council adopted a programme of work on positive 
adjustment policies. 
This program lead to a study in which a large number of OECD mem-
ber countries reported on their subsidy programs as well as on their 
methods of impact appraisal. 
With respect to the use of macro-economic models to evaluate the 
(4) 
overall impact of subsidies the following problems were noted. 
Firs t , the data requirements exceeded the data available. 
Secondly, most member countries found tha t these large models were 
useful only if the subsidies significantly affected aggregate levels 
of output or public expenditure. 
Lastly, these large models a re usually demand-driven. This means 
tha t supply is t rea ted as an endogenous variable, which makes the 
model unsuited to dealing with exogenous government incentives 
to supply (in prac t ice a charac ter i s t ic of most subsidies). 
This OECD study is of par t icular in teres t to us. It reveals how the 
developed countries , in te rms of administrat ion, public finance, macro-
economic analysis and data collection, a re in fact evaluating their 
subsidy programs. 
The limited validity of most applied macro-economic models seems 
to suggest implicitly tha t for the appraisal of subsidy programs in 
developing countries one should not aim a t applying comprehensive 
methodologies. 
Another interest ing macro-economic report , a trifle closer to our 
subject, concerns a sys temat ic analysis of da ta on agricultural subsidies 
in Lat in-America /"^ 
The major aim of this report was to indicate the usefulness of quanti-
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fying government expenditure policies. The expressed aim was (as 
in the OECD report) to improve budget da ta and budget classification. 
3.1.1.2 General Equilibrium Effects 
Although to ta l impact analysis may not always be feasible, mainly 
because of the da ta requirements , it is still important to consider 
general equilibrium implications. 
First ly, if one neglects the distorting impact on other economic agents 
or sectors one may overs ta te the social benefits of the subsidy. 
Secondly, ignoring the in tersectora l and distributional effects of the 
subsidies may lead to erroneous policy recommendations about the 
direct ion of changes in the subsidy programs. 
(i) Distort ions 
The government costs of an agricultural subsidy program consist 
of the ac tua l expenditure (or reduced revenues) and the costs of 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . ^ 
These two cost i tems a re not net welfare costs to society. In fact , 
the ac tua l expenditure is a social opportunity cost of public funds 
not being spent elsewhere in the economy. Accordingly, t he costs 
of administrat ion a re social opportunity costs as well. 
Civil servants and equipment may be removed from one budget i tem 
to another . 
Before discussing the distort ions, two important side effects for which 
ac tua l expenditure has to be adjusted have to be m e n t i o n e d . ^ 
Firs t , ac tua l expenditure may be overs ta ted because of increased 
tax revenues due to increased wages and profits in the subsidized 
sector (minus the decreases in tax revenues from non-subsidized ac t i -
vit ies). 
Secondly, they may be unders ta ted when the subsidy reduces general 
revenues (e.g. a subsidy based on the infant industry argument in 
the pr imary s tages of resource allocation). 
Economic l i t e ra tu re on subsidies identifies two major sources of dis-
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tort ions tha t have to be added to the adjusted government costs . 
Firs t , the 'excess burden' of a subsidy. This concept refers to the 
transfers of funds to economic agents without increasing their produc-
( 9 ) 
t ivi ty. These economic agents merely take advantage of the subsidy. 
A suboptimal behaviour tha t often leads to welfare losses (in every 
subsidy there is an element of windfall gain which is enjoyed by those 
who, even in the absence of the subsidy, would have undertaken the 
desired activity a n y w a y ) / ^ 
Secondly, the distorting impact from subsidies on resource allocation. 
Welfare in non-subsidized economic act ivi t ies may decrease because 
of inflationary pressures due to subsidies elsewhere. 
For instance: a reduction of non-subsidized productivity, an increased 
idleness of resources, and capital and labour shortages in non-subsi-
dized sectors . 
(ii) The Intersectoral and Distributional Impact from Agricultural 
Subsidies 
Subsidization, in our view, is an a t t emp t to assist the allocating power 
of the price mechanism. Therefore, it seems logical that prior to 
a decision on public assistance one must examine the impact of chan-
ges in relat ive prices on income distribution and sector performance. 
With respect to the examination of interact ing pr ice effects resulting 
from agricultural subsidies four market sides a re of part icular in teres t 
to us. 
First , the supply-side of farmers producing food and non-food commo-
dit ies. 
Second, the demand-side of consumers (including farmers) of food 
commodit ies . 
Third, the supply-side of farm inputs i.e.: factors of production, i.e. 
labour, land and other capi ta l ; and inputs like seed, ferti l izer and 
equipment. 
Fourth, the industrial demand-side of farm output (i.e. the food and 
non-food processing industry; t rade and t ransport) . 
First we discuss the major side effects of direct agricultural subsidies, 
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star t ing from the farm supply-side. 
Then, we will highlight some specific effects from indirect agricul-
tural subsidies, notably consumer subsidies. 
In order to clarify the discussion the four marke t sides and the major 
interact ing effects have been represented in figure 8. 
In the following t ex t we will refer to the numbered lines tha t represent 
the ef fects . 
demand foreign 
substitutes 
10 
non -agricultural 
expenditure 
10 
non -agricultural 
import 
9 
consumers 
6 
real income 
growth rate 
wages 
13 
agricultural 
export 
agricultural 
employment 
non-agricultural sector 
demand foreign 
farm inputs 
demand domestic 
farm inputs 
12 
Figure 8 General Equilibrium Effects from Agricultural Subsidies 
Optimal direct agricul tural subsidy programs a re subject to a number 
of a priori considerations concerning farm production. The distribu-
tion of farm capi tal (i.e. the distribution in farm sizes) is important 
to the magnitude and direction of output response to incentive pro-
grams. 
Large farms generally produce a larger marketable surplus and pur-
chase a larger amount of farm inputs. For this reason, d i rec t agricul-
tural subsidies tend to be skewed towards large farms. 
The next factor concerning the initial response conditions, re la tes 
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to the s t a t e of technology. We s ta ted earl ier tha t in- a s t a t e of advan-
ced farm technology subsidies may entail a shift in production. A 
continuing process of economies of scale brings about higher produc-
tion levels even if prices la ter decline because of the increasing aggre-
ga te supply/demand ra t io . 
Conversely, the production response in a s t a t e of traditional farm 
technology will be much more inelast ic. 
A final important aspect regarding production change, is the reduced 
production of non-subsidized output or the decreased utilization of 
non-subsidized farm input. 
A large shift, for instance, from foreign exchange crops to domes-
t i c food crops may not be desirable in the long run. An unbalanced 
subsidization of farm inputs may entai l diseconomies or external i t ies 
(vide the empirical analysis in Pa r t Two). 
With regard to the objective of balanced subsidization of farm inputs 
the following illustration may be helpful. Imagine tha t farm production 
is represented by the contents of a cask constructed with clap-boards. 
The maximum volume of water the cask can contain is determined 
by the lowest clap-board. 
Suppose now, tha t these clap-boards represent farm input constraints 
such as : 
rotat ion scheme (mainly because of soil fert i l i ty and diseases, most 
crops can not be grown continuously on one and the same plot); soil 
fert i l i ty (not every type of soil is suitable to the subsidized crop); 
farm budget (the need for additional credit may impose a serious 
barrier to an optimal subsidy response); t ransport facilit ies; s torage 
facil i t ies; water ; fert i l izer; and chemicals . 
The idea is c lear . If an agricultural subsidy program only enhances 
a number of clap-boards but leaves one or two a t the original size, 
the contents of the cask will remain unchanged. 
An important implication is, tha t s ta t is t ical information on farm 
production is indispensable to an effect ive direct agricultural subsidy 
program. 
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A subsidy induced increase in farm production has the following in ter -
sec tora l e f fec ts . 
It may increase agricultural exports which in turn enhance foreign 
exchange earnings (1). 
It may increase the amount of imported farm inputs which decreases 
foreign exchange savings (2). 
It may increase domest ic demand for farm inputs produced in the 
non-agricultural sector (3). 
It may increase the supply of food and non-food commodities to the 
non-agricultural sector (4). 
These las t two direct effects on the non-agricultural sector may, 
of course, cause further multiplying effec ts in the economy, notably 
with respect to employment , income and capi tal formation. 
Two secondary effects a r e of par t icular in te res t : the effect on con-
sumers and the ef fec ts on employment . 
Lower food prices caused by a farm output increase result in higher 
real incomes for consumers (5) and (6). This may lead to increased 
demand for (other food and non-food) agricultural commodit ies (7); 
to a decreased demand for imported (food and non-food) agricultural 
commodit ies (8); to increased demand for imported non-agricultural 
commodit ies (9); and to increased demand for domest ic non-agricul-
tural commodit ies (10). 
The re la t ive magnitude of these income effects a re dependent on 
the income-elast ic i t ies of the various income ca tegor ies . Moreover, 
i t must be realised tha t the demand schedules in the various income 
groups will not remain unchanged. 
The employment effect is basically direct and indirect . The direct 
effect is threefold. 
Firs t , the increased farm production may require more labour (11). 
This, of course, depends largely on the labour-intensity of the subsi-
dized farm output . In fact the effect may even be negat ive if the 
farm capi ta l / labour ra t io increases because of extended farm mechani-
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zat ion. 
Secondly, increased util ization of farm inputs may cause an increase 
in employment in farm input sectors (12). 
Thirdly, employment may increase in all s tages relating to agricultu-
ral commodities if more resources a re devoted to marketing and 
processing of food and non-food commodities (4). 
The indirect effect re la tes to the fact tha t most food commodities 
a re a principal wage good. Lower food prices therefore bring about 
a downward pressure on nominal wages which in turn may boost employ-
ment in the non-agricultural sector as well as in the agricultural 
sector (13) and (14). 
Agricultural pr ice policies may also s ta r t a t the consumer end. The 
problem of determining the differential income effect of relat ive 
pr ice changes on consumers of different income classes and the diffe-
rential pr ice effect on the production and income of farmers , is basical-
ly the same, i rrespect ive of whether the price change is init iated 
a t the supply side or a t the demand side. 
(12) 
Mellor has studied this problem in considerable depth. The under-
lying result is of part icular importance to a study of agricultural 
subsidies when the adjustment to food price changes largely occurs 
through the income effect . Income and expenditure elast ici t ies vary 
great ly among various income groups. 
The study revealed, for instance, tha t a reduced price variation in-
creased the decline in farm income in years of production decline 
for the third to the fifth deciles in farm income distribution. Converse-
ly, it stabilized income for the lowest income farmers (net consumers) 
(13) 
and the highest income farmers (largest marketable surplus). 
Other studies show tha t real income can be increased more efficient-
ly by the distribution of cheap foodstuffs ra ther than by direct cash 
nil) 
t ransfers . 
Moreover it was shown tha t such a distribution may genera te an addi-
tional demand for nongrain foods a t an even faster r a t e proportionally 
than it increases foodgrain consumption which would assist further 
in improving the overall nutrit ional s ta tus of the p o o r . ^ 5 ^ 
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3 . 1 . 2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Agricultural Subsidies 
Par t ia l equilibrium analysis has been used extensively in the evaluation 
of agricul tural support programs. Here we will briefly review the 
l i t e ra ture on this subject . 
Subsequently, we will a t t e m p t to answer the question why this ap -
proach, despite i ts serious theore t ica l drawbacks, can still be consi-
dered as fairly useful to policy evaluation. The major fields where 
par t ia l agricultural welfare analysis has been applied, a re : 
(i) agricul tural pr ice support measures 
(ii) agricultural pr ice stabil ization measures 
(iii) t rade restr ic t ions 
(iv) agricultural research benefi ts . 
3 . 1 . 2 . 1 A Brief Review of the Literature 
(i) Agricultural Pr ice Support Measures 
The two pioneers in applying par t ia l welfare analysis to pr ice support 
measures were Nerlove and Wallace. ^ 1 7 ^ They measured social, 
costs and benefits from various a l te rna t ive farm price support pro-
grams in the U.S.A., viz.: government procurement , deficiency pay-
ments and bufferstock policies. Net social loss (NSL) was taken as 
the difference between government expenditure and the ne t social 
benefits to farmers and consumers. 
Wallace also analysed the social costs and benefits of farm input 
control (e.g. ac reage al lotments) . 
The net loss of any of the programs was highly dependent on the 
( 1 8 ) 
es t imated elast ic i t ies of supply and demand. 
Since then a large number of economists has applied this technique 
based on the es t imat ion of e las t ic i t ies and the concept of economic 
surplus. 
( 1 9 ) 
Their analyses brought about a few ref inements , inter alia: Johnson 
introduced the concept of second-best solutions in es t imat ing NSL; 
Welch / 2 0 ^ took the factor of uncertainty into account; J o s l i n g ^ 2 ^ dis-
64 
tinguished between marginal and average social costs . 
More recent papers with some relevance to our study are , inter 
alia: Buxton e t . a l . ( 1 9 7 4 ) ( 2 2 ) ; Haessel e t . a l . ( 1 9 7 5 ) ( 2 3 ) ; Barker e t . a l . 
(1976) ( 2 * J ; Whitby ( 1 9 7 7 ) ( 2 5 ) ; Ahmed ( 1 9 7 9 ) ( 2 6 ) ; Nieuwoudt (1979) 
( 2 7 ) a n d Garcia ( 1 9 8 1 ) ( 2 8 ) . 
(ii) Agricultural Pr ice Stabilization Measures 
(29) 
A pioneer in this field was Waugh. His ar t ic le (1944) was the 
first of a large flow of par t ia l welfare analyses on price stabil ization. 
The dispute was not res t r ic ted to agricul ture. In section 3.3.2.1 we 
give the outlines of this discussion. 
In addition, we will argue why, within cer ta in limits, pr ice variation 
may increase welfare. 
(iii) Trade Restr ict ions 
The part ia l equilibrium framework required for measuring the s t a t i c 
welfare effects from protect ion has been familiar since Marshall 
introduced the concept of economic surplus. 
This framework was applied first by B a r o n e ^ 3 ^ and subsequently 
by other textbook wri ters . They demonstrated both the loss from 
protect ion and the possibility of national gain from exploiting foreign 
countries. 
In the la te twent ies the 'Bridgen Commi t tee ' calculated the excess 
costs of pro tec ted p r o d u c t i o n / 3 ^ Later V i n e r ^ a n d Corden ( - ^ i m p r o -
ved on the results of the Commi t t ee study. 
Johnson ^ 3 ^ generalizes the concept further in his well-known ar t ic le 
on the scientific tariff. 
A recent extensive l i te ra ture review on welfare analysis of res t r ic -
tions on international t rade has been wri t ten by Corden .^5 ) 
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(iv) Agricultural Research Benefits 
The first major evaluation of agricultural research benefits was carr ied 
(36) 
out by Schultz. He compared the value of inputs saved with the 
cost of research and development. 
Since Schultz 1 work there have been many par t ia l equilibrium analyses 
of agricultural research benefi ts . 
The importance to us of the various studies is in the way they have 
(37) 
differed in specification of demand and supply schedules and, in par-
t icular , on the na ture of supply function shifts. 
For instance, diverging shifts result in fewer benefi ts to farmers 
than parallel or convergent shifts (vide also section 3.4.1). 
(38) 
Griliches assumed a parallel shift (horizontal or vert ical) , P e t e r -
son a proportional shift; Akino and H a y a m i ^ a pivotal shift; and 
Lindner and J a r r e t t ^ and Rose ^ studied all four possibilities; pivo-
tal (diverging), proportional (diverging), paral lel and converging. A 
recen t extensive review of the l i t e ra tu re has been wri t ten by Norton 
e t . a l .<* 3 ) 3.1.2.2 Partial Welfare Analysis: Pros and Cons 
In the previous sub-section we have seen tha t many agricultural policy 
appraisals a re based on par t ia l equilibrium analysis and the es t imat ion 
of changes in economic surplus. The use of this tool will be demonst ra-
ted in the following sect ions. 
In appendix 2 we will evaluate the theore t ica l problems in measuring 
welfare changes by economic surplus. 
Suffice it to say here tha t the measurement of welfare changes by 
economic surplus runs into problems if: 
a) the pr ice changes a re relat ively large 
b) a large proportion of the income is spent on or earned from the 
commodity or group of commodit ies being examined 
c) the e las t ic i ty of substi tution with respect to the o ther commodit ies 
in the surplus measure is large 
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d) the value of the commodities in question, as compared to tota l 
GNP, is relatively large. 
Economic surplus refers to the Marshallian twins, viz.: producer 's 
surplus and consumer's surplus. 
Consumer 's surplus can be depicted by the Dupuit-triangle, tha t is 
the triangular a rea below the demand curve and above the price line. 
It is the difference between the consumer's to ta l benefit and the 
to ta l cost of the product to the consumer. 
The monetary measure is depicted in figure 9. 
Demand 
Figure 9 0 * Y Consumer's Surplus 
Y* 
Consumer 's surplus, the shaded area in figure 9, equals:^ D(Y)dY. 
Producer 's surplus is the relevant a rea above the supply line. The 
area depicts the difference between what the farmers actually 
receive for their produce sold and the minimum amount they would 
have been prepared to accept . 
It is just a diagrammatic way of measuring farmer 's profits plus 
rent . A more suitable te rm is economic rent (vide appendix 2). 
Supply 
Figure 10 0 Y* Y Economic Rent 
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The economic rent re la ted to production of Y* a t pr ice P* has been 
depicted by the shaded a rea in figure 10. 
Since the supply curve is just the marginal cost curve, we can wr i te : 
cost function. Since C(0) equals fixed costs , the ren t payments to 
land and capi ta l , we have exact ly the in terpre ta t ion described above: 
economic rent is profits plus rent . 
We will conclude this section by discussing both the shortcomings 
and advantages of the use of par t ia l equilibrium analysis. 
Shortcomings 
The assumptions of par t ia l equilibrium analysis res t r ic t the scope 
of i ts application. 
The following major ceter is-paribus clauses a re assumed: the r a t e 
of exchange is in equilibrium; world marke t prices a re exogenous; 
no major substi tution in production; no major changes in marketing 
costs; and no changes in consumers ' demand preferences . In addition 
we have to assume per fec t knowledge on the pa r t of economic agents 
and also per fec t mobility in marke t adjustment . 
It will be c lear tha t any result of par t ia l equilibrium analysis will 
be contingent upon these assumptions. 
A further drawback is tha t the analysis is isolated and refers to one 
marke t only. 
The important general equilibrium implications which we discussed 
ear l ier a re therefore omi t t ed . 
In par t icular , the welfare impact through the income effect is an 
impor tant omission. 
Neither income distribution and employment , nor rural-urban labour 
migrat ion, nor the flow of savings, nor the composition of farm output 
and the adoption of c a p i t a l - or labour intensive technologies can 
be understood by one par t ia l equilibrium analysis by itself. Theoret ical 
l imitat ions of the concept of economic surplus cons t i tu te a further 
drawback (vide appendix 2). 
Economic ren t = p*Y* - C'(Y) dY 
0 
= P*Y* - C(Y*) + C(0), where C(Y) is the marginal 
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Advantages 
One of the main questions posed by policy makers, prior to the imple-
mentat ion of an agricultural policy program, concerns the direct 
and short - term impact of agricultural subsidies on the volume of 
farm output . 
Another important ex-ante question is: who will benefit most from 
the subsidy? 
It will become clear from the following sections tha t the side of 
the market with the lower elast ici ty gets the grea ter par t of the 
subsidy. 
On the other hand it can be seen tha t the effectiviness in te rms 
of raising farm output levels, is an increasing function of each of 
the e las t ic i t ies . 
Par t ia l equilibrium analysis, i.e. the est imation of elast ici t ies and 
economic surplus can therefore be considered a useful tool in answering 
these ex-ante questions. 
A second mer i t of par t ia l equilibrium analysis is its i l lustrative power. 
The Marshallian diagrams clearly show the policy maker the direct 
operational impact of government intervention. 
Lastly, it is important to emphasize tha t par t ia l equilibrium analysis 
is just one tool. 
It does not exclude the simultaneous use of other methods of ana-
(44) 
lysis. Quite often economic analysis has to provide answers within 
a short period of t ime, without sufficient s ta t is t ical information or 
without computer facilities a t hand. 
In these cases in par t icular it has proven its grea t analytical value. 
Direct Farm Income Subsidies 
One of the most common (social/political) justifications for agricul-
tural subsidy policies in developing countries is their effect on income 
distribution. 
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In figure 7 and the re la ted discussion we pointed out tha t a farm 
income subsidy is more a pal l iat ive aimed a t dealing with symptoms 
ra ther than a t dealing with the basic causes of income inequity. 
For farm income is the functional result of five different input and 
output fac tors . 
A farm income subsidy therefore merely redistr ibutes pover ty . A 
significant improvement in the income of the rural poor can only 
be achieved through increased productivi ty, Of course, we can 
justify this subsidy when temporary aid is impera t ive , for instance, 
in cases like bad harvest years , draught or other (regional) disasters . 
In most instances financial constraints will limit the application of 
income subsidies to regional policies only. This further emphasizes 
the fact tha t farm income subsidies a re basically unsuited to offsetting 
substantial pr ice f luctuations. 
In this section we will briefly discuss the impact of farm income subsi-
dies (if any) and secondly compare the difference in uti l i ty between 
farm income subsidies and farm input subsidies. 
3.2.1 The Impact of Farm Income Subsidies 
Depending on the distribution in farm size, an increase in nominal 
farm income may have a differential i m p a c t / ^ An increase in farm 
income increases first the marketable surplus of farm produce. 
Secondly, it could prevent small-scale farmers from migrating to 
urban a reas . 
The propensity of small-scale farmers to migra te is probably, inter 
al ia, a function of expected future gains in agr icul ture vis-a-vis expec-
ted future gains in non-agricultural ac t iv i t ies , age and risk aver-
(47) 
sion. 
A third effect on small-scale farmers is tha t the higher income will 
reduce risk, which would make them more ready to accep t new farm 
technologies. 
Fourthly, large farmers will produce more because of the increased 
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demand, re-invest sooner and invest more. 
Conversely, we may note several effects which would decrease welfare. 
First , farmers (either large or small-scale) who are not only maxi-
mizing farm profi ts , but also allocating their inputs between farm 
and non-farm act ivi t ies , including leisure, may, because of an income 
subsidy, reduce their farm investment in favour of the various a l te r -
nat ive possibilities. 
Although the income subsidy is already inflationary in itself, this 
will also cause a decline in marketable surplus of food i tems. 
Secondly, the positive income effect of small-scale farmers staying 
on their land may be overshadowed by the reduced opportunity for 
large scale farmers to benefit from their economies of scale by buying 
the abandoned plots . 
For administrat ive purposes farm income subsidies a re often related 
to some production f a c t o r / * 8 ^ Actually, in these cases we do be t te r 
speak of farm input subsidies. 
Such a production factor cum farm income subsidy has more advan-
tages . 
By using this policy, a government can s t imulate agricultural produc-
tion in a part icular direction, e.g. labour intensive, land or capital 
intensive, or it can s t imulate production of a part icular crop or type 
of l ivestock. 
The most usual type of this sort of farm support is the income subsidy 
based on acreage . 
One disadvantage of this type of farm income subsidy is tha t it is 
highly beneficial to larger farmers and will worsen farm income distr i -
bution. 
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3.2.2 Utility Comparison between Farm Income Subsidies and Farm Input 
Subsidies 
It can be shown with the help of indifference curve analysis, t ha t 
( 4 9 ) 
a farm input subsidy which initially brings about the same level 
of welfare to farmers as a farm income subsidy, will be more costly 
to the government (although this conclusion is to some ex ten t depen-
dent on some arbi t rary assumptions^"^) . 
0 X X X B B' B " 
FARM INPUT OO/FUTURE FARM INCOME 
Figure 11 Indifference Curves of Present and Expected Future 
Farm Income Levels 
In the initial equilibrium E, the fa rmer ' s indifference curve I is a t 
a tangent to his budget line BB. From his farm income he invests 
OX ^  in farm input (X) and spends Y^B of his income (Y). 
Hence he leaves OY^ for consumption and other expenditure . The 
farmer must make a choice between present consumption and future 
income. He is prepared to spend Y^B for OX^ of farm input to secure 
his future income. 
The Government can raise his welfare in two ways; e i ther by farm 
income subsidy, or by farm input subsidy. If the government decides 
to subsidize farm input X, the farmers budget line will shift to BB" , 
and his welfare will be increased from I to I 1 . At E ' , his new equili-
brium, the farmer invests OX^ in X and pays only Y 2 B # Since the 
farmer would have paid YjB without the input subsidy, the costs 
of the input subsidy to the government amount to Y.Y_. 
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Conversely, a farm income subsidy which pushes the farmer 's welfare 
to the same level I', implies a new budget line B'B' parallel to BB 
and a t a tangent to I ' . In this equilibrium E " , the farmer invests 
OX 2 and pays Y^B ' . The costs of the income subsidy equal the pa-
rallel shift of the budget line, hence BB', which is less than the 
costs of the input subsidy, i .e. Y^Y 2 -
Although i t is cynical to say so, we may s t a t e , tha t for situations 
where these findings a re valid (the indifference curves do exist), 
and where the government is more interes ted in rural vote catching 
than fostering agricultural production, a farm income subsidy, 
is likely to be the most appropriate policy. 
3.3 Direct Farm Output Subsidies 
3.3.1 Farm Output Price Support Measures 
In this section we will analyse the par t ia l equilibrium effects in 
a situation where technology is s ta t ic and where there is no sub-
st i tut ion in supply, i .e . we assume no supply shifts. The basic prin-
ciple of the analysis would be the same even if there w e r e . ^ 
In addition we will briefly discuss the principal methods of applying 
the analysis. 
3.3.1.1 Partial Equilibrium Effects 
Two major categories of direct output price support measures 
can be distinguished, viz: guaranteed prices and deficiency payments , 
and guaranteed prices and minimum import pr ices. These ca tego-
ries a re i l lustrated in figure 12 and figure 13 respectively. 
73 
• Q 1 Q 2 QjFARM OUTPUT 
Figure 12 Guaranteed Price and Deficiency Payments 
In figure 12 S depicts the domestic supply curve of a cer ta in farm 
output and D the demand curve for this farm output . Suppose the 
government raises the price from Pw to Pg. Assuming a fixed supply 
schedule, this will cause an increase in output from to Q^. The 
price for consumers is maintained a t the world market pr ice level 
Pw, because of the deficiency payments to the farmers . This deficien-
cy payment equals Pg - Pw and is paid on Q 2 of farm output a t 
a budget cost of PgPwLM. For convenience sake we assume tha t 
S has a constant e las t ic i ty in the range KM. Fur thermore , C is a 
scalar which includes supply shifters and e^  is the e las t ic i ty , hence 
Q - CP l . 
The appropriate cr i te r ia for evaluation of this pr ice support measure 
a re the following: 
1. Direct Government Cost : PgPw L M = " P w ^ " 
2. Increase of Farmers ' Surplus or Economic Rent : Pg Pw K M = 
/ V e 1 r ( l + e , ) - i P g , 
/ CP dP = , — — C P 1 = ,—±— (P o - P O ) 
PJ 1 + e , p 1 + e . ^ g y 2 W' w L 1 w 
3. Shadow Costs of Resources used in Additional Production: 
Q,Q 2MK = 
/ • g ' ^ - l r ^ r ^ ' ^ f - r i T ^ - W 
74 
4. Net Savings in Foreign Exchange: 
Q j Q 2 L K = Pw ( Q 2 - Qj ) . 
As one can easily conclude, the consumers bear no costs and enjoy 
no benefits from this policy measure. The policy merely transfers 
money to the farmers . 
Figure 13 Guaranteed Price and Minimum Import Price 
A combined policy of guaranteed prices and import price barriers 
is i l lustrated in figure 13. Consumers as well as importers have to 
face a cer ta in price threshold. The demand function D in the range 
NR is defined as Q = B P 2 . 
The implications for the economy are the following: 
1 . Direct Government Revenue: (tariff) LONM = (Pg - Pw) ( Q 3 - Q 2 ) . 
2. Increase of Farmers ' Surplus or Economic Rent : 
s D 
a 
PgPwK M = 1 (PgQ 2 - PwQj) . 1 + e 
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3. Shadow Costs of Resources used in Additional Production: 
Q{Q2 M K = (Pg Q 2 - Pw Q{). 
4. Net Savings in Foreign Exchange: 
5. Decrease of Consumers ' Surplus: 
Pg Pw R N = / B P 2 dP = ,—— B P o,„ l + e_ Pw 1 + e 2 J Pw 
(1 + e j 1 P 8 
T V - e 2 ( P ^ 3 " PwV 
Apparently, the consumers a re the ones who pay for this policy mea-
sure. The area M L O N can be regarded as a transfer from consumers 
to the government , the a rea Pg Pw K M is a transfer from consumers 
to farmers , and the a rea K L M represents a transfer from consumers 
to the resources for the additional production. Sometimes, the r e -
maining area N O R is referred to as the consumers ' cost . 
3.1.1.2 Methods of Implementation 
Farm output price support measures a re often implemented to tackle 
distortions or to reduce farm income inequity. 
A major problem is tha t it is difficult to mee t the objective of 
assisting only the rural poor. Also, a pr ice policy, based on the lowest 
income group, tha t would assure a reasonable income level to all 
would exceed budget const ra ints . On the other hand, general pr ice 
support methods may worsen income distribution. 
With respect to the determinat ion of the level of guaranteed prices , 
two methods can be distinguished, viz. formula methods and non-
formula methods. The formulae most commonly used a r e : 
1. Farm income formulae, where the pr ice support level is based 
on a cer ta in net income level for the farming community as 
a whole or for cer ta in types of holdings. An important disad-
vantage of this formula lies in the difficulty of i ts calculat ion. 
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2. Cost of production formulae, where the price level is related 
to the est imation of all or some costs of production. Again the 
difficulties of defining and measuring of the costs of production 
(52) 
const i tu te a major drawback. 
3. Par i ty formulae, under which the price level is based on a his-
torical average price received for the produce and an index of 
farm input pr ices . If the price indices include changes in volume, 
then these formulae may be considered as superior to the ones 
ad 1. and 2. The lack of sufficient s ta t is t ical information can, 
however, limit i ts applicability. 
4. Multiple factor formulae, where many factors a re taken into 
account , like recent demand trends, prices in representat ive 
markets , future price prospects , cost of production, farm incomes 
and inflation r a t e . These formulae a re widely used in the heavily 
subsidized agricultural sector of the E.E.C. A disadvantage is 
the substantial scope for disagreement among the pr ice-set t ing 
members in policy-making discussion groups. 
The question as to which of the above mentioned formulae is best 
in a par t icular context , depends largely on the political objectives 
and the available s ta t is t ical information. 
Non-formula methods, where price levels a re based on elements 
like the cost of the support policy, administrat ive convenience, and 
supply and demand prospects , may in par t be s tat is t ical ly assessed 
but a re not brought into a fixed relationship by a formula. 
A general advantage of formula methods is, tha t they provide a 
higher degree of pr ice security to farmers . Conversely, non-formula 
methods have a higher degree of flexibility. 
77 
Apart from the problems re la ted to the availability of recent s t a t i s -
t ical da ta , many developing countries also lack the necessary admini-
s t ra t ive framework to implement pr ice support policies. A minimum 
of market administrat ion and quality standards legislation is indispen-
sable. For these reasons, pr ice support measures , notably in developing 
countr ies , a re often carr ied out in combination with buffer stock 
policies, enabling the government to tackle some administrat ive 
problems and to encourage minimum quality s tandards. 
3.3.2 Farm Output Price Stabilization Measures 
We s ta ted earl ier tha t large price fluctuations of agricultural commo-
dities may have a de t r imenta l impact on the economy, basically 
through the income effect . 
For these adverse effects we refer to the discussion on the general 
equilibrium implications in section 3 .1 .1 . 
The principal problem is how to damp these major fluctuations with-
out undermining the adjusting power of minor pr ice fluctuations 
as a marke t signal. 
In this section we will first analyse the welfare effects of these 
minor f luctuations. 
Then we will analyse farm income fluctuations into a pr ice f luctua-
tion component and a production fluctuation component. Thirdly, 
we will briefly discuss the methods of implementing farm pr ice s t a -
bilization policies. 
3.3.2.1 Partial Equilibrium Effects of Minor Price Fluctuations 
(53) 
In a par t ia l equilibrium framework, Waugh showed tha t consumers 
gain more from a pr ice decrease , caused by shifts in supply, than 
they lose from an equal pr ice r ise . Consumers therefore , gain from 
pr ice fluctuations and lose from pr ice stabil izat ion. Probably un-
aware of Waugh's work, OP^  demonstra ted similar results for produ-
ce r s . Producers gain from price f luctuations due to shifts in demand, 
and accordingly lose from pr ice stabil izat ion. 
78 
Massell integrated the two approaches and found tha t where de-
mand and supply shift randomly, the tota l gains from price stabil i-
zation are always positive, provided the gainers compensate the 
losers. 
Abstracted from further g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s ^ ^ which include, inter alia, 
addit ive s tochast ic disturbances, these basic findings a re depicted 
(57) 
in figures 14 and 15 respectively. 
0 QUANTITY 0 QUANTITY 
Figure 14 Price Stabilization and Figure 15 Price Stabilization and 
Supply Shifts Demand Shifts 
Waugh's argument is ref lected in figure 14, where consumers can 
face two pr ices , viz: Pj and P 2 . Consumers ' surplus with respect 
to P j and P 2 can be wri t ten as CS(Pj ) = (a + b + c + d + f), and 
CS(P 2 ) = f. 
Assuming P j and P 2 occur with equal frequency, the expected value 
of consumers ' surplus is given by: E(CS, P) = f + l/2(a + b + c + 
d) . 
If pr ices a re stabilized a t P , the expected value of consumers ' surplus 
a t this fixed pr ice , i.e. E(CS, P) , equals (a + b + f). 
Hence, E(CS, P) < E(CS,P), and the reduction in welfare equals 
l/2(c + d - a - b ) > 0 . 
Oi's findings a re analogous. In figure 15 producers a re confronted 
with two compet i t ive prices Pj and P 2 , each with equal probability. 
Economic rent with respect to Pj and P 2 is respectively: ER(Pj) = f, 
and ER(P 2 ) = (a + b + c + d + f). Hence, E(ER, P) = f + l/2(a + b + 
c + d). When prices a re stabilized a t P , E(ER, P) = (a + b + f). Again 
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the reduction in welfare amounts to E(ER, P) - E(ER, P) = l/2(c + d ~ 
a - b) >0. 
Massell combined these two results , assuming tha t producers will 
(58) 
compensate consumers in loss of welfare and vice versa. 
In figure 14 a pr ice reduction from P 2 to P benefits consumers by 
(a + b) and costs producers a, which results in a net gain of b. A 
pr ice rise from Pj to P results in a gain to producers of (c + d + e ) , 
and a loss to consumers of (c + d), which results in a ne t gain of 
e. Pr ice stabil ization a t P therefore provides a net gain of (b + e) 
to consumers and producers jointly. 
In figure 15 pr ice stabil ization a t P entai ls a similar result , i.e. 
a ne t gain of (b + e) to consumers and producers jointly. 
Notwithstanding the theore t ica l value of the general argument , we 
doubt if this kind of par t ia l equilibrium analysis will be useful to 
the study of farm output pr ice stabil izat ion measures . For a fuller 
understanding of our argument - the results of Massell cum suis 
a re not re levant to agricul ture - we have to invest igate the gains 
and losses due to pr ice fluctuations (or conversely: losses and gains 
from pr ice stabilization) more closely. 
Gains and losses from price fluctuations a re implicitly based on 
(59) 
the assumption of convexity in profit functions. 
Intuit ive Proof: 
Producers , in adjusting their production plans, will produce more 
of a specific output if they expect higher prices, and produce less 
of this output when they expect lower pr ices . The profit from their 
adjustments in production induced by pr ice fluctuations will exceed 
the gains from producing a fixed amount of output a t a stabilized 
p r ice . These a re precisely the features of a convex profit function 
lying above a tangential 'passive' linear profit function (e.g. a fixed 
production plan with proportional profits). An ' ac t ive ' profit maximi-
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zing producer will shift away to cheaper inputs when current input 
prices rise and accordingly try new output possibilities if current 
output prices decline. In ei ther case, the ' ac t ive ' profits will exceed 
the 'passive' profi ts . 
Formal proof: 
Notat ion: p - vector of output prices 
c - vector of input prices 
n - profit function 
x - vector of inputs 
y - vector of outputs 
Convexity implies tha t if (p", c") = (tp + (1 - t ) p \ t c + (1 - t)c ') 
then 7 t ( p " , c")<c tn(p, c) + (1 - t) n (p ! , c') for O ^ t - ^ 1 . 
Suppose now, tha t producers face output price Pj' with probability 
q, and price p 2 with probability (1 - q). The stabilized output price 
vector is p = qq + (1 - q)p 2 > 
When the profit function is convex we have: 
qnip^, c) + (1 - q) 7 i ( p 2 , c) » 7 i ( p , c) = ^ (qp j + (1 - q ) p 2 , c). 
Hence, average profits with pr ice fluctuations exceed average profits 
under price stabil ization. 
Returning to agricul ture , this result only holds if profit maximizing 
farmers can adjust their production plans to price changes. Where 
farm inputs a re extremely rigid output pr ice stabilization measures 
may be advantageous to farmers . 
We conclude tha t theoret ical ly it is uncertain whether social welfare 
will increase or decrease from farm output price stabilization mea-
sures. This conclusion is supported by our geometr ic illustration 
in figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Stabilization of Farm Output Prices 
When there is a shortfall in farm production (Qj) the supply curve 
S' will become inelastic as soon as it reaches its maximum volume. 
Thus, we depict S' as a kinked supply curve. 
When there is a shortage, Qj is marketed at the high price Pj . Under 
average conditions the normal supply curve S meets demand D at 
the point of equilibrium (Q^ , P g C [ )• Beyond equilibrium, when there 
is a glut, the price will drop according to the slope of the demand 
curve D. At (Q_, P_ ) the excess supply is marketed at the low price 
A price reduction from P . to P benefits consumers by a and costs 
Therefore, the net gain from price stabilization in this case is zero. 
A price rise from P_ to P costs consumers (e + d + c) and benefits r 2 eq 
farmers by (c + d). 
eq 
farmers a as well. 
CS(P 1) = g 
ER(P.) = (a + c + f) 
E(CS, P e q ) = (a + g) 
E(ER, P ) = (c + f) 
C S ( P 2 ) = (a + b + c + d + e + g ) ; E ( C S , P ) = (a + b + g) 
E R ( P 2 ) = f ; E ( E R , P G ) = (c + d + f) 
8 2 
Therefore, the net loss from price stabilization in this case equals 
e. 
To summarise our par t ia l welfare analysis, farmers will generally 
gain from price stabilization measures if (c + d) > a. The fact, that 
consumers have to bear the cost (i.e. c *• d + e - a) not to mention 
the administration costs of a price stabilization policy, is sometimes 
neglected in the usual arguments justifying a price stabilization 
p o l i c y . ( 6 0 ) 
3.3 .2 .2 Variations in Production Value Analysed into a Market- and Produc-
tion Component 
To determine if farm income fluctuations a re due more to market 
failures than to fluctuations in production one can a n a h s e the fluctua-
tions of gross farm revenues or to ta l value into a price fluctuation 
component and a production fluctuation component. 
The formula to be used is based on the well-known Taylor series 
approximation of the variance of the product of two stochast ic va-
riables. In our case: to ta l value of aggregated farm production (TV) 
equals the price level (P) t imes the volume of larm production (Y). 
Hence: Var (TV)S 'Y 2 Var (P) + P 2 V a r (Y) + 2 P Y Cov (P, Y) 
The right-hand side can be rewri t ten thus: 
Y2 Var (P) ~ P 2 Var (Y) + 2 FY Cov (P, Y) = Rp * R> - Rpy. 
" 7 2 Var (P) + F 2 Var (Y) 
This faci l i ta tes interpretat ion since Rp -r Ry, the direct effects 
of price and production fluctuations, a re positive and sum to unity. 
Rpy, the interaction te rm, can be negat ive, indicating a reduction 
in variance of the tota l value. If sufficient data exist, the volume 
of farm production Y can be analysed in a. similar way into a yield 
component and an acreage component. 
8 3 
If the variation in to ta l value is largely due to fluctuations in pro-
duction, then the most suitable program will have to deal with the 
causes of this production variation (e.g. by public investment like 
irr igation). 
If, on the other hand, the variation in to ta l value is mainly caused 
by pr ice fluctuations, then a policy of buffer stock measures (or 
other marke t regulations) can be justified. 
3.3.3.2 Methods of Implementation 
Although farm output pr ice stabil ization measures a re nearly innume-
rable, we feel t ha t we can be brief about the principal argument . 
Categor ies of Pr ice Regulations: 
1. Free Range of Guaranteed Prices where the pr ice fluctuations 
a r e reduced but not to a fixed lower and upper l imit . 
2. Minimum Guaranteed Prices where a lower pr ice limit is fixed. 
3 . Fixed Range of Guaranteed Prices where both the lower and 
upper l imits a re fixed. 
4. Fixed Guaranteed Pr ice where one fixed pr ice level has been 
established. 
(62) 
The following methods of implementat ion can be distinguished: 
1. International Trade Rest r ic t ions . Vide Section 2.3 aad the next 
two sections of this chapter . 
2. Price:Legislat ion. Here , the old adage comes into i ts own: every 
single government regulation entai ls another government regula-
tion. The economic postula te to which we refer here has not 
been falsified yet by empirical evidence: if a pr ice is fixed and 
demand exceeds supply a black marke t will emerge ; and, if a 
pr ice is fixed and supply exceeds demand wastage and thus 
a loss in welfare will be the ne t result . Another government 
regulation to deal with the l a t t e r problem is a system of l imited 
pr ice guarantees , where prices a re only guaranteed for a fixed 
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volume of farm output. This measure basically implies a two 
price system, and, where retai l prices a re maintained a t a high 
level, it becomes a form of export subsidy. 
3. Buffer Stock Policies. Buffer stocks can be controlled by the 
government, by farmers or by farmers ' organizations. Buffer 
stock policies a re notorious for their operational problems and 
l imitat ions. Firstly, wastage in shortage. Secondly, the tendency 
for costs to increase beyond budget l imits . The agencies respon-
sible for operating buffer stocks a re often reluctant to lower 
their pr ices . Thirdly, problems of a logistic na ture ; for example 
management of transport and communications. Fourthly, the 
method can be quite expensive, and hence is not a suitable one 
for individual developing nations to pursue by themselves. 
Lastly, the effectiveness of public buffer stock policies is often 
muted by the existence of pr ivate carryover stocks. 
4. Output regulations. For instance, tapping of rubber was res t r ic ted 
under the schemes of pr ice control during the inter-bellum, and 
the plucking of tea was res t r ic ted under* the International Tea 
Agreement . However, in both cases the measures were supported 
by other policies. 
5. Stabilization Funds. These funds can be built up f rom. years in 
which output is high and may compensate price falls in bad years 
(seasons). Under the hort icultural auction system in The Nether -
lands, producers pay a small percentage of their (daily) receipts 
into the auction fund which is used to compensate those producers 
whose products a re withdrawn when no buyer .wants to pay the 
established minimum pr ice . 
This brief enumeration is of course not exhaustive. Nevertheless, 
i t clearly demonstrates the-var ious l imitat ions of- price stabilization 
measures, especially in relation to developing countries. 
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Farm Import Restrictions 
.1 Partial Equilibrium Effects 
The partial equilibrium effects of import restrictions have already 
been discussed in section 3.3.1.1 (vide figure 13). An extreme use 
of this policy measure leads to complete protection, i.e. autarchy. 
A departure from a domestic deficit to autarchy is depicted in figure 
17. Clearly consumers are the ones who pay a high price for such 
a policy. 
P(AuO 
p 
/ 5 
\ ( 
Q 
1 \ 
a3 FARM 
Figure 17 Prohibitive Import Restrictions 
The static effects of prohibitive import restrictions are as follows: 
1. Direct Government Cost: t ( K Q J Q J M ) = t P W ( Q 3 - Q ^ » t = ad va-
lorem tariff. 
2 . Increase in Farmers' Surplus or Economic Rent: 
1 + e 
1 
w 
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3. Shadow Costs of Resources used in Additional Production: 
k. Net Savings in Foreign Exchange: 
QjQ^M K = P w ( Q 3 - Qj). 
5. Decrease of Consumers' Surplus: 
P aut w P M N = 
"aut 
B P dP = 1 + e 2 v a u t v 2 ( P a u t Q 2 "
 Pw<V' 
w 
3.3.3.2 Methods of Implementation 
Since it is not our intention to list here all the implications of the 
various methods of implementation as reflected in the GATT regu-
(63) 
lations only some of the major points will be high-lighted. 
Imports can principally be res t r ic ted by three categories of t rade 
intervention, or by combination of these categories , viz.: 
1. Financial methods 
2. Quant i ta t ive Methods 
3. S ta te Trade Monopsony 
(1) Financial Methods 
-Minimum Import Prices; when import prices are lower than a cer ta in 
minimum level a levy is imposed to make up the difference. 
-Variable Levies; a levy on imports will be raised if domestic prices 
fall below the guaranteed minimum and be lowered if domestic 
prices rise above the upper limit of the guaranteed range. 
-Prohibitive Tariffs; when imports of a cer ta in commodity are entirely 
banned. 
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(2) Quant i ta t ive Methods 
It has often been argued tha t these measures give more effect ive 
protect ion to the domestic agricultural sector than financial methods. 
A further advantage, in part icular for developing countries , is tha t 
quant i ta t ive measures a re easier to administer (e.g. via import l i-
censes) than financial methods. 
(3) S ta t e Trade Monopsony 
This measure has sometimes been used in developing countries during 
periods of food shortages. The applicability of this method depends 
largely on the standard of administrat ion in a par t icular country 
(e.g. with respect to the incidence of corruption). 
3.3.4 Farm Export Subsidies 
3.3.4.1 Partial Equilibrium Effects 
Figures 18 and 19 a re the obverse of figures 12 and 13. 
Figure 18 depicts a common type of export subsidy, with no direct 
ef fec ts on the domestic consumers. Figure 19 shows the effects 
of an export subsidy policy tha t also causes a domestic distort ion. 
Figure 18 Common Export Figure 19 Guaranteed Price for 
Subsidy Farm Export Produ-
ce with a Domestic 
Demand 
88 
The effects of export subsidy with no direct impact on domestic 
consumers, figure 18, are as follows: 
1. Direct Government Cost: K M N O = (P - P^Qf Qj)-
2. Increases of Farmers ' Surplus or Economic Rent : K L N O = 
P 
/
ex e . v - v o 
C P dP - Q, (P - P ) = P L—2— - Q.) - P ( . — - - Q. ) . 
M ex w ex 1 + e j M w 1 + e^ M 
1 w 
3. Shadow Costs of Resources used in Additional Production: 
Q 3 I 
L Q 2 Q 3 N = / <% e 1 dQ = ( P e x Q 3 - P w Q 2 ) . 
Q 2 e j 
4. Net Savings in Foreign Exchange: LQ 2 Q 3 M = Q 2 ) ' 
The effects from the guaranteed export price policy, figure 19, 
a re as follows: 
1. Direct Government Cost: K N O R = ( P - P )(Q,,- Q,) . 
g w 4 1 
2. Increase in Farmers ' Surplus or Economic Rent : P P M O 
f P e 8 * 
J g c p l d P ^ ( P g Q ^ - P w ^ -
p 1 ° 
w 
3. Shadow Costs of Resources used in Additional Production: 
1 
Q, - g 3 e, 
4. Decrease in Consumers' Surplus: 
rP 
/
t 
B P 2 = , — (P Q, - P „ , Q J . 
g w p 1 + e 2 g v l w^2 
w 
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5. Net Savings in Foreign Exchange: 
K Q ^ L + M Q 3Q^N = P W [ ( Q 2 - - Q 1 ) + (Q^- Q3)]. 
Evidently, in the la t t e r case , the major costs a re borne both by 
consumers and the government . 
As far as the incidence of export subsidies in developing countries 
is concerned the following observations a re worthy of no te . Deve-
loping countr ies with a dominant agricultural export sector generally 
find themselves in a vulnerable position vis-a-vis the world marke t . 
Their government revenues a re largely dependent on these agricul-
tural expor ts . When world marke t pr ices decline it will be difficult 
for these governments to subsidize their farm exports out of decrea -
sing revenues. A further problem is, tha t these exports often s tem 
from perennial crops like coffee, cocoa, rubber, c i t rus or t ea , which 
do not admit of a flexible response in supply. This problem can be 
further aggravated by the predominance of only a few crops within 
one country. Again, it is doubtful if export subsidies a r e the best 
way to foster agricul tural expor ts . 
Experience shows tha t in general , farm exports have been boosted 
by increased diversification in supply, by new agricultural (processed) 
produce, and in par t icular by an improvement in market ing. For 
ins tance, the success s tories of the Israeli and the Dutch boom in 
farm exports a r e market ing success s tories ra ther than subsidy success 
s tor ies . Unfortunately, a thorough analysis of marke ts in developed 
countr ies by exper ts from developing countr ies , let alone the e s t a -
blishment of ac t ive sales agencies , still receives too l i t t le considera-
t ion. 
3.3.4.2 Methods of Implementation 
Apart from guaranteed prices for farm export produce which cause 
domest ic distort ions (vide: figure 19) we can distinguish five major 
groups of agricul tural export support measures . 
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1. Multiple Exchange Ra tes . 
This support measure implies a par t ia l devaluation (concealed deva-
luation concerning a part icular crop or area) in order t o lower the 
export pr ice in international currency and a t the same t ime to in-
crease returns to farmers . 
2. Remission of Export Taxes. 
In i ts impact this policy measure is somewhat similar to multiple 
exchange ra t e s . The prices perceived by farmers a re raised because 
of a reduction in taxes on export revenues. Like the previous mea-
sure, this method too is limited in its application. Neither method 
can be maintained in the event of a decline in world market pr ices. 
3 . Buffer Stock Policies. 
This approach can probably be applied succesfully in part icular by 
countries with a comparat ively large world market share . 
4. Limited Price Guarantees . 
These measures may serve to dispose of excess supplies on the world 
market by raising the price of a fixed volume on the domestic market . 
5. Pooling, Stabilization Funds and Direct Cash Transfers. 
These systems require a cent ra l marketing board or a similar body, 
tha t can deal with the heavy administrat ive burden involved. 
3.4 Direct Farm Input Subsidies 
In this section we will analyse the part ia l equilibrium effects of 
farm input subsidies, and in addition discuss the operational dynamics 
of input subsidy programmes. 
3.4.1 Partial Equilibrium Effects 
The differential impact of input subsidies on input demand and supply 
and farm output supply can be elegantly i l lustrated in one graph 
(vide figure 20). 
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Figure 20 Farm Input Subsidy, Farm Input Market and Farm Output 
Supply 
In figure 20, S(Q) and S(Q)' depict the farm output supply curves, 
without and with subsidy; S ( X ^ , S(X)^ and S(X) w a r e respectively the 
domest ic supply curves of farm input X and the world supply curve 
of X; D(Q) represents the demand curve for farm output Q; and D(X) 
is the demand curve for X. 
Situation prior to the imposition of the input subsidy: 
-domest ic producers of X sell a volume of X, a t the pr ice P(X)j 
- farmers purchase a volume of X 2 a t P(X)j of which amount (X 2 ~ Xj) 
has been imported 
- fa rmers produce of farm output a t the world marke t pr ice P(Q)j 
-consumers purchase Qj a t P(Q)j of which amount (Q3- Q j ) has been 
imported. 
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Suppose the government decides to subsidize farm input X (e.g. seed) 
a t pr ice P(X) 2 - Since demand a t this pr ice corresponds to X^ of farm 
input, the government has to subsidize (P(X)j - P (X) 2 ) for each unit 
of farm input. 
The imposition of the subsidy causes a downward shift of S(Q) over 
an equal dis tance as the subsidy (P(X)j- P ( X 2 ) perpendicular a t X 2 c.q. 
Q r Hence, (P(Q) ^ P(Q) 2 ) equals (P(X) : - P (X) 2 ) . The reason for this 
shift is, t ha t the volume of Q j of farm output can be produced with 
less cost , viz. (P(Q)j - P ( Q 2 ) for each unit of farm output . Since the 
market pr ice is P(Q)j, farmers will increase their production to Q 2 -
The domestic producers of farm input X may increase their production 
accordingly, e.g. to Xy assuming a parallel supply shift. ^ 
e e e e 
Assuming: S(Q) = CP l ; S(Q)' = EP 3 ; S(X) = FP 4 ; S(X)' = GP 5 , 
the major par t ia l welfare effects a re the following: 
1. Direct Government Cost of the Subsidy: 
P(X) L P (X) 2 C E = X^ ( P ( X ) r P(X) 2 ) . 
2. Increase in Farmers ' Surplus or Economic Rent : 
P(Q) 1 g m\ e 
P(Q), L N - P(Q). K R = / EP 3 - / CP 1 = 
1 1 IS KJ 
rh3 p<Q)iQ2-TT- e i p ( Q > i Q r 
3 . Shadow Costs of Resources used in Additional Production: 
(OQ 2 NL - OQjRK) + ( X ^ H B - XgXjGA) = 
f'dxU 
9 3 
j - J - j ( P ( X ) 1 X 1 - P ( X ) 2 X Q ) 1. 
4 . Increase in Surplus or Economic Rent of Domest ic Producers of 
Farm Input: 
/ P ( X ) 1 e f P { X ) l e 
P ( X ) , B H PCX). - P(X)_ AGP(X), = J G.P 5 ' d P - J FP ^dP 1 1 2 1 p ( X ) 2 p ( X ) 2 
— ( P ( x ) 1 x 3 - P ( X ) 2 x ^ - j - ^ (P(x) 1x 1 - p(x)2x0). 
5. Net Change in Foreign Exchange (reduced import from output minus 
increased import farm input): 
Q 1 Q 2 N R - (X 3 X^EH - X ^ F G ) = P(Q)j (Q 2 - - P(X){ 
(x4- x3) - (x2- x 2) 
If one observes the induced supply shift from S(Q) to S(Q)' more close-
ly, the implicit assumption of no improvement in technical efficien-
cy becomes apparent . It has been ref lected namely by tangents of 
the supply curves a t R and N respect ively. 
The downward shift in output supply can be e i ther : 
-parallel ; same technical efficiency: = ^ g% 
-convergent; reduced technical efficiency: > ^ g X ^ 
-divergent; improved technical efficiency: ^ ( Q ) ^ 3-S ^ 
SX SX 
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It must be feared, that when input subsidies a re not accompanied 
by improved farm technology (e.g. not only more seed but also higher 
yielding variet ies; not only more ferti l izer but also be t te r fertilizing 
prac t ices , etc .) the shift will be nothing but parallel (and probably 
a t net social costs). 
Hayami and Rut tan emphasized this argument in a more general con-
(66) 
tex t . Borrowing their illustration we depict in figure 21 two supply 
response curves drawn for tradit ional technology and advanced techno-
logy, M n and M. respectively. 
Figure 21 Traditional and Advanced Technology 
The meta production function (M) is the envelope of many such supply 
response curves, each representing a different degree of technology. 
It can be easily observed, tha t even if the input/output price rat io 
declines from P Q to P j (e.g. by an input subsidy), farmers cannot 
move from A to B, and will be trapped a t C, unless Mj becomes a-
vailable. 
3.4.2 The Operational Dynamics of Farm Input Subsidies 
In this paragraph we will prove the conceptual framework, vide figure 
22, tha t has served as a theoret ical foundation for our empirical case 
study as far as farm input subsidies a re concerned. 
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Figure 22 The operational Dynamics of Farm Input Subsidy Programmes 
The adminis t ra t ive framework of farm input subsidy programmes 
may consist of physical input t ransfers as well as of money t ransfers . 
In e i ther case it is uncertain before hand to what ex ten t the subsidy 
will raise the demand for farm input. 
A price reduction of the input can have both an income effect (3) 
and a substitution effect (1 ) . The l a t t e r can enhance input demand 
(1) but the ne t effect (1) — (4) will also depend on other factors in-
fluencing input demand, in par t icular those factors re la ted to the 
production function (11). The adminis t ra t ive framework also largely 
determines the coverage of the subsidy programmes, i .e. the degree 
of par t ic ipat ion by farmers . The relationship between the adminis t ra-
t ive framework and the input-mix and prices of other inputs (9) is 
very impor tan t . If, for ins tance, production is only e las t ic when there 
is a combination of two or more inputs (a likely case) and only one 
input is being subsidized, the subsidy programme is bound to fail (10). 
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The dual relationship with respect to the profit function, the input 
demand functions and the production function, '(11) and '(12> will 
be explained and demonstrated in the empirical case study. The prin-
ciple is, tha t farmers base their decisions in par t on output/input 
price rat ios which form the relation between these three functions. 
The administrat ive framework can also have an impact on input supply 
(2) especially in the case of physical input t ransfers , but also with 
regard to s torage, t ransport and other marketing facilities concerning 
input supply. A monopoly in domestic input supply can hamper the 
subsidy programme (7). In anticipating the subsidies, domestic produ-
cers of these inputs may form a car te l and raise their prices accor-
dingly. Increased importation of inputs will entail a drain on foreign 
exchange resources (8) . 
The util ization of input is the final result from all these factors affec-
ting the demand side (5) and the supply side (6). 
Eventually, depending in par t on its elast ici ty of production and its 
cross-elast ici ty, with respect to other farm inputs, the increased util i-
zation of the subsidized farm input may entail a rise in farm output 
supply (13). 
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PART TWO 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES AND FARM 
LABOUR DISTORTIONS IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
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Par t two of this study consists of the major findings of an evaluation 
of agricultural subsidy programs in Trinidad and Tobago. The evalua-
tion was carried out by the author from 1982 to 1984 and concerned 
a number of direct farm input and farm output support measures. 
The declining terms of t rade against agriculture were important to 
the analysis of the agricultural subsidies on the two Caribbean sister-
islands. This was mainly caused by relatively high industrial wages, 
a heavily subsidized industrial sector , and the low status of agricul-
tural labour. ^ 
The empirical analysis therefore may have part icular relevance to 
agricultural subsidies directed against farm labour distortions. 
The investigation is based mainly on the results of two stratified 
sample surveys, viz. a survey of 609 crop farms (April-June 1983) 
and a survey of 79 dairy farms (October 1983). 
Since secondary data were in limited supply, the method employed 
consists in the main of a number of consecutive part ial equilibrium 
analyses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE INCIDENCE OF FARM LABOUR DISTORTIONS 
Our analysis of the incidence of farm labour distortions consists of 
th ree s tages . 
The first s tep in the assessment of the distortions is based on answers 
to the questions on risks and limiting factors in increasing farm p ro -
duction. We hypothesized tha t the re la t ive importance of the difficul-
ty of hiring farm labour and the wages of workers being too high 
as compared to other risks and limiting factors to be chosen by the 
farmers from a list, would provide an initial indication. 
The second s tep v/as the es t imat ion of production functions from a 
cross-section of the da ta . This procedure provided information on 
the two components of farm labour distortions namely farmer ' s own 
labour distortion and hired labour distort ion. 
Thirdly, we invest igated the economic efficiency of farm production 
t ha t was found to be relat ively less dis tor ted. This would provide 
a basis for ex-an te analysis of agricul tural subsidy programs. 
The th ree s tages a re discussed below in sections 4 .1 , 4.2, and 4.3 . 
Risks and Limiting Factors for Increasing Farm Production 
Concerning the questions on risks and limiting factors we asked the 
farmers to choose three risks or limiting factors out of 20 possible 
const ra ints , and rank them in order of impor tance . 
Three types of constraints were recorded most often, viz.: 'not enough 
land ' - l - , ; ' can ' t ge t workers to hire ' and 'wages of workers too high' 
- 2 - ; and 'pr ice of farm produce is too low' - 3 - . 
The rank and frequency of the recorded constra ints a re depicted in 
tab le 1. Only frequencies of more than 10% a re included. 
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Table 1 Rides and limiting Factors; Rank and Frequency of Recording 
in Percentage of Fanners 
Temporary Crops 
vegetables 
root crops 
land(l) labour(2) price(3) 
rank rank rank 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
% of farmers % of farmers % of farmers 
23 v ' 12 12 11 
13 21 13 14 24 
29 12 12 23 
rice 46 34 
Perennial Crops 
bananas/plantains 
cocoa 
coconut 
coffee 
c i t rus 
20 
20 13 15 
27 
25 32 
29 
13 
II 16 
14 
Dairy Farming 30 60 
(*) Example: 23% of vegetable farmers s ta ted 'not enough land' was 
the most important limiting fac tor . 
1 0 7 
It is c lear , tha t the labour constraint seems to be the major impedi-
ment to increasing farm production. 
'Not enough land' appears to be a serious constraint as well, especially 
to temporary crop farmers . 
The relat ive importance of this land-constraint will be discussed in 
the next section. An interest ing finding is, tha t other constraints 
on the input side, like prices of fer t i l izer , chemicals , and equipment 
were not recorded very often. 
4.2. The Estimation of Production Functions 
Crop Farming 
We knew from preliminary sample results tha t a vast majority of 
crop farmers farmed pa r t - t ime . 
The est imation of production functions would reveal if a significant 
difference existed between the production functions of pa r t - t ime 
farms and full-time farms. 
Next, we hoped to ascer ta in the distorting impact on hired labour. 
Thirdly, production functions might reveal the relat ive importance 
of the land-constraint . 
Firs t we a t t empted to e s t ima te 'normal ' types of agricultural produc-
tion functions for all crop farmers . We therefore grouped pa r t - t ime 
and full-time farmers together . 
'Normal ' or undistorted production functions contain as independent 
variables, inter alia: acreage , type of soil, slope, irr igation, fer t i l i -
ze rs , equipment, and hired labour. 
These independent variables a re , under undistorted conditions, often 
found to ref lect the farmers ' assets and managerial capabili t ies as 
well as the environmental factors beyond the farmers ' control . Both 
ca tegor ies , as hypothesized, determine the yield. 
However, the results from the regression of production (measured 
in returns) on the normal independent variables were disappointing. 
We found tha t the independent variables failed to provide an expla-
nation for the resul ts . 
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Then, as a second step in the estimation of production functions for 
crop farmers, we included the answers to the questions: 
'On average, about how many hours per week do you spend on your 
farm?' 
With the inclusion of answers to this question the regression results 
improved considerably. 
More or less acceptable regression results were obtained for seven 
out of the eleven estimated production functions (vide: (3), (4), (5), 
(7), (9), (10) and (11) in table 2. 
The regression results in table 2 lead us to the following observations. 
First, no normal (undistorted) relationship as indicated above, could 
be established so far. 
The reason was that too often we lacked data on farm inputs like 
fertilizer, seed or hired labour. 
Further enquiry into these missing data revealed that many part-t ime 
farmers utilized farm inputs on an irregular basis. 
This strongly confirmed our suspicion (which we already held) of dis-
torted crop production on part-t ime farms. 
Secondly, we observed that with regard to the temporary crops (3), 
(4) and (5) the variation in production levels is almost entirely explained 
by the number of hours per week the farmer spends on his farm. 
This confirmed our doubts concerning the land-constraint as stated 
by temporary crop farmers (excl. rice). The non-significance of acreage 
in production functions (3), (4) and (5) reduces a major influence of 
this constraint. 
We also tried to include total acreage, i.e. not only the acreage of 
(2) 
the major crop and the acreage owned. But neither trial improved 
the fit. Concerning the perennial crops (7), (9), (10) and (11) we see 
that the variation in production levels is also explained by the number 
of acres and to a lesser extent by the available equipment. 
In case of the perennials we may tentatively conclude that production 
is mainly determined by the amount of easily picked fruit the farmer 
can harvest within the time available. 
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Table 2 OLS - Estimates of Production Functions including Farmer's Own Labour Input 
Coefficient of: 
Crop Functional n Constant Hired Own R 2 DW 
Form Term Acreage Equipment 
TT$ 
Labour 
TT$ 
Labour 
Temporary Crops 
Vegetables Tr. (1) linear 172 104.75 17.68 
(8.67) 
0.32 
(0.10) 
145.69 
(118.36) 
0.11 1.90 
Rootcrops Tr. (2) linear 67 -2269.66 777.52 
(188.22) 
102.11 
(26.42) 
0.29 1.57 
Rootcrops To. (3) double-log 29 2.71 0.17 
(0.22) 
-2.89 
(0.13) 
1.27 
(0.23) 
0.57 2.10 
Grain/legumes Tr. (4) linear 36 -1178.9 700.7k* 
(431.67) 
0.18* 
(0.083) 
** 
73.90 
(24.47) 
0.48 2.69 
Rice Tr. (5) linear 48 -194.22 -64.81 
(137.61) 
** 
87.15 
(5.62) 
0.85 2.02 
Tr. Trinidad; To. Tobago; n number of observations; Own Labour in hours per week; * significant, t 0.80; 
** significant t 0.99; ( ) standard error 
Table 2 continued 
Coefficient of: 
Crop Functional n 
Form 
Constant Hired Own 
Term Acreage Equipment Labour Labour 
TT$ TT$ 
R DW 
2.11 
3.54 
Perennial Crops 
Cocoa Tr. (6) linear 49 -3278.1 
Cocoa To. (7) double-log 26 
Coffee Tr. (8) double-log 18 
Coconut Tr. (9) linear 33 -7147.03 
Coconut To. (10) double-log 11 
Citrus J r . (H) double-log 34 
0.93 
1.0 
246.62 
(74.27) 
* 
0.39 
(0.24) 
0.25 
2.36 
(0.55) 
* 
-0.59 
(0.67) 
0.46* 
(0.13) 
-3.01 
(0.16) 
-4.66 
(0.07) 
0.13 
( . 4) (0.07) 
1.19 
(0.17) 
* 
0.16 
(0.16) 
0.87* 
(0.05) 
8.65 
187.96 0.25 2.13 
0.48 1.35 
(120.51) 
0.88 
(0.22) 
0.67 0.40 1.31 
(0.07) (0.48) 
298.06 0.79 1.96 
0.83 1.35 
(77.02) ** 
2.30 
(0.68) 
1.46** 0.91 1.93 
(0.14) 
The larger the acreage the more easy fruit the re is to pick. The 
remainder is left on the t rees . 
Finally, the serious distortion with respect to the hired labour input 
could only be confirmed by the absence of da ta . As compared to 
actual labour requirements , hired labour was hardly used a t all . 
The third step in es t imat ing production functions was crucial in 
assessing the incidence of distortions because by running regressions 
for full-time crop farmers only, we could see if normal production 
functions could in fact be es t imated . 
Based on the available degrees of freedom and on the labour inten-
sity of the crops, we more or less arbitrari ly chose a 40-hours lower 
limit for rootcrop farmers and a 50-hours lower limit for vegetable 
farmers . 
The number of full-time farmers in the other categories of crops 
was too small as compared to the number of degrees of freedom 
we needed for the est imation of normal production functions. 
The results of these two regressions for full-time crop farmers a re 
depicted in table 3. 
These a re of par t icular in teres t for the analysis of farm input sub-
sidies. The production function for root crops is es t imated for 39 
farmers , which accounts for 41% of the to ta l number of root crop 
farmers surveyed. The average returns of full-time root crop farmers 
a re 2092 $TT/acre against 1018 $TT/acre for pa r t - t ime root crop 
(3) 
farmers . 
The production function for vegetables is based on 49 full-time vege-
table farmers , i.e. 31% of the tota l number surveyed. 
The returns for full-time farmers a re 7503 $TT/acre against 5847 
$TT/acre for the pa r t - t ime vegetable farmers . 
Because of the much larger acreage of full-time vegetable farms 
(2.9 acres full-time against 1.3 acres par t - t ime) the corresponding 
disparity in tota l re turns is more significant on vegetable farms 
than on root crop farms (viz.: root crop farms, 3556 $TT(ft) and 
1833 $TT(pt); vegetable farms, 21834 $TT(ft) and 7601 $TT(pt)). 
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Table 3 OLS - Estimates of Production Functions for Full-Time Vegetable ( £50 hrs/wk) and Root Crop Farmers 
(^40 hrs/wk) 
Coefficient of: 
Crop Functional n Constant R 2 DW 
Form Term Acreage Equipment Fertilizer Pesticides Seed Hired 
Labour 
$TT $TT $TT $ TT $TT 
Vegetables ( 50 hrs/wk) linear 49 4182.5 -4.50 3.05 23.99 -4.45* 48.53 -3.04* 0.71 2.30 
(9.66) (0.10) (6.41) (4.90) (10.23) (2.86) 
Root Crops ( 40 hrs/wk) linear 39 -611.8 7.21 
(2.91) 
2.28 
(0.04) 
** 
14.09 
(3.09) 
* 
-9.00 
(4.35) 
3.76 0.79 
(1.02) 
1.83 
n number of observations; * significant, t 0.80; ** significant, t 0.99; ( ) standard error 
Our conclusion is, t ha t a normal relevance of hired labour, chemicals , 
fert i l izer and seed to crop returns could not be falsified with regard 
to full-time rootcrop and vegetable farmers . 
Albeit without proof, we venture to postulate tha t the same will 
be t rue for other categories of full-time temporary crop farmers 
for which we possessed insufficient da ta . 
From these th ree consecutive s teps we can tentat ively deduce tha t 
the high opportunity costs for the farmers ' own labour leads to a 
distorted production on 50% to 70% of temporary crop farms. 
As for perennial crops, we assume a much heavier impact from farm 
labour distortion mainly because of the high labour intensity of peren-
nial crop farming. Two factors seemed to confirm this assumption: 
first, the large discrepancy between average returns and world ave-
rages (vide section 6.3.2); 
secondly, according to the sample results , we noted tha t the percen-
tage of full-time perennial crop farmers as compared to full-time 
temporary crop farmers was ext remely low. 
Dairy Farming 
The survey of 79 dairy farmers was analysed into a category of 
17 'marginal ' farmers with annual production levels of not more 
than 20.000 kg milk, and a category of 62 ' be t t e r ' dairy farmers 
with higher production levels. ^ 
All dairy farmers in the sample claimed to be full-t ime farmers . 
Since it is much more difficult to be a pa r t - t ime dairy farmer than 
a pa r t - t ime crop farmer, we were inclined to accep t these answers. 
The apparent absence of a distortion concerning the fa rmer ' s own 
labour enabled us to e s t ima te a normal production function for both 
ca tegor ies of dairy farmer (vide table 4). 
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Table 4 OLS - Estimates of Production Functions for High-Producing - (1) and Low-Producing Dairy Farmers (2) 
Functional 
Form 
n Constant 
Term 
Coefficient of 
R 2 DW 
Calving 
R a t e 
Acreage 
Improved 
Pasture 
Concent ra te 
Feed 
$TT 
Fert i l izer 
$TT 
Farmer ' s 
Own Labour 
Input 
Fencing 
$TT 
double - log ( 1 ) 62 6.87 0.57** 3.63* -0.14* -68.55 -2 .88 0.43 1.73 
(0.10) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.16) 
double ^ log (2) 17 1.17 0.99** 0.70* 3 .05* 0.54 1.64 
(0.38) (0.68) (0.03) 
n number of observations; * significant, t 0.80; ** significant, t 0.99; ( ) standard error; 
Calving Ra te is the ra t io : b i r ths /average no. of cows in milk plus average no. dry cows; 
Farmer ' s 'Own Labour Input in hours per week 
Comparing table 4 with table 3, we note that the fit for full-time 
temporary crop farming is superior to that for dairy farming. How-
ever, the following could be tenta t ive ly concluded. 
Apart from a minor influence from the farmer ' s own labour on produc-
tion levels for low-producing dairy farmers , production levels generally 
seem to be more re la ted to the quality than to the quanti ty of the 
fa rmer ' s own labour input. For it is clear tha t the major factor 
influencing production for both categories is the calving r a t e . In 
other words, the fa rmer ' s skill in get t ing his cows in calf. 
Economic Efficiency: A Prerequisite of Agricultural Subsidies 
Agricultural subsidy programs to enhance farm production can only 
be succesful if farmers a re maximizing their profit and hence res -
pond to changes in re la t ive pr ices . 
This profit-maximizing behaviour can be ascer ta ined by a t e s t for 
economic efficiency. 
A pract ica l method of test ing economic efficiency with the help 
of a cross-section of the da ta only is the normalized res t r ic ted profit 
function approach. 
Lau and Yotopoulos ^ ' have developed this approach which is based 
on Mc Fadden's theory of profit functions. ^ 
We will discuss this valuable tool for agricultural subsidy analysis 
in appendix 1. 
A problem is tha t this approach can not be applied when input prices 
a re fixed. 
For this reason we could not t e s t the economic efficiency of dairy 
farms since most inputs were supplied by the government a t fixed 
(subsidized) pr ices . 
For full-t ime root crop farmers we lacked the necessary information 
on farm input pr ices . We could therefore only t e s t the economic 
efficiency of full-t ime vegetable farmers . 
The principle of the normalized res t r ic ted profit function approach 
implies the es t imat ion of a profit function and the corresponding 
input demand functions. 
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Table 5 OLS - Estimates* 1 1* of the Normalized Restricted Profit 
Function and Input Demand Functions for Full-Time Vege-
table Farmers 
Normalized Rest r ic ted Profit Function 
2 
Constant Coefficients . R DW 
« 1 a2 « 3 ß{ ß2 
•X- -X- -X-
6.9 -0.51 1.21 -1.02 0.22 0.31 0.28 2.18 
(0.54) (0.75) (0.58) (0.08) (0.31) 
Input Demand Functions 
Coefficients 
D D D D 
«1 a2 a3 œ 4 
-0.3155 -0.048 -0.009 -0.074 
(0.347) (0.005) (0.001) (0.029) 
R 2 0.2 0.64 0.54 0.12 
Estimation Equations: c n 
Normalized res t r ic ted profit function: in ^ = constant + £ «j In ^ + ^ ^ In Zj 
-" c i x i 
input demand funct ions: — B — = aP i = l . . .m. 
7t 1 
Notation 
c l - wage hired labour x 3 - amount seed 
C 2 - pr ice ferti l izer x 4 - amount pesticides 
C 3 - pr ice seed Z l ' - value equipment 
C 4 - pr ice pesticides Z 2 - acreage 
X l - hours hired labour P - output price 
x 2 - amount fert i l izer Tt - profit: r e t u r n s - .2 
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The hypothesis of profit maximization is not falsified when the coef-
ficients, concerning the respect ive farm inputs a re equal in ei ther 
type of equation. 
Since the profit function is derived from a Cobb-Douglas type of 
production function, a t e s t of constant returns to scale is necessary 
for the t e s t of profit maximization (vide appendix 1). The regression 
results a re shown in table 5. 
Unfortunately, the fit of the es t imated normalised profit function 
2 
was ra ther poor: R = 0.28. 
Conversely the fit of the es t imated input demand functions of seed 
and fer t i l izer is acceptable , i .e . 0.54 and 0.64 respectively. 
We assigned a level of significance of 0.01 for the tes t of the hypo-
thesis of constant re turns to scale and for the t e s t of profit maxi-
mizat ion. 
The tes t s of both the hypotheses of constant re turns to scale and 
the hypothesis of profit maximization a re depicted in table 6. 
Table 6 Tests of Hypotheses of Constant Returns to Scale and Profit 
Maximization 
Hypothesis of Profit Computed F Cri t ica l F -va lues 
Maximization 
n \ (a., a P)2/3 
a - a u 2 v i i 
1 " 1 fcl 1 
D 
•0.212 F ( 3 , 4 5 ) n < w = 42 
D I V / 4 5 m 
Hypothesis of Constant R e -
turns t o Scale ^ 
W 1 ( / } . + / Î - - l) 2/2 
- 4 9 - h d - 0 : 2 7 1 H 2 , 4 6 ) a 9 9 = 5.1 
£ e.746 
fcl 1 
Both Categor ies of Hypotheses not Rejec ted 
118 
For both hypotheses the computed F-value did not exceed the cr i -
t ical F-value from the F-distribution. 
Hence we conclude tentat ively (poor fit profit function) tha t the 
hypothesis of profit maximization can not be rejected. 
Extending this t en ta t ive result loosely, we assume tha t , given the 
actual production s t ruc ture , full-time crop farmers a re in principle 
efficient farmers . 
Generally, agricultural subsidies affect farm production tha t is 
relatively undistorted first , i .e. only when this category of 'undistor-
ted' farmers responds efficiently to price changes. 
For this reason it is important to ascer ta in the price responsiveness 
of farmers prior to the implementation of the subsidies. 
Otherwise subsidies a re mere social income support programs having 
no substantial impact on production levels. 
If pr ice responsiveness is doubtful, it may be be t te r to refrain from 
direct subsidization and try something else. 
For instance, the more pr ice-neutral public investment programs 
we discussed in section 1.3.3 a re likely to be preferred in these 
cases . 
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NOTES 
1. E.g., from our discussions with farmers we learnt tha t very few 
wanted one of their sons to become a farmer . 
Whether or to what ex ten t the low s ta tus of agricultural labour 
is related to the period of unfree labour before emancipation in 
1838, or to the period of the importat ion of indentured labour from 
India (1838-1917) or to the demonstrat ion effect of petroleum induced 
industrialization and urbanization or to other factors is a question 
we will not a t t e m p t to answer here . 
2. The questions and answers on farm production and marketing in 
the questionnaire apply only to the fa rmer ' s main crop. 
3 . Again, average and to ta l re turns for one main crop only. 
4. We took the 1982-production figures as a basis. 
5. Vide Yotopoulos, P.A. and Lau, L.J. , 'Microeconomic Output Supply 
and Factor Demand Functions in the Agriculture of the Province 
of Taiwan' , American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 58, 
1976, pp. 333-340. 
6. Vide McFadden, D., 'Cost , Revenue and Profit Functions' in 'Produc-
tion Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory and Applications' , Vol. 
1, Eds. M. Fuss and D. McFadden, North-Holland Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam, 1978. 
7. Joint es t imat ion of both equations by means of generalized least 
squares (i.e. Zellner 's method) may lead to more efficient e s t ima tes . 
Vide Zellner, A., 'An Efficient Method for Estimating Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressons and Tests for Aggregation Bias ' , Journal of 
the American Stat is t ical Association, Vol. 57, June 1962, pp. 348-
368. 
8. The tes t s a re defined in appendix 1. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FARM INPUT SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 
In this chapter we a t t emp t to explain why a number of farm input 
subsidy programs have not been succesful in improving the agr i -
cultural t e rms of t rade . The major reasons for programme failure, 
in our opinion, a re explained systematical ly with the help of the 
analytical framework outlined in section 3.4.2. 
Subsequently we will evaluate the actual impact on util ization of 
farm inputs and on production levels. In a second section we discuss 
the relevance of es t imat ing production functions for subsidy appraisal. 
A third section is devoted to an ex-ante analysis of ferti l izer subsidy. 
5.1 Ex-post Analysis of Farm Input Subsidy Programs 
5.1.1 Administrative Design 
Most of the farm input subsidy programs to be analysed in this 
chapter came on s t ream in the early seventies . 
The whole package contained some 25 different programs, viz. 
(1) 
subsidies on land preparat ion, fer t i l izers , chemicals , spraying e-
quipment, machinery and equipment, water s torage/ i rr igat ion, coffee 
rehabil i tat ion, cocoa rehabili tat ion, orchard establishment, soil 
conservation, pas ture establishment, ground l imestone, livestock 
housing, livestock feed, vehicles, wheel t r ac to r s , drying facil i t ies, 
farm roads, bridges and culverts , fencing, molasses, jiffy pellets 
and pots , bee-keeping equipment and loans. 
Excep t for livestock feed, where subsidization was paid a t source, 
t h e administrat ive design of most of these specific input subsidies 
implied application, assessment, approval, and (delayed) payment 
subject to presentat ion of bills. 
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From the analysis of the survey results and our discussions with 
farmers and extension officers we identified four major defects 
in the administrat ive system, viz.: 
(i) the programs were not sufficiently directed against farm labour 
distortion 
(ii) lack of familiarity with the large number of different subsidies 
(iiil the diseconomies of adminis t ra t ive procedures 
(iv) the delays in subsidy payments 
(i) The Programs were not Sufficiently Directed Against Farm Labour 
Distortion 
This defect is probably the most serious. In section 2 .1 . where we 
discussed domestic distort ions, it was proven theoret ical ly tha t the 
best policy against a factor distortion is a factor tax-cum-subsidy 
in the opposite direction of the distort ion. 
A tax-cum-subsidy on production was considered a second-best solution. 
In our case the l a t t e r implies farm output subsidies (vide next chapter) . 
Conversely, it is difficult to see how farm input subsidies, other 
than for labour or labour-substi tuting technologies, can possibly be 
successful. 
If most farmers feel they can be t te r improve or make their present 
income levels more secure by other act ivi t ies or a re impeded in 
their efforts to increase production by serious labour shortages, 
(2) 
cheap fer t i l izer or chemicals will not improve the s t a t e of affairs. 
In other words, the subsidy will then only have an income effect . 
The farmer will purchase the same amount of the cheaper farm input 
and save some money. 
An exception has to be made for the so-called t r ac to r pool. This 
program formed par t of the subsidy on machinery and equipment. 
The t rac to r pool, where farmers could hire t r ac to r s a t low prices , 
reduced the hired labour constraint for temporary crop farmers in 
a number of cases. 
In principle, other subsidies on mechanizat ion could have a similar 
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result , but the fourth defect , i .e . delays in subsidy payments , ensured 
tha t in our case these were merely used for cheap replacement 
(i.e. a t no faster pace than usual). 
The t rac tor pool, on the other hand, was a subsidy which had no 
t ime delays (except for the waiting list). 
For dairy farming we noted a similar inbalance in farm input sub-
sidization. As s ta ted earl ier , in addition to the hired labour constraint 
we observed a distortion in the quality of the farmer 's own labour. 
The dirty stables, the large number of cases of masti t is and the 
low calving ra tes corroborated this view. 
Dairy farming requires constant close monitoring of animals in a 
hygienic environment which in turn requires both efficient management 
and sufficient farm labour. 
Farm input subsidies for dairy farming consisted in the main of 
cheap provision of concent ra te feed. Clearly, this subsidy was not 
directed against quant i ta t ive or qual i ta t ive labour distortion. 
(ii) Lack of Familiari ty with the Large Number of Different Subsidies 
No less than 41% of the farmers in the surveys were found to be 
entirely unaware of farm input subsidy programs. 
The remaining 59% can be analysed as follows: 14% of farmers 
could mention one subsidy; 27% could mention 2-4 different subsidies; 
14% could mention 5-8; and less than 4% could recall more than 
8 different subsidies. 
The distribution of relat ive awareness was rather askew. Large 
farmers closer to urban cent res were found to be more subsidy-
conscious than small-scale farmers in rural a reas . Despite considerable 
governmental efforts to promote the programme, we feel that the 
complexity of the whole package impeded a wider coverage. 
(iii) The Diseconomies of Administrative Procedures 
The first diseconomy was the t ime involved in administrat ive proce-
dures for application, assessment, approval and payment of the 
subsidies. 
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Our regional es t imates vary from 50% to 80% of the available 
man-hours. Since most subsidies were administered by extension 
services, this brought about a serious reduction of usual extension 
work. 
Secondly, complicated procedures encouraged fraudulent use of 
the subsidies by e.g. making it possible for farmers to apply twice 
for the same farm input. 
A third problem for the extension services was the conflict in 
being an extension-officer trying to c r ea t e good relationships with 
farmers on one hand, and on the other hand being a subsidy-officer 
who has to assess subsidy applications (e.g. rejecting unrealist ic 
bills for the purchase of fert i l izer and chemicals , and repeatedly 
warning farmers not to apply for a larger acreage , for a subsidy 
on land preparat ion, than was in fact being cul t ivated) . 
(iv) The Delays in Subsidy Payments 
Most delays in subsidy payments varied between 6 months and 
1 1/2 years . 
These belated payments , combined with a high r a t e of inflation 
(i.e. 15%) which was already enhancing the t ime-preference of 
recipients , probably increased further the income effect of the 
farm input subsidies. 
5.1.2 Monopoly in Supply of Subsidized Farm Inputs 
Apart from deficiencies in adminis t ra t ive design, the impact of 
farm input subsidies on uti l ization can also be reduced by higher 
farm input pr ices . Of course, a subsidy induced shift in demand 
for farm inputs facing an unchanged supply schedule, will always 
entai l rising pr ices . However, under normal c i rcumstances (more 
or less full competi t ion) supply will shift as well, which dampens 
the pr ice increase . 
A problem a r i s e s when producers of farm inputs (or importing 
firms of farm inputs from abroad) ant ic ipate the subsidies and 
form a car te l or when monopoly power already exists . 
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In such circumstances a large par t of the subsidies, in stead of 
being transferred to farmers , is siphoned off by monopolistic sup-
pliers. The existence of monopoly power can be ascertained by 
(L) 
computing Herfindahl 's index. 
In our case, one of the heaviest subsidized farm inputs, i.e. fert i l izer, 
was locally produced. The computed index for three major categories 
of ferti l izer varied between 0.5 and 1.0 (minimum = 0 and maximum 
= 1), which does not falsify the existence of monopoly power. 
The exercise of monopoly power can be ascertained by the com-
putat ion of Lerner 's i n d e x . ^ 
In our case i t was important to investigate if — ~ M C ^ or ^ P p A C ^ 
(AC are the , easier to compute , average costs which a re an approxi-
mation for MC assuming constant returns to scale; proof trivial) 
increased af ter the imposition of the subsidy program on fertilizer. 
However, neither MC nor AC could be computed, so we decided 
to compare the growth r a t e of retai l prices for ferti l izer and chemi-
cals with the general inflation r a t e of approximately 15%. 
The following average growth ra tes for prices were computed 
(1977-1982). 
Pr ice Super Phosphate (heavily subsidized fertil izer) 24% 
Price Diathane (heavily subsidized chemical) 25% 
The chemical was imported duty-free. Since the growth ra te of 
prices of most other subsidized farm inputs kept pace with or 
lagged behind the es t imated 15%, we tentat ively concluded that 
monopoly power was exercised with respect to ferti l izer and chemi-
cals . 
5.1.3 Utilization of Farm Inputs and Production 
In this section we will evaluate the actual impact on utilization 
of farm inputs and production levels. 
Crop Farming 
The ex-post evaluation concerning input util ization was carried 
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out with simple chi-square t e s t s . 
This was possible since we faced a with-without situation with 
respect to 41% non-part icipating crop farmers and 59% par t i c i -
pating crop farmers . Of course, we could only tes t the most im-
por tan t subsidies in t e rms of par t ic ipat ion. These were , in order 
of importance, the subsidies on land preparat ion, fert i l izer and 
chemicals . 
Firs t we tes ted the exis tence of a relationship between part icipat ion 
in a farm input subsidy program and uti l ization of tha t specific 
farm input for all crop farmers . The tes t results a re given in table 
7 below. 
For most cases in table 7 we found no relationship between subsidy 
and uti l ization. 
Conversely, a strong relationship was found between the subsidy 
for land preparat ion and the number of hired labour hours, with 
a t r ac to r . 
A weak relat ion was revealed with chemicals and fer t i l izers . 
The next step in our analysis was the computat ion of Pearson 's 
ra t io for the different ca tegor ies of par t ic ipat ing crop farmers . 
In the case of vegetable farmers we established a similar, but 
stronger, relationship to tha t in table 7 (i.e. hired labour for plough-
ing and rotavat ing by t r ac to r , expenditures on fert i l izers and 
chemicals) . 
No relationship a t all could be established for the other categories 
of crop farmers . 
The third step was to see if, within the category of vegetable 
farmers , regional c lusters could be found. 
In fac t , our tr ial for one specific vegetable a rea proved to be 
the last p iece in the puzzle . 
The proportions of farmers in this a rea part ic ipat ing in subsidies 
on mechanical land preparat ion, chemicals , fer t i l izers and spraying 
equipment were 80%, 83%, 88% en 66% respect ively. 
The subsidy-minded farmers in this area were also utilizing these 
farm inputs heavily. Subsequently we subtrac ted the tables on 
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Table 7 First Analysis - All Crop Farmers, Relationship Farm Input 
Subsidies and Utilization Farm Inputs 
Tested 
Subsidy On: 
Relationship 
Measurement: 
Pearson's X2(dî,0.90) X2(df,0.995) Tentative 
Ratio Conclusion 
Mech. Land Prep. 
Manual Land Prep. 
Mech. Land Prep. 
Manual Land Prep. 
Land Preparation 
Land Preparation 
Land Preparation 
Fertilizers 
Chemicals 
Chemicals 
Cult. Acreage 
Wet Season 
Cult. Acreage 
Wet Season 
Cult. Acreage 
Dry Season 
Cult. Acreage 
Dry Season 
Hired Labour 
Tractor 
Hired Labour 
Cutlassing 
Hired Labour 
Bed Formation 
Expenditure 
Fertilizers 
Expenditure 
Weed Killers 
Expenditure 
Insecticides 
1.94 
0.56 
1.72 
0.51 
11.67 
3.08 
4.20 
9.23 
6.56 
1.95 
6.25 
6.25 
6.25 
6.25 
6.25 
6.25 
6.25 
6.25 
4.61 
6.25 
11.34 
11.34 
11.34 
11.34 
11.34 
11.34 
11.34 
11.34 
9.21 
11.34 
no relation 
no relation 
no relation 
no relation 
strong relation 
no relation 
no relation 
weak relation 
weak relation 
no relation 
part icipat ion and uti l ization for this category of subsidy-minded 
farmers from the corresponding tables for all crop farmers , and 
computed Pearson 's ra t io ' s again. 
Apart from the fact tha t all computed ra t io ' s for all crop farms 
minus the subsidy-minded farmers declined substantially, the relat ion-
ships which had previously established also disappeared, namely: 
- subsidy on land preparat ion/hired labour ( t ractor) : 5.46 
- subsidy on fer t i l izer /expendi ture on fert i l izers : 5.25 
- subsidy on weed ki l lers/expenditure on weed killers : 2.06 
Our last step was to invest igate If a causal relationship existed 
between the high degree of part icipat ion and the high level of 
util ization of the inputs for subsidy-minded farmers . 
For this purpose answers to the following question were analysed: 
(a) If you had not received a subsidy for the inputs you s ta ted 
(in the previous question), would you have used the same amount 
of input or less of i t? 
(b) Which inputs would you use more of if the amount of subsidies 
were increased? 
We were aware tha t these questions a re ra ther t ransparent . We 
therefore expected a bias towards a decreased util ization when 
the subsidy was decreased, and conversely a bias towards increased 
util ization when the subsidy was increased. 
The findings, however, conflicted with our expecta t ions . It appears 
tha t the subsidy-minded, farmers hardly would use any less inputs 
if the subsidies were decreased. Also, the number of subsidy-minded 
farmers , who would use more farm inputs if the subsidy were in-
creased, was relat ively low. 
The answers of subsidy-minded farmers to questions (a) en (b) 
a re displayed in table 8. 
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Table 8 Reaction of Subsidy-Minded Farmers to Increase/Decrease in Farm Input Subsidies 
Subsidy on: Par t i c i -
pating 
Farmers 
Increased Subsidies 
Would Use: 
More Inputs 
Decreased Subsidies 
Would Use 
Less Inputs The Same Amount 
No. No. % No. % No. % 
Mechanical Land 33 
Preparat ion 
Chemicals 34 
Fert i l izers 36 
Spraying 27 
Equipment 
3 9 
18 53 
21 58 
2 7 
4 12 
6 17 
6 22 
30 91 
30 88 
30 83 
21 78 
Although the hypothesis of a causal relationship between pa r t i -
cipation and util ization has to be re jected, the findings do show 
the relat ive impor tance of the subsidy on fert i l izers as compared 
to other farm input subsidies. 
In addition we computed the ra t io ' s of the answers to the following 
twin-questions: 
(c) Which of the subsidies you receive, do you consider to be 
most important for maintaining your level of production? 
(d) Which of the subsidies you receive, do you consider to be 
least Impor tant? 
: ( 'most / least important ' ratio) 
-i Subsidy on mechanical land preparat ion 7/9 = 0.78 
Subsidy on Chemicals 9/3 = 3.0 
- Subsidy on fert i l izers 15/2 = 7.5 
' Subsidy on spraying equipment 2/12 = 0.17 
i Despite the fact tha t the survey may show that the subsidy on 
' fer t i l izers may possibly have an impact , we conclude tha t current 
farm- 'input "subsidy programs for crop farmers have had no impact 
* on, the-ut i l iza t ion of farm inputs. Pr iva te discussions with farmers 
* and extension officers corroborated to this view. 
Against the ' background of the rejection of the hypothesis on 
the relationship between the par t ic ipat ion in farm subsidy pro-
grams and the uti l ization by crop farmers , a t es t on the impact 
on production becomes, of .course , s u p e r f l u o u s . ^ 
Apart from this a-priori zero impact , an ex-post evaluation of 
the impact on production was hampered in any case by the 
exis tence of other subsidies. 
Dairy Farming 
With respect to dairy farmers we noted a close relationship be-
tween the input subsidy programs and levels of ut i l izat ion. 
The major input subsidy was the one for concent ra te feed. Apart 
from a few exceptional cases in our survey (administrative pro-
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blems in applying for the subsidy) all dairy farmers received 
this input subsidy. Hence we could not carry out a chi-square 
analysis. 
Nevertheless, we tentatively conclude that there was an over-
utilization of concentrate feed because of the subsidies. The 
first reason is that the ratio kg. concentrate feed/lit. milk was 
computed a t 61% for the high producing and 82% for the low 
producing farmers (the usual ratio is approximately around 35%). 
Secondly, the significant negative coefficient for concentrate 
feed (vide table 4) indicates that utilization has been pursued 
far beyond optimal levels. 
A second important subsidy was the one for pasture improvement. 
We found a close but perhaps trivial relationship between part i -
cipation in the subsidy program for pasture establishment (49% 
of farmers) and acreage under improved pasture. 
In answer to the question - if the price of concentrate feed in-
creased by 25 percent per bag, would you: 
(e) buy less or the same amount of concentrate feed? 
(f) grow more pasture or keep the same acreage of pasture? 
42% of the farmers would buy less and 58% would buy the same 
amount of concentrate feed, and not less than 83% would grow 
more pasture. 
Conclusions concerning the observed relationship between the 
subsidy on concentrate feed and pasture improvement could be 
summarized as follows: 
(i) substitution - a price increase of 25% in concentrate feed 
entails an extension in improved pasture on 
83% of dairy farms 
(8) 
(ii) elasticities - a reduction of 1% in public expenditure for 
concentrate feed leads to a 0.14% increase 
in milk production; and an extension in improved 
pasture of 1% entails a production increase 
of 3.16% 
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(iii) 'mos t / l eas t 
important ' ra t io - 38 dairy farmers considered the subsi-
dy on pas ture improvement , 8 consi-
d e r e d t h e subsidy on concent ra te 
feed to be most impor tant . 
(iv) public expenditure - from the to ta l input subsidy payments 
to dairy farmers of 27.400.000 $TT, 
27.250.000 $TT was spent on concen-
t r a t e feed and only 22.900 $TT on 
pas ture improvement . 
The exac t magnitude of welfare loss from the subsidy on con-
cen t r a t e feed is difficult to ascer ta in because several distorting 
effects have to be added to this loss. 
First , we are convinced, tha t the subsidy maintained a large 
group of inefficient dairy farmers (viz. low calving r a t e s , mast i t is) . 
Without the subsidy, a cer ta in proportion of these marginal farmers 
would possibly have left the industry. 
Secondly, in view of the potent ia l substi tution vis-a-vis pas ture 
improvement (0) above) the emphasis on concen t ra te feed in 
fact impeded a production increase from pas ture improvement . 
Because, if we keep tota l expenditure on farm input subsidies 
unchanged, a minor increase in the ra t io (expenditure pas ture 
improvement /expendi ture concen t ra te feed) would enhance milk 
production. 
The Relevance of Production Functions to Subsidy Analysis 
Farm input subsidy programs a re generally focussed on farm 
inputs with a large marginal physical product which a re relatively 
underutil ized. 
These two proper t ies a re often ascer ta ined with the help of 
production functions. Below, we shall briefly review these typical 
tools for designing the appropr ia te farm input subsidy policy. 
Next, we will discuss the corresponding values for full-t ime vege-
table and root crop farmers and high- and low producing dairy 
farmers (vide tables 3 and 4) respectively. 
Under normal or undistorted conditions, it is hypothesized that 
a profit maximizing farmer will a l locate his inputs in the following 
fashion: 
n m _ m 
max. *=ZP.Q.-IP..X..+A(X -X,)+M"(X P..X..~ B), 
i=l * ' ] = ' 11 1) * K }=!• il 11 
where P ^ is the price of the i-th product , ; P.^ is the price 
for the j - th input, X^ , used for the i-th product; A and fi are 
Lagrange multipliers, X^is the shor t - term physical input contraint 
(e.g. land, labour) and B is the budget available to the farmer. 
In theory, by inverting the coefficient matr ix and computing 
the scalor equation, the n x m + 2 differential equations can 
be solved, so tha t the optimal input-output mix can be determined. 
In reali ty, where continuous functions rarely exist , an appropriate 
method tha t approximates to this equilibrium under constraints 
is given by e.g. linear programming. 
The marginal physical product of a farm input . (MPP) is the first 
' s o 
derivative of output with respect to an input, hence . i, 
. SX.. il 
The over- or underutilization of a farm input can be ascertained 
by the relat ive marginal value productivit ies computed a t the 
mean. 
This can be obtained as follows. Farm profit is maximized when 
the marginal profit with respect to a farm input is zero . 
Hence * L i L - »1 P*ft Q 
H e n c e ax.. - «x.. sx.. - 0 
(without subscripts) P^ - P^ = 0 
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P X P X x x 
«a A E Q 
SX Q 1 1 X 
P X and P Q a r e often subst i tuted by their average values, i .e. 
X q 
P X and P Q. x q v 
The degree of over- or under uti l ization is approximated by solving 
the ra t io for P x , i .e . t he marginal value product (MVP). 
The computed value can thus be compared with the ac tua l average 
input p r ice . If the MVP exceeds P x then the farm input is under-
ut i l ized; conversely, if P x exceeds MVP then the input is over-
uti l ized. 
Of course, the application of this rule of thumb is highly contingent 
upon the reliability of the production function e s t ima te s . 
One reason why some caution must be exercised in the use of 
single-equation production functions for subsidy analysis is the 
exis tence of simultaneous equation bias. This bias re la tes to 
the mutual interdependencies within the farm input matr ix , and 
between inputs and outputs . Theoret ical ly, a production function 
model would be be t t e r described by a system of simultaneous 
equations, each represent ing a different causal relat ionship. 
Again, the da ta requirements of such a model prevent i ts wide 
application. 
Mainly for this reason single-equation production functions have 
often been used, implicitly based on the hope tha t the es t imated 
e las t ic i t ies a re not grea t ly biased. 
One grea t advantage of the normalized res t r ic ted profit function 
approach is tha t these mutual inter-dependencies rarely exist . 
For the variation in profit is solely explained by the variat ions 
in input pr ices and fixed assets (vide table 5). 
A drawback is, t ha t this approach which is s ta t is t ica l ly more 
efficient cannot be applied when most farmers face similar input-
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and output pr ices . 
In this respect it is interesting to observe with respect to full-
t ime vegetable farms the differences between indirect production 
elast ici t ies from the normalized res t r ic ted profit function approach 
and the direct e last ici t ies from the es t imated single-equation 
production function. 
Table 9 Indirect Est imates Direct Est imates 
(table 5) (table 3) 
Prod. Elast ici t ies: 
Fer t i l izer 0.048 0.62 
Seed 0.009 0.53 
Equipment 0.22 2.48 
Intuitively, the smaller indirectly es t imated elast ici t ies will 
correspond more closely to reali ty than the direct es t imates . 
Nevertheless, the signs as well as the relat ive magnitudes do 
match . 
We think that the direct es t imates a re overs ta ted here due to 
a neglect of positive cross-elast ici t ies of farm inputs in the 
single-equation production function. 
In table 10 we have depicted the marginal physical product and 
the marginal value product . The figures in table 10 also seem 
to suggest tha t the computation of the two yard-st icks, MPP 
and MVP, be t t e r a re based on profi t - and input demand functions 
than on production functions. 
Since the average price for a bag of fert i l izer amounts to 
50 $TT, the MVP of 93 indicates under-util ization of this farm 
input. 
Conversely, for seed we observed an average price of 100 $TT, 
which implies over-uti l ization when compared with a MVP of 
83. Over-uti l ization is also confirmed by the negative MPP's 
for chemicals and concent ra te feed. As for chemicals , we conclude 
tha t subsidization of this farm input may even have aggravated 
the external i t ies from this input use, i.e. pollution of surface 
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waters and residuary chemicals on purchased vegetables . 
Table 10 Marginal Physical Products and Marginal Value Products 
Type of Production Marginal Physical Product Marginal Value Product 
(Lbs, lit) ($Tf ) 
Full-Time Vegetable 
Production 
hired labour 
fer t i l izer 
chemicals 
seed 
NRPF* 1 0 ) S E P F ( 1 1 ) N R P F ^ S E P F ( 1 1 ) 
1.86 
0.83 
-3.04 
23.99 
-4.45 
48.55 
93 
83 
1201 
489 
Full-Time Root 
Crop Production 
hired labour 
fer t i l izer 
chemicals 
ac reage 
3.76 
14.09 
-9.00 
7.21 
272 
704 
3288 
Dairy production 
(High) 
calving r a t e 
improved pas ture 
concen t ra t e feed 
35.13 
1025.02! 
-0.48 
18150 
Dairy Production 
(Low) 
calving r a t e 
fa rmer ' s own labour 
fencing 
58.03 
27.50 
21.23 
697 
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However, we repeat , no causal relationship could be established 
between subsidy and- util ization up to this point. 
Further we note in table 10 a much higher MVP for improved 
pasture than for land for root crop farming. 
To conclude the ex-ante analysis based on es t imated elast ici t ies , 
potent ia l scope for subsidization seems to exist only with regard 
to fert i l izer and improved pas ture . Scope for extension and educa-
tion concerning dairy farm management is confirmed by the 
computed MPP's for calving ra t e s . 
Ex-Ante Analysis of a Subsidy on Fertilizer 
Even if we exclude the problems of administrat ive design and 
labour distortions, par t of a fert i l izer subsidy for full-time vege-
table farmers will still be siphoned off by monopolistic suppliers. 
We shall demonst ra te below how a part ia l equilibrium framework 
may provide a prac t ica l basis for appraisal of these monopoly 
effects . 
We computed the following elast ici t ies from the es t imated coeffi-
cient for fert i l izer in the input demand function: 
- price elast ici ty of demand for fert i l izer with respect to 
vegetables - 1.048 
- own pr ice elast ici ty of vegetable 
supply 0.057 
- production elast ici ty of vegetables with respect to 
fertil izer 0 . 0 4 6 ( 1 2 ) 
The other assumptions concerning paramete rs and data s tem 
from our survey results as well as from secondary data collection. 
They are summarized in table 11. 
Our par t ia l equilibrium analysis applies only to full-time vegetable 
farmers . This is because, for the category of pa r t - t ime farmers, 
we assume no potential impact on utilization and production. 
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Table 11 Assumptions for the Partial Welfare Analysis of a 
Fertilizer Subsidy to Vegetable Farmers 
Total no. of vegetable farmers 3200 
No. of full-t ime vegetable farmers 980 
Total value vegetable production 38 604800 $TT 
Value full-time vegetable production 21 400000 $TT 
Fer t i l izer consumption on all vegetable farms 1 500000 lbs 
Fer t i l izer consumption on full-time vegetable farms 1 100000 lbs 
Ex-ante price of 100 lbs fert i l izer (Super Phosphate) 50 $TT 
Price incidence of monopoly power in fer t i l izer supply 10 % 
Fer t i l izer subsidy to vegetable farmers 30 % 
A fert i l izer subsidy to p a r t - t i m e farmers probably has only an 
income ef fec t . Fur thermore , the exercise of monopoly power 
will in fact raise this income subsidy. In s tead of 60000 $TT 
(i.e. 0.3 x 400000 x 50 $TT/100 lbs) p a r t - t i m e vegetable farmers 
will receive 66000 $TT (i.e. 0.3 x 400000 x 55 $TT/lbs). This 
amounts per p a r t - t i m e farm household to respect ively: 27 $TT 
and 30 $TT. The ne t income effect will be 18 $TT and 21 $TT. 
In section 3.4 where we discussed the par t ia l equilibrium effects 
of an input subsidy the world supply curve of fer t i l izer was 
completely e las t ic . 
Conversely, in our case the subsidy only applies to locally produced 
fer t i l izer . Therefore, the slope of the monopolistic supply curve 
(13) 
bends upwards. 
Based on the es t ima ted e las t ic i t ies , we assume tha t a subsidy 
of 15 $TT per bag (in figure 23: P x - P x ) would increase demand 
from 1 100000 lbs to 1 445840 lbs. 1 2 
In figure 23 this has been depicted by paral lel demand shift from 
A to C. 
However, since supply is not completely e las t ic a new equilibrium 
will be achieved a t B. P - P is the incidence of monopoly 
. X^ X j 
power, which equals 5 $TT/bag. 
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Figure 23 Farm Input Subsidy and Monopoly in Farm Input Supply 
At B the farmers pay 55 $TT/bag and receive 16.5 $TT (P - P ) 
3 4 
af terwards from the government. The quanti ty of fert i l izers 
a t B is JC, , i .e. 1365144 lbs. Based on the es t imated production 
elast ic i ty with respect to fert i l izer and assuming no monopoly, 
the subsidy would increase production to Q^. The corresponding 
value of this production increase is 309495 $TT. The exercise 
of monopoly power reduces somewhat this potent ia l production 
increase. This t ime the increase is only - Qj , i .e. 237280 
$TT. 
With reference to section 3.4.1. , the impact of monopoly power 
on the 5 distinquished welfare effects from a ferti l izer subsidy 
can now be quantified. 
139 
1. The Impact of Monopoly on Direct Government Cost 
The direct government cost ex-monopoly is represented by the 
a rea P P DC, i .e. 216876 §TT. 
X , x ^ 
Cum-monopoly we have: P P EB, i .e . 225249 $TT. 
x 3 xu 
The exercise of monopoly power, therefore , increases direct govern-
ment cost by 8373 $TT, tha t is 4%. 
2. The Impact of Monopoly on Farmer's Surplus 
Farmer ' s surplus would be represented ex-monopoly by the area ' 
above the shifted supply curve S(Q)" and under the world marke t 
pr ice P . 
q 
Assuming a paral lel supply shift, the ex-monopoly increase is 
fa rmer ' s surplus is t h e r e f o r e - g - g ^ - (309495~$TT) = 292805 $TT. 
Conversely, the cum-monopoly increase in fa rmer ' s surplus amounts 
to ~f (237280 $TT) = 224484 $TT. '. 
The exercise of monopoly power reduces welfare to farmers 
by 68321 $TT, which is 23%. 
3. The Impact of Monopoly on Resources used in Additional 
Production 
The ex-monopoly increase in resources for additional production 
is on the one hand represented by the a rea under S(Q)" from 
Qj to and on the o ther hand by X ^ X 2 CA. 
1 
Hence: 1 (309495 $TT) + 172920 $TT = 189333 $TT. . 
1 + .0D57 
The cum-monopoly increase in used resources is: 
~ " ^ H - (237280 $TT) + ± ( P v + P v ) ( X , - X . ) = 151784 $TT. 
1 + 0.057 1 X 3 X l •* 1 
Apparently, under monopoly, 20% less resources will be used. 
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4. The Increase in Monopoly Surplus 
Here we have the ext ra profit to the monopolistic supplier of 
the subsidized fert i l izer . This monopoly profit is represented 
by the a rea P P AB, which can be approximated by 
x 3 x l 
1/2 (X, + X,) (P - P ) = 61629 $TT. 
5. The Impact of Monopoly on Foreign Exchange Savings 
When the government subsidizes locally produced fert i l izers 
as well as imported fer t i l izers , the situation is similar to the 
one we displayed in figure 2 0 . ^ ^ 
Assuming tha t P is the world market pr ice, the change in 
1 
foreign exchange savings ex-monopoly is represented by the 
difference between the a r e a s . P f Q ^ - Q j ) and XjJCCA. 
Hence: 309495 $TT - 172920 "$TT= 136575 $TT. 
Cum-monopoly the change is only represented by 
P q ( Q 2 - Q 1 ) = 237280 $TT. 
To conclude, the exercise (and public protection) of monopoly 
power in the supply of subsidized farm input entails the following 
three major welfare effects : it decreases fa rmer ' s welfare, 
it enhances direct government cost , and it saves foreign exchange. 
The shadow pr ice , however, of saving foreign exchange by sub-
sidizing local fert i l izer only is relatively high. This can easily 
be shown by computing the relevant cost /benefi t ra t io ' s for 
e i ther approach, viz. cum- and ex-monopoly. 
Cost/Benefi t Rat io ' s Cum-Monopoly Ex-Monopoly 
(C/B) ( 1 5 ) 2.05 1.98 
FE 
(C/B) ( 1 6 ) 1.00 1.35 
D 
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These findings also i l lus t ra te our discussion about the distorting 
effects of subsidies (vide section 3.1.1). For we have shown 
here how the react ion of a monopolistic supplier of fert i l izer 
to an indirect subsidy decreased the impact of a direct subsidy 
to the farmers . 
Conversely, if we assume in the case of a ferti l izer subsidy 
ex-monopoly a shift in local fert i l izer supply, e.g.* from A to 
F (which is not unlikely to happen in the longer run), <G/B) p g 
would then amount t o : 
change farmer ' s surplus + P^Qj-Q{) " XjX^CF 
direct government cost 
This t ime, the welfare gains, as compared to the situation 
of subsidy cum-monopoly, a re three-fold. For, now the foreign 
exchange savings from reduced vegetable imports largely exceed 
the losses from imported fer t i l izer , viz.: 
309495 $TT - 40348 $TT = 269147 $TT. 
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NOTES 
1. I.e. herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, nematicides, and acaricides. 
2. However, we do not wish to deny the existence of a possible sub-
st i tut ion between e.g. fert i l izer and labour under undistorted con-
ditions. 
3 . The average calving r a t e for high producers was 56 and for low 
producers 40. Even in suboptimal weather conditions, as in Trinidad, 
this r a t e should be a t least 70. 
4. Herfindahl, O.C., 'Concentrat ion in the Steel Industry', Colombia 
University 1950. The formula is H+ = £ s . 2 where s. is the 
t . = 1 it 
relat ive share of the ith firm in the industry's output . This index, 
like the Gini-coefficient, measures a degree of concentrat ion. 
It may demonst ra te the exis tence of monopoly power but not neces-
sarily the exercise of i t . 
5. Lerner, A.P. , 'The Concept of Monopoly and The Measurement 
of Monopoly Power' Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
1933 - '34. 
The formula of this well known index is P " ^ C , where P is the 
average cost pr ice of the product, and MC the marginal unit cost 
of the product . 
Under equilibrium this index e q u a l s - - g - , or minus the pr ice flexi-
bility of demand. d(pq) 
iVto. M P - dC „ d(pq) . P-MC P " dq - q dp = _ J * 
dq dq P P p dq E ' 
6.. Pearson's chi-square tes t was used to verify if the observed fre-
quencies in a distribution table differed significantly from an ex-
pected frequency distribution (i.e. total independence between 
two sets of variables). 
The decision rule we applied was: no relation (participation on 
the one hand, and util ization/production on the other hand) if the 
computed rat io from the tables did not exceed the X2- value 
2 
according to the X - distribution. 
7. Indeed, the computed Pearsons' ratios were insignificant. 
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8. Since farm inputs a re not predetermined with respect to farm 
output , but due to various interdependencies, the derived e las t ic i -
t ies a re s ta t is t ical ly not quite consis tent . 
The signs and re la t ive magnitude of the derived elas t ic i t ies , however, 
may keep their analyt ical value (vide next section). 
9. Only with respec t to the significant coefficients (vide tables 3, 
4 and 5). 
10. Based on the normalized res t r ic ted profit function approach; signi-
ficant coefficients only (hence, in our case, from the input demand 
functions). 
11. Based on the single-equation production function, significant co -
efficients only. 
12. Vide appendix 1. 
13. In our case we had over-capaci ty in the fer t i l izer plant , so we 
assumed no shift in fer t i l izer supply. 
14. Except for the shift in local fer t i l izer supply. In our case domestic 
production remains unchanged. 
1 5 (c/P>) change farmers ' surplus + foreign exchange savings 
v ' T E " d i rec t government cost 
16 (C/B) - c n a n g e farmers ' surplus 
D d i rec t government cost; 
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CHAPTER 6 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FARM OUTPUT SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 
The first section of this chapter contains a brief ex-post analysis 
of four guaranteed pr ice systems. 
The source of farm income variation for temporary crops is 
analysed in the second section. Here we applied the same method 
as in section 3.3.2.2. 
In the third and last section we shall discuss the principal problem 
of Pa r t Two, viz. how to res tore the t e rms of t rade for agricul-
ture by means of agricultural subsidies. 
6.1 Ex-Post Analysis of Farm Output Subsidy Programs 
We s ta ted earl ier that many developing countries may lack 
the necessary administrat ive framework to implement pr ice 
support measures efficiently. The brief ex-post analysis clearly 
demonst ra tes tha t the program implementat ion described in 
our study forms no exception in this respect . 
6.1.1 Administrative Design 
The deficiency payments for perennial crops, i .e. the difference 
between the guaranteed price and the world marke t pr ice , 
were paid to the relevant growers ' associations. 
These growers ' associations used to pay an interim price to 
the farmers until the (belated) political decision on the annual 
guaranteed pr ice level was taken . After the decision the farmers 
were paid the full guaranteed pr ice . 
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Copra 
The guaranteed pr ice system for copra farmers was first installed 
in 1975. 
The next decision came two years la ter , i .e . in 1977, so tha t 
in 1976 the same pr ice was paid as in 1975. 
In 1978 and 1979 there was no guaranteed pr ice . 
Conversely, in 1980 and 1981 new guaranteed pr ices were in-
stal led. Subsequently, no poli t ical decision was made in the 
following two years , 1982 and 1983. 
Cocoa and Coffee 
Quaranteed pr ices for cocoa and coffee were installed in 1981. 
The full amount , however, was only paid in tha t year and not 
in the following years , 1982 and 1983. 
An interim pr ice was paid by the grower 's association in 1982 
and 1983. This pr ice varied around 50% of the 1981 pr ice . 
Dairy Farming 
For dairy farming, the deficiency payments were made to 
a dairy factory. The factory was pract ical ly the sole buyer 
of fresh milk, because more than 85% of dairy farmers sold 
their milk to this one factory. 
The guaranteed pr ice system for milk came on s t ream in 1973. 
No pr ice decisions were made in 1976, 1978, 1979. , 1982 and 
1983. In these years the factory paid the same pr ice to farmers 
as in the year before . 
In tab le A where the annual pr ices and production volumes 
a re given for the period 1970 - 1981, the actual guaranteed 
pr ices a re marked with an as te r ix . 
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Of course, the ra ther irregular deficiency payments did not 
much reduce the price insecurity of the farmers . 
The major impediment to a smoQth operation of guaranteed 
price systems was again, in our opinion, the absence of clear 
policy formulation. It was for instance not clear , whether the 
policy was meant to support farm incomes or i t was a genuine 
a t t e m p t to reduce farm labour distortion. This political incon-
sistency probably lead to the serious t ime delays in establishing 
the level of guaranteed pr ices . 
When a political agreement on the pricing was finally reached, 
administrat ive procedures concerning the actual payments resulted 
in further delays. 
Our point is tha t the t ime preference of farmers for subsidy 
payments should not be underest imated. A cost reduction from 
a lower guaranteed price tha t is belatedly established, will 
be largely overshadowed by a decreased impact on production. 
Also, it is probably more efficient to pay a relatively low price 
within a month than a relatively high pr ice after a year . 
6.1.2 Actual Production Response to Guaranteed Price Systems 
We did not possess a sufficient number of observations to 
falsify, fo r ' i n s t ance , hypotheses on turning points in production 
trends or on reduction in price variat ions. 
However, from background information on the actual implemen-
tat ion of guaranteed price systems, the survey results , and 
the price and production figures in table A, we were able to 
infer sufficient c i rcumstant ia l evidence to confirm a potential 
positive responce to an agricultural pr ice policy. 
The relevant t ime-spans to be analysed are for 
copra : 1974-1983; cocoa: 1976-1983 ( 1 ) ; coffee: 1976-1983 ( 1 ) 
and milk: 1973-1983. 
For the analysis of annual production figures we do not include 
the years prior to 1973, because in 1973, i.e. the first year 
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of the oil-boom, farm labour began to migra te in substantial 
numbers to urban a reas . This migration, as can be seen by 
the annual production figures, brought about a significant de -
crease in production levels of perennial crop farms and dairy 
farms. 
As expected, this sharp decrease in production levels is not 
shown by the figures concerning temporary cropfarming (vide 
table B). 
The reason is, as we discussed in chapter 4, tha t the small-
scale temporary crop farms were less dependent on hired labour 
than the large perennial crop farms and dairy farms. 
In graph 1 we have given the annual production figures for 
the four distinquished categories of farm production. 
Copras 1974 = 100 
(2) 
73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 • '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 
Graph 1. Annual Production Figures and Guaranteed Prices 
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The guaranteed-price years have been depicted by the encircled 
indices. Although the number of observations is ra ther small, 
in most cases we do observe a positive influence on the pro-
duction t rend. 
For the years where the (guaranteed) price increases amounted 
to more than 50% (copra : 1975 and 1981; milk : 1980) the 
turning points in production trends are more clearly demonstrated. 
Returning to the survey observations on farm level, the following 
can be noted. 
Perennial crop farmers as well as dairy farmers s ta ted tha t 
the guaranteed pr ice level was not high enough to enable them 
to hire more farm labour. 
The actual production responses to guaranteed prices merely 
consisted of an ex t ra effort in improving the harvesting pract ices 
and in reducing post-harvest losses. In the questionnaire we 
included several questions concerning changes in farming prac t ices . 
We were anxious to find out if price increases would entai l 
longer-term production responses by a del iberate a t t empt to 
improve, inter alia, weeding-, pest /disease control- , pruning -
and other pre-harvesting prac t ices . Unfortunately, this was 
not the case . 
The majority of farmers claimed in fact to be reluctant to 
invest their t ime in an improvement of pre-harvesting prac t ices 
because of insecurity with regard to a continuation of the 
guaranteed price systems. 
Analysing Variations in Agricultural Production Value into 
a Market and a Production Component 
We argued earl ier tha t , in a normal situation without major 
food shortages or market distortions, it was not cer ta in if vari-
ations in farm output prices would always decrease welfare. 
The gains from pr ice variations because of profit maximizing 
behaviour by farmers could very well exceed consumer's losses 
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if any (vide section 3.3.2.1). 
However, in our case , we do not have a normal or undistorted 
s i tuat ion. Most of the farm production is in fact dis tor ted. 
Output prices appear to be too low to bribe more pa r t - t ime 
farmers to the full-t ime job. 
It is evident t ha t a pr ice variation around a relat ively low ave-
rage will differ considerably from a pr ice variation around 
a 'normal ' average . 
In section 3.3.2.2 we showed tha t the variation in production 
value can be analysed into a pr ice component and a production 
component . Fur ther , we assumed tha t the impact of pr ice s t a -
bilization measures is proportional to the size of the pr ice 
component. 
According to the sample resul ts , the proportions of production 
costs as well as of marketed surpluses did not vary too much 
over different farm sizes, nor did they f luctuate widely over 
the various regions. 
The analysis into the variation of production value may thus 
also serve as an analysis into the variation of farm incomes. 
The analysis is not re levant , however, to production values 
of copra, cocoa, coffee and milk. The reason is, t ha t the guaran-
teed pr ice systems for these four ca tegor ies of farm production 
in fact reduced much of the annual pr ice variat ions. Moreover, 
we would also have to leave out the period up to 1973, which 
would reduce the number of observations too much. Conversely, 
the analysis could be quite meaningful with respect to temporary 
crops. Here we faced nei ther guaranteed prices nor severe 
discontinuities in farm production conditions. 
The results of the analysis with regard to two different vege-
tables and rootcrops a re depicted in table 12. 
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Table 12 Direct Effects of Production and Price Variation 
concerning Vegetables anil Root Crops (vide table B) 
Tomatoes (1970-1981): 
2 
linear trend tomato prices: P = -470.15 + 442.20 t (R = 0.85) 
T (58.37) 
after trend elimination: . !R = 0.614 R = 0.386 R = -0.662 
p y py 
Cabbages (1970-1982): 
linear trend cabbage prices: P. = 37.42 + 201.29 t (R 2 = 0.80) 
•* (31.65) 
after trend elimination: R = 0.615 R = 0.385 R = -0.423 
P y py 
Sweet Potatoes (1970-1981): 
'2 
linear trend sweet pot.prices: P+=-33.27 + 151.12 t (R' = 0.88) 
1 (17.27) 
after trend elimination: R = 0.408 R = 0.592 R = -0.526 
P y py 
Dasheen (1970-1981): 
linear trend dasheen prices: P + = -253.79 + 156.22 t (R2 = 0.86) 
* (19.71) 
« 
after trend elimination: R = 0.919 R = 0.081 R = -0.431 
p y py 
The estimated direct effects of the price fluctuation, i.e. R , in-
dicate that except for sweet potatoes, more than 50 percent 
of the variability in farm income can be attributed to price 
variations. 
The linear interaction term, i.e. R ^ y , was negative in all four 
cases, indicating that price and production interactions have 
tended to reduce the variance in total production value. 
The results of our analysis provide some support for an agricul-
tural price stabilization policy with respect to seasonal crops. 
It is important that a reduction of annual price variations should 
stabilize farm income as well. 
As has been shown in chapter 4, the main reason for the low 
aggregate domestic production value (and hence of a high food 
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import bill) of temporary crops is the exis tence of a serious 
distortion with respect to the fa rmer ' s own labour input. 
A more stabilized farm income may indeed bribe more p a r t -
t ime temporary crop farmers to the full-time job. 
Of course, we a re aware of the fact tha t it is easier to s t a t e 
the desirability of a pr ice stabil ization program than to imple-
ment one. In par t icular with regard to seasonal crops, which 
a re often highly perishable, a pr ice stabil ization program may 
encounter many problems. Viz., inter alia: 
- the lack of quality standards and quality control 
- the need for cool s torage facil i t ies 
- the need for t ransport faci l i t ies . 
A possible approach could be to s t a r t a program of e.g. buffer 
stocks with respect to one temporary crop only. 
Again, the relat ively high initial costs may be overshadowed 
by long te rm benefi ts from the learning process . 
When the program operates will it may be extended to the 
next crop, e t c . 
Ex-Ante Analysis of Anti-Distortive Farm Output Subsidies 
Below we will a t t e m p t to show how the agricultural t e rms 
of t rade can be improved with the help of farm output subsidies. 
We s ta ted earl ier (vide sect ion 2.1) tha t , theoret ical ly , the 
best policy of dealing with a factor distortion would be a factor 
tax-cum-subsidy. 
However, in our case (and presumably in most cases) direct 
subsidization of farm labour will be ext remely difficult to imple-
ment . 
In this section we shall analyse the par t ia l welfare effects 
of a guaranteed pr ice system when agr icul ture suffers from 
serious labour distort ion. 
Firs t we introduce our theore t ica l conceptualizat ion of an an t i -
dis tort ive guaranteed threshold pr ice . 
152 
Secondly, based on this concept, the part ia l welfare effects 
will be es t imated for copra-, cocoa-, coffee- and milk-production. 
6.3.1 The Concept of an Anti-Distortive Guaranteed Threshold Price 
A guaranteed price can bribe a pa r t - t ime farmer to take a 
full-time job and further enable him to hire more labour. 
When labour restr ict ion has been removed, idle land and other 
farm inputs can be employed m o r e ' efficiently. This increased 
efficiency will push the production possibility curve to higher 
levels (vide figure 24). 
Of course, we real ize tha t substantial labour distortion may 
require a quite expensive guaranteed price program. 
However, for two reasons such an expensive ant i-dis tort ive 
•guaranteed price system may be economical in the long run. 
Firstly, costs and benefits of ant i -dis tor t ive guaranteed pr ice 
programs do not only consist of public cash payments and costs 
of administrat ive services on the one hand and increased farmer ' s 
surplus and increased foreign exchange savings on the other . 
On the contrary . We also have to take into account the long-
te rm general equilibrium ef fec ts . 
To a large extent a government by implementing such a system, 
invests in a learning process entailing important real and pecuni-
ary economies of scale. The former applies, in the first instance, 
to the cumulative effect on the farmer ' s skills in allocating 
capi ta l and labour on his farm (with the multiplying effects 
we mentioned earl ier in section 3.1.1.2). 
Secondly, as argued below, we are convinced, tha t , when a 
guaranteed price reaches a so-called distortion threshold, p ro-
duction levels will increase a t an accelera ted r a t e . 
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In figure 2k we have tr ied to demonst ra te our point with the 
help of the neo-classical toolkit . 
Figure 2* . Effects of an Anti-Distortive Guaranteed Threshold 
Price 
We depicted in the upper graph two production curves, 
Y D = f(X.)^ and = fCXpjjD » the distorted production function 
and the undistorted production function respect ively. 
15k 
M C (marginal costs), above AC (average costs), is the short 
t e rm supply curve of the distorted production. 
Suppose a guaranteed price drives supply up to N where Y 2 
will be offered. The profit made a t this pr ice P enables farmers 
to purchase more of the expensive production factor X^. 
In our case , this implies: 1) to exceed the opportunity costs of 
the farmers own labour 
2) to be able to pay the high wage of 
farm labour. 
The use of more X^ pushes the production function upwards 
to Y y D which causes an increase in supply from Y 2 to Y^ . 
A further pr ice increase will enhance production a t a higher 
r a t e since M C ' i s more elas t ic than M C due to improved efficien-
cy (vide section 3.4.1). 
To conclude, a guaranteed pr ice that equals or exceeds the 
threshold pr ice P will bring about two effects : 
1) an almost immediate production increase from Y 2 to Y^  
(very high elast ici ty of supply in the range NK) 
2) an increased elast ici ty of supply beyond K ( M C as compared 
to MC). 
In the longer run the multiplying effects we mentioned above 
will result in a supply-shift from M C to M C " . 
6.3.2 Partial Equilibrium Effects of a Guaranteed Threshold Price 
System 
6.3.2.1 Methodology and Assumptions 
The methodology can best be introduced with the help of an 
il lustration of the par t ia l equilibrium framework. This has been 
depicted in figure 25. We repea t , our intended ex-ante analysis 
does not take in to account the many general equilibrium im-
plications we described in section 3.1.1.2. 
The approach may provide to the policy maker only an initial 
insight into the possible effects of a successful ant i -dis tor t ive 
155 
price policy. 
Our assumptions a re ra ther optimist ic in the sense tha t the 
analysis presumes, in ter alia, an efficient adminis t ra t ive system 
with prompt payments to farmers as well as an economically 
efficient response by fa rmers . 
As can easily be seen, figure ,25 is similar to the lower graph 
in figure 24. 
Figure 25. The Threshold Price Concept in a Partial Equilibrium 
Framework 
As far as quantif ication of our threshold price concept is con-
cerned* three crucial e lements to the analysis have to be es t i -
mated first, viz.: 
(i) the current pr ice-e las t ic i ty of supply 
(ii) the cost incidence of farm labour distortion 
(iii) t he production incidence of farm labour distort ion. 
(i) The Current Pr ice-Elast ic i ty of Supply 
For the approximation of the current supply elast ic i t ies we 
used the yearly da ta from 1973 onwards (vide table A). 
To the ac tua l computat ion we applied two further res t r ic t ions . 
Firs t , we took into account only subsequent years exhibiting 
both a pr ice and a production increase . 
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A second restr ict ion concerns the a-priori knowledge of farmers 
with regard to the pr ice . From discussions with farmers we 
learnt tha t in some years they were in fact unaware of the 
pr ice to be paid. We decided to exclude these years as well. 
The remaining pr ice and production data were substi tuted 
in the following formula: 
log Q, - log Q . . 
- (vide fig. 25)°' 
log RX - log P 0 
The par t ia l welfare effects concerning each category of agr i -
cultural production are es t imated for the lowest and the 
highest computed elast ici ty , viz.: 
copra : 10.33 and 0 . 4 3 
cocoa : 0.08 and 1 . 5 3 
coffee : 0 . 2 6 and 0.90 
milk : 0 . 2 6 and 1 . 5 7 
(ii) The Cost Incidence of Farm Labour Distortion 
The cost-incidence of farm labour distortion is represented 
in figure 2 5 by the area Q Q Q J D C Q Q Q J D C equals the additional 
costs of production necessary to increase supply from QQ to 
Q R 
At this point the threshold price Pj is paid and supply becomes 
completely elast ic untill Q 2 is reached. 
From the survey results we know the average current expendi-
ture on hired farm labour and equipment, i .e. the a rea O Q ^ C . 
The labour- and equipment costs with respect to undistorted 
farm production are respectively approximated by low and 
( 6 ) 
high world averages , i.e. the a rea O Q ^ D . 
The distorted and undistorted cost es t imates together with 
the respect ive yield es t imates a re depicted in table 1 3 . 
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Table 13 Yield- and Cost of Production Estimates under 
Distorted and Undistorted Conditions 
Average Survey Undistorted World 
Resul ts Averages 
Kow High 
Copra 
yield lbs /acre 178 1500 2500 
acreage 13 
equipment ($TT) 4687 10000 20000 
farm labour (mhrs/acre) 15 50 100 
no. of farmers 7000 
Cocoa 
yield (lbs/acre) 374 800 15C0 
acreage 11 
equipment ($TT) 2971 10000 20000 
farm labour (mhrs/acre) 14 50 100 
no. of farmers 2000 
Coffee 
yield (lbs/acre) 102 1000 2000 
ac reage 6 
equipment ($TT) 5421 10000 20000 
farm labour (mhrs/acre) 2 50 100 
no. of farmers 4000 
Milk high producers low producers 
yield (kg/cow) 3448 2334 3000 6000 
cows 12.5 7.8 
machinery ($TT) 20754 4500 idem idem 
acreage 12.2 9.1 
farm labour (mhrs/ 
10 cows) 
no. of farmers ' ' 
0 
80 
0 
250 
100 200 
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The level of the guaranteed threshold price can now be computed 
from the following identi t ies: 
Q = CP 
C 1 
1 + 1 0 ^ 0 
p . Q n and 
OQjD 
It follows tha t 
P , 
Therefore, 
1 + I 
e 
1 — > 
p i Q i 
can be approximated by 
1 + I e, 
[ ° Q i D . 
LOQQCJ 
It is important to note tha t the geometr ic representat ion of 
a par t ia l equilibrium framework like figure 2 5 does n o t . apply 
to absolute measures of costs and production as given in 
table 1 3 . 
For, although P Q could be found directly from the survey 
results , P was unknown to us. The areas O Q Q C and OQ^D 
do not equal the sum of costs of farm labour and -equipment, 
but we assumed for the sensivity analysis tha t they would possess 
a similar proportional relationship with these costs . 
Fur ther , we assumed that 2 0 0 manhours equal 3 0 . 0 0 0 $TT 
(i.e. 2 0 % higher than an annual industrial salary because of 
a presumed social preference for industrial work). 
PQ equals the 1 9 8 3 world market pr ice , except for milk where 
we maintain the 1 9 8 1 - guaranteed pr ice . The elast ici ty with 
respect to M C ' is es t imated a t 1.5 MC. 
1 5 9 
(iii) The Production Incidence of Farm Labour Distortion 
The production incidence is the difference between undistorted 
survey results. 
In figure 25 this is depicted by the distance Q 2 - Q n . 
6.3.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitiviy analysis contains four options for each category 
of agricultural production, viz,: 
A. e j = low , low undistorted world yield average 
B. e j = low , high " " 
C. el = high , low " " 
D. e j = high , high " " 
With respect to each of these four options the following six 
elements are computed, viz.: 
P, 
(1) (-=r-~ 1) x 100% - the necessary price increa-
world yield averages and the average yields according to the 
0 se to reach the guaranteed 
threshold price 
(2) Direct Government Cost ($TT) the deficiency payments 
measured at the undistor-
ted production levels, i.c. 
(3) Change in Farmer's Surplus ($TT) 
(4) Change in Foreign Exchange 
Savings ($TT) 
(5) Cost/Benefit Ratio (i) 
(6) Cost/Benefit Ratio (ii) 
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Copra ( P Q = 0.53 $TT/lb) 
A B C D 
ei = 0.33 e{ = 0.33 el = 0.43 ei = 0.43 
1500 lbs/acre 2500 lbs/acre 1500 lbs/acre 2500 lbs/acre 
(1) P 1 / P Q (%) 138 301 125 264 
(2) Direct Gov. Cost 100 362 90 318 
(mil $TT) 
(3) Farmer^ Surplus 82 272 72 228 
(mil $TT) 
(4) Foreign Exchange 64 112 64 112 
(mil §TT) 
(5) C/B (i) 0.64 0.31 0.71 0.35 
(6) C/B (ii) 0.82 0.90 0.80 0.72 
Cocoa ( P 0 = 2.29 §TT/lb). 
A B C D 
ei = 0.08 e{ = 0.08 ej^  = 1.53 e i = 1.53 
800 lbs/acre 1500 lbs/acre 800 lbs/acre 1500 lbs/acre 
( 1 ) P 1 / P 0 ( % ) 223 514 65 116 
(2) Direct Gov. Cost 90 388 26 88 
(mil $TT) 
(3) Farmer 's Surplus 84 350 17 75 
(mil $TT) 
(4) Foreign Exchange 22 57 22 57 
(mil $TT) 
(5) C/B (i) 0.24 0.15 0.85 0.65 
(6) C/B (ii) 0.93 0.90 0.65 0.85 
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Coffee (P Q = 3.05 $TT/lb) 
A 
ei = 0.26 
1000 lbs/acre 
(1) P 1 / P Q (%) 401 
(2) Direct Gov. Cost 293 
(mil $TT) 
(3) Farmer's Surplus 225 
(mil $TT) 
(4) Foreign Exchange 66 
(mil $TT) 
(5) C/B (i) 0.23 
(6) C/B (ii) 0.77 
B C D 
ei = 0.26 ej = 0.90 ei = 0.90 
2000 lbs/acre 1000 lbs/acre 2000 lbs/acre 
768 191 319 
1124 140 467 
804 99 267 
139 66 139 
0.12 0.47 0.30 
0.72 0.71 0.57 
Milk ( P n = 1.47 $TT/kg) 
A B C D 
ei = 0.26 e j = 0.26 e i = 1.57 e i = 1.57 
3000 kg/cow 6000 kg/cow 3000 kg/ cow 6000 kg/cow 
High Producers 
(1) P l / P 0 (%) 
(2) Direct Gov. Cost 
(mil $TT) 
(3) Farmer's Surplus 
(mil $TT) 
(4) Foreign Exchange 
(mil $TT) 
(5) C/B (i) 
(6) C/B (ii) 
127 
11.2 
9.7 
3.8 
0.34 
0.87 
49 
4.4 
3.0 
3.8 
0.86 
0.68 
Low Producers 
(1) P l / P Q (%) 176 
(2) Direct Gov. Cost 15.2 
(mil $TT) 
(3) Farmer 's Surplus 12.7 
(mil $TT) 
(4) Foreign Exchange 1.9 
(mil $TT) 
(5) C/B (i) 0.13 
(6) C/B (ii) 0.84 
325 
56.0 
43.9 
10.5 
0.19 
0.78 
65 
5.6 
3.6 
1.9 
0.34 
0.64 
103 
35.2 
18.9 
10.5 
0.30 
0.54 
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From the sensitivity analysis, based on variation in both the 
magnitude of the labour distortion and the magnitude of the 
elast ici ty of supply, two general conclusions may be inferred. 
First , a combination of low elast ici ty of supply with large labour 
distortion requires an extremely high threshold pr ice . 
This is demonstrated by the cases of copra B, cocoa B, coffee 
and milk B (low producers). 
Conversely, the lowest threshold prices a re found for all C cases, 
i .e. a combination of high initial elast ici ty of supply and relatively 
l i t t le labour distortion. 
Secondly, the cost /benefi t rat ios a re almost solely determined 
by the magnitude of the elast ici t ies of supply. 
For, in all cases we note tha t a higher elast ici ty entails larger 
foreign exchange savings as compared to direct government cost , 
i .e. C/B (i). 
Accordingly we note tha t a lower elast ici ty increases the direct 
benefit to the farmers . This is because the lower elast ici ty en-
p p n* p 
nances the rat io 1 0 , i .e. C/B (ii). 
P 1 P 0 G F 
In te rms of financial efficiency, hence C/B (i), and accepting 
only more realist ic lower supply elast ici t ies (i.e. the cases A 
and B), the four categories of guaranteed threshold price systems 
can be ranked in the following order: 
1. copra 
2. milk 
3. cocoa 
4. coffee 
The figures from the relevant sensitivity analyses speak for 
themselves. In a more dynamic context , however, it will be 
clear that when the world market price P n exhibits a declining 
trend this will depress C/B (i) accordingly. 
The same will be t rue , muta t i s mutandis, for an increasing world 
market pr ice . 
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NOTES 
1. 1975 is not included with respect t o cocoa and coffee due to i ts 
ex t r eme beneficial c l imat ical conditions. 
2. The 1980- guaranteed pr ice for copra and milk was belatedly e s t a -
blished. 
3 . That is, when new guaranteed pr ices were established. 
4. Another possibility is to pursue a conservative industrial labour 
policy. 
5 E _ d g . £ _dUng) _ d(logg) _ l o ^ l ~ lo%% 
dp ' q d(lnp) d(logp) logpj - l ogp n 
6. Largey based on: 'Agricultural Compendium for Rural Development 
in the Tropics and Subtropics; Elseviers Scientific Publishing Com-
pany, Amsterdam, 1981. 
7. I.e. reduced imports of dairy products and dairy subst i tutes . 
164 
APPENDIX 1 
THE NORMALIZED RESTRICTED PROFIT FUNCTION APPROACH 
Introduction 
The exis tence of a dual correspondence between profits on the 
one hand and input demand and output supply functions on the 
other hand has often been introduced in textbooks on ma the -
mat ical economics as Hotelling's lemmaP^ 
Hotelling's lemma or the derivative property is the following 
proposition: 
let y (p,c) be the f irm's supply function and let Xj (p,c) be the 
firm's demand function for factor i, then 
Y(p,c) = — and X(p,c) = , 1 = 1,... ,m, 
8p 6cj 
(2) 
when the derivatives exist , and when c » 0 and p > 0 . 
(3) 
TT(P,C) is a profit function with the usual conditions and is 
assumed to be differentiable with respect to output pr ice p and 
input pr ice c a t the point (p ; c ) » 0 . 
Hence, for a profit maximizing firm, output supply and input 
demand can be determined by differentiating the profit function 
with respect to the respect ive pr ices . 
This finding is of utmost importance to empirical economic analysis. 
Because, assuming profit-maximizing behaviour, output supply-
and input demand elast ici t ies can now be es t imated without 
direct reference to the mutu 
of output and variable inputs. 
(L) 
direct reference to the mutually dependent physical quanti t ies 
The profit function of a firm can be described as : 
i r(p,c)=max |p.y(x) - § J C J X J ) . 
When some inputs a re held fixed, e.g. land and other capi tal , 
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we have the res t r ic ted profit function (RPF): 
7r(p,c,z) = max (p.y(x,z) — § j C ^ ) , where z represents the 
vector of fixed inputs. 
When both sides of the equation a re deflated or normalized by 
the output price p , we have the normalized res t r ic ted profit 
function (NRPF): 
TT* = max (y*(x,z) - S ! C i * x i ) • 
IT* is often employed in s tead of 7r(p,c,z), because it is more 
convenient to work with it*. 
Samuelson ^ was the first economist who analysed normalized 
res t r ic ted profit functions. The concept has been further refined 
by G o r m a n ( 6 ) , Mc. F a d d e n ( 7 ) , D i e w e r t ( 8 ) , J a c o b s e n ( 9 ) , Shepparcf 1 0 ] 
and L a u / 1 1 ^ 
The pioneers in employing the NRPF approach in empirical analysis 
of agricultural production in developing countries were Lau and 
Y o t o p o u l o s ( 1 2 ) . 
Our application of the concept (vide Par t Two) is based on their 
work. 
A full theore t ica l review of the concept would lead us way beyond 
the scope of this appendix. Since we a re more in teres ted in em-
pirical applications we shall res t r i c t ourselves to the methodological 
foundations of the NRPF approach as applied in our analysis. 
Below, we shall, s tar t ing from a Cobb-Douglas type of production 
function, demons t ra te the derivation of the NRPF, the input 
demand functions, the tes t hypotheses, and the various e las t ic i t ies . 
In order to keep the main a rgument c lear we have put the proofs 
of theorems and other mathemat ica l derivations tha t interrupt 
the main argument in footnotes . 
The Derivation of the NRPF and its Properties 
Following Lau (op.cit. , 1979, pp.190-191) we s t a r t from a Cobb-
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Douglas type of production function with variable inputs only. 
This function is given by 
Y = fti X?,i=l,...m, • (1 ) 
where A4 =^<*^( < 1), because Y is assumed to be with decreasing 
returns in X and homogeneous of degree fi in X. 
The first-order condition for a maximum is 
c. , 1=1,. . . . ,m, \£) X " i l 
where c^ represents the normalized unit pr ice of the ith variable 
input (note tha t both sides of (2) have been divided by p). It 
(13) 
can be proven tha t a production function is homogeneous of 
degree k in-X if and only if the corresponding normalized profit 
function is homogeneous of degree --(k/l-k) in c. 
Since Y is homogeneous of degree k in X, and if we denote 
the normalized profit function by G, then we have 
Y = ( l - M ) _ 1 G (3) 
Equation (2) can now, by substituting (2) and using a dual t rans-
formation^*^, be wri t ten as, 
a i ( 1 ^ ) " 1 G = c. , 1=1 m <*> 
-SG /Sc. 1 
Integrating over c^ , i=l , . . . ,m, gives 
G(c) = K*fi o f * 1 - * ) " 1 (5) 
i = 1 * 
where K is a constant of integrat ion. 
-X-
Since K may also be determined for initial conditions we have 
for Cj =1 in equation (2), X^  =" jY , i=l , . . . ,m. 
Substituting this into equation (1) we have 
Y = ft xT=ft afvK • ( 6 ) 
i = l 1 i = l 1 
Rearranging, 
Y ^ f U ? ^ 
= (1 - M ) 4 G ( 1 ) 
= (i -M)_1K*. 
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m a i 1/(1-*«} 
Thus, G(l) = (1 - n) Y = (1 - M) (II a?) and for all i = l 
c ; , i = 1, . . . ,m, 
G(c)= ( i-M)ft 1( |r i ( 1-M r . 
1 = 1 * (7) 
To extend this result to a Cobb-Douglas production function 
with fixed inputs Z and a constant te rm A, we have 
Y = AI1 xTfi Z?\ • (8) 
i = l n 1 = 1 ^ 
It can be p r o v e n ^ 5 ^ tha t when Y = F(X) and T t * = G(c) represent 
a production function and its conjugate normalized profit function 
respectively, tha t if 
Y = A F(X) -> TT* = A G(c/A). 
Applying this theorem to equations (7) and (8) we have, 
-AW"'(1 -„) (ft ( V * 1 " ' 1 ) .(ftIZ?"-)") . <9) . 
\ i = l d j / \ i = l / 
Taking natural logari thms of equation (9), we have 
In TT * = Iti A ' + 2 o . ' f n c . + i ft'InZi, (10) 
1 = 1 1 1 i = l 1 1 
where A'= A ( 1 " M ) \ l - ju) (jl a ? 1 " * 0 1 ) , o , ' = - O i ( l - M)_1< 0, 
i = 1 , m , andj3j'= j3i(l > 0 , i = 1 , n . 
As can easily be seen, equation (10) is precisely the est imating 
equation we used in our empirical analysis (vide table 5). 
The derived input demand functions a r e given by Hotelling's 
lemma (vide above), i .e. , 
Sir* . , 
Xi = - — , i = l , . . . , m . ( I D 
OCj 
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Multiplying both sides of equation (11) by -CJ/TT* gives 
-~lT=^i—-,i= 1 , -»m, = a i . (12) I T * olncj 
Equation (12) represents the input demand function we used for 
our est imation (vide table 5). 
The crucial assumption of profit maximization can be tes ted 
simply b y . the coefficients of variable inputs since they appear 
in both equations, i .e. (10) and (12). Hence, 
H Q : «.'(10) = «j*(12), V i=l , . . . . ,m. 
The t e s t concerning the assumption of constant returns to scale 
is less straight forward. It can be proven, however, by using 
Euler 's theorem tha t a production function is homogeneous of 
degree one in all inputs if and only if the NPRF is almost homo-
geneous of degree one in its fixed inputs .^ ^ 
n 
Therefore, H n : X / } . ' = 1. 
u i=l 1 
The various elast ici t ies we applied in our ex-ante analyses a re 
derived as follows. 
Equation (12) in natural logarithms gives 
M X i = l n ( - a i ' ) + I n 7 r * - I n C i , i = l m. ( 1 3 ) 
Hence the input demand elast ici t ies a re given by 
S l n X j 6In7r* 
5 In Cj 8 In Cj 
1 = O i ' - 1 « 0 ) . 
The input demand elast ici ty with respect to the pr ice of output 
is given by 
S l n X j S l n X j S l n c i w , 1 N / ^ f t W . 4 S l n q 
— - ^ = — \ _ _ ! = - 1 . ( 0 1 - 1 ) 0 0 ) ; t h a t equals - 1 
5 I n p 5 I n C j 8 I n p o l n p 
follows directly from the properties of the profit function 
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(3) 
(vide footnote ). 
The output responses with respect to one specific input X^ and 
input pr ice c^ can be computed as follows. 
Output is given by Y = TT* + CjXj 
= ir*(l — aft vide equation (12). , 
The output elast ic i ty with respect to the pr ice of one specific 
input is given by 
5 I n Y S ln i r* 
x-j — = a j ' ( < 0 ) . 
5 In Cj 6 In Cj J 
The output elast ic i ty with respect to one specific input is given 
by 
S I n Y 5 I n Y Sine,- -l 
= . — = a,- . (<Xi — 1) (> 0). 
8 In Xj 8 In cj 8 In Xj ^ J 
The own-price supply e las t ic i ty is given by 
S_hiY = m S J n Y S f e c i m _ a . - ( > 0 ) 
8 I n p i=i S I n c i 8 In p i=i 
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NOTES TO APPENDIX 1 
1. Hotelling, H., ' Edgeworth's Taxation Paradox and the Nature 
of Demand and Supply Function' , Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 40, 1932, pp. 577-616. 
2. Proof: suppose ( y * , x * ) is a profit-maximizing supply-demand 
plan a t prices (p*,c*). 
Define the function: g(p,c) = n (p,c) - (p.y*- c .x*) . 
Since the plan (y*,x*) is the best plan a t prices (p*,c*), the 
function g reaches a value of zero a t (p*,c*). 
The first - order conditions for a minimum a re : 
8g(p*. c») = 8 7 T ( P * , c«) y # = Q 
8p 8p 
8g(p*,c*) 87r(p*,c*) . n 
= - + .x* = 0 , i = l , . . , m . 
8q 8q 
Since this is t rue for all p * and c*, we have the derivations 
in the t ex t . 
3 . Propert ies of the profit function: 
(i) nondecreasing in p , nonincreasing in c (proof is obvious) 
(ii) homogeneous of degree 1 in (p,c) 
proof: the composition of costs and returns will not be changed 
multiplying the costs and returns by some factor t 
(iii) convex in (p,c) 
proof (vide also p. 81): 
(a) the profit will go down a t decreasing r a t e if the 
price of an input rises; because as this input becomes 
more expensive and other prices stay unchanged, the 
profit-maximizing firm will shift away from it and 
use other inputs 
(b) the profit will go up a t increasing r a t e if the price 
of an output rises; because as this output becomes 
more profi table, the profit-maximizing firm will shift 
towards the more profitable output 
(iv) continuous.in (p,c), a t least when p > 0 and c » 0 (proof follows 
from iii). 
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4. These functions thus obtained can now be explicitly wri t ten 
as functions of variables tha t a re usually considered to be de te r -
mined independently of the firm s behaviour. Hence they are 
exogenous variables. 
If, however, these exogenous variables vary l i t t le from firm 
to firm (&-%[. in the case of pr ice regulations or non - compet i t ive 
markets) the resulting lack of variation decreases the applica-
bility of the NRPF-. approach considerably (vide also e.g. Varian, 
1978, op.cit . , pp . 125-126). We believe to a cer ta in extent tha t 
in our case (vide table 5) the lack of variation in input prices 
hampered the establishment of a good fit . 
5. Samuelson, P.A., 1 Pr ices of Fac tors and Goods in General 
Equilibrium', Review of Economic Studies, Vol.21, 1953-1954, 
pp.1-20. 
6. Gorman, W.M., 'Measuring the Quanti t ies of Fixed Fac to r s ' , 
in ' Value, Capital and Growth: Papers in Honour of Sir John 
Hicks' (Ed.J.N. Wolfe), Aldine, Chicago, 1968, pp. 141-172. 
7. Mc Fadden, D.L., 1979, ibidem. 
8. Diewert , W.E., 'Functional Forms for Profi t and Transformation 
Funct ions ' , Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.6, 1973, pp. 284-
316. 
9. Jacobsen, S.E., 'Production Correspondences ' , Econometr ica, 
Vol.38, 1970, pp. 754-770. 
10. Sheppard, R.W., 'Theory of Cost and Production Funct ions ' , 
Princeton University Press , Pr inceton, N.J . , 1970. 
l l . L a u , L . J . , ' A Charac te r iza t ion of the Normalized Res t r ic ted 
Profit Function' , Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 12, 1976, 
pp. 131-163; 
Lau, L.J. , 'Applications of Profit Functions ' , in Contributions 
to Economic Analysis; 'Production Economics: A Dual Approach 
to Theory and Applications ' , North-Holland Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam, 1979, pp. 133-216. 
12. Lau, L.J. , and Yotopoulos P.A., 'A Test for Rela t ive Efficiency 
and Application to Indian Agricul ture ' , American Economic Review, 
Vol. 6 1 , March 1971, pp. 94-109; 
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Lau, L.J. , and Yotopoulos P.A., 'A Test for Relat ive Economic 
Efficiency: Some Further Resul ts ' , American Economic Review, 
Vol. 63, March 1973, pp. 214-223; 
Lau, L.J. , and Yotopoulos P.A., 'Profit , Supply and Factor Demand 
Functions ' , American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 54, 
Feb. 1972, pp. 11-18; 
Lau, L.J., e t . al. , 1976, ibidem. 
13. Proof: 
By Euler 's theorem for homogeneous functions we have 
S ^ X ^ k Y ' <"> 
1 - 1 8Xi 
Applying the dual transformations (vide next footnote) equation 
(14) becomes 
- ± C j — = k ( G - S q — • ) . 
Hence, 1 q = G . (15) 
1 = 1 Sq ( 1 - k ) 
By applying the dual transformations, the production function can 
be wri t ten as 
Y = ( G - S q — ) . (16) 
Substituting equation (15) into (16) gives 
Y = G + — G = (l - k ) - 1 G. 
1 - k 
Q.E.D. 
14. As s ta ted earl ier , the NRPF -approach is based on the dual corres-
pondency between the production function of a profit maximizing 
firm and its conjugate NRPF. 
The dual transformations can be explained (vide tLau, op. c i t . , 
1979, pp. 142-147) with the help of the Legendre transformation. 
Consider the production function 
Y = ( X 1 , . . , X m ; Z 1 ) . . . , Z n ) . (17) 
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The Legendre transformation of Y is defined as 
5Y 
T i = , i = l , . . , m . (18) 
The production function Y is assumed to be locally strongly concave 
in the variable inputs X, so tha t the transformation is non-singular 
and hence invert ible. 
Xj can now be expressed in terms of T,- and Zf. 
Xi = hi(Ti,.. , T m ; Z 1 ) . . , Z n ) , i = l , . . ; m . (19) 
A Legendre 's dual transformation of Y can be defined as follows 
g(T, T m ; Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) = S h i C T , Z ) T i - Y ( h 1 ( T , Z ) , . . . , h m ( T , Z ) ; Z ) . (20) 
i = l 
Equation (20) leads to the important dual relat ions between Y and 
G. 
5g m 5h. m SY 5 h. 
— = ? , - I T j + h i - Z — i = l , . . , m . (21) 
8Ti J = 1 STi J = 1 5 X i 5 T i 
Sg m 5hj ^ m 5Y 5hj 5Y . 
— = 2 — " - T j - S . — •, i = l , . . , n . (22) 
5Zi J = 1 8 Z i J = 1 6Xj 6Zi 5Z t 
Substituting now equation (18) and (19) we have the following dual 
t ransformations 
^ = h i = X i ; « L = - « Y _ . (23) 
8Ti 8Zi 8Zi 
Under the assumption of profit maximization we have 
5Y 
= C i , 
SXj 
hence by equation (18) T^ = c^ . 
Equation (20) may, by applying the dual t ransformations and sub-
t i tut ing Tj = c . , be wr i t ten as : 
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g = S qXj (c, Z) - Y (X, (c, Z) , . . , X r a ( c , Z) ; Z) (24) 
i=l 
Equation (24) equals the negative of the NRPF, or - G(c,Z). 
Summarizing, we have found the following dual relations 
5g 5g 6g 5Y 6G 
— = — = X ; — = and — = - X ; 
5c 5T 8Z 5Z 6c 
. 6G _ 5Y 
SZ 8Z 
Referring to the t ex t , it will be seen easily that 
Oi ( l -M)_1G , Oi ( l - M ) _ 1 G — equals 
Xi - 5G/6q 
15. Proof: 
n - max (AF(X) - C X) 
= A max (F(X) X) 
= AG(c/A). Q.E.D. 
16. Proof: 
By Euler 's theorem we have 
§ 8JLX. + l ! l . Z l = kY. ( 2 5 ) 
1 = 1 5Xi 1 = 1 8Zi 
By a dual transformation equation (25) becomes 
_ § c . ^ + i ^ . Z i = k(G-S q ^ ) . (26) 
i = 1 5q 1 = 1 5Zi i = 1 8q 
If Y is homogeneous of degree k = 1, equation (26) simplifies 
to 2 — . Z; = G . 
1 = 1 5 Z t 
Hence, Y is homogeneous of degree 1 if and only if the NRPF 
is almost homogeneous of degree one in Z. 
Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX 2 
ON ECONOMIC SURPLUS 
Since its invention by the French engineer Dupuit in 1 8 4 4 ^ the 
concept of economic surplus has caused a grea t deal of academic 
controversy. 
Basically, the debate has taken place in two ra ther distantly re la ted 
contexts . On the one hand empirical economists who were not 
part icularly concerned with the possible theore t ica l caveats of 
the concept , studied i ts usefulness to public cost benefit analy-
• (2) s is . 
On the other hand many theoris ts expressed doubts as to whether 
(3) 
the concept would provide an exact measure of welfare changes . 
In this appendix we shall review the th ree basic difficulties in 
measuring welfare changes by economic surplus, viz: 
(i) the fundamental difficulty of measuring changes in util i ty 
(ii) the difficulty in the aggregation of economic surplus over 
goods and services 
(iii) the difficulty in the aggregation of economic surplus over 
individuals. 
Although, consumer 's surplus refers to demand prices and economic 
rent (producer's surplus) to supply prices, both welfare measures 
a re basically symmetr ica l . ^ Therefore, what will be said below 
with respect to consumers, demand curves and consumer 's surplus, 
applies by analogy also to owners of factors of production, supply 
curves and economic ren t . 
(i) The Fundamental Difficulty of Measuring Changes in Util i ty 
Dupuit defined his concept of consumer 's surplus as the difference 
between the sacrifice which the purchaser would be willing to 
make in order to ge t it and the purchase pr ice he has to pay in 
exchange. 
He analysed the question of subsidization towards the costs of 
constructing a bridge and found tha t a consumer will be usually 
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willing to pay more for a good than he is actually paying. Dupuit 
proposed that this 'excess satisfaction' could be measured by the 
tr iangle below the demand curve and above the price line. 
Some 70 years la ter , Marshall introduced the concept of consumer's 
surplus, together with tha t of producer 's surplus, to the English 
speaking w o r l d . ^ 
He viewed consumer 's surplus as ' the excess of the price which 
he (i.e. a consumer) would be willing to pay ra ther than go without 
the thing, over tha t which he actually does pay' (Marshall, 1920, 
p.124). 
Marshall 's approach differs from Dupuit in tha t he recognized the 
problem tha t util i ty gained from an increased expenditure on one 
good because of a price decrease of tha t good, cannot be seen 
independently from the decreased expenditure on other goods. 
He found that this decreased expenditure on other goods would 
in fact raise the marginal util i ty of money, which would in turn 
reduce the reliability of the Dupuit - tr iangle as a cardinal util i ty 
- index. To overcome this theoret ical complication, Marshall assumed 
the marginal util i ty of money to be approximately constant for 
movements along the demand schedule. 
The reason for this assumption will be explained below when we 
depict the various measures of consumer's surplus in an indifference 
map. 
Some 20 years la ter , Hicks redefined the concept by using an ordinal 
system of indifference curves. ^ With further clarification by 
Henderson ^ four additional measures of consumer 's surplus were 
(8) 
distinguished: 
1. Compensating variation (CV) is the amount of compensation, 
paid or received, that will leave the consumer in his initial 
welfare position following the change in price if he is free 
to buy any quanti ty of the commodity a t the new pr ice . 
2. Compensating surplus (CS) is the amount of compensation, paid 
or received, that will leave the consumer in his initial welfare 
position following the change in price if he is constrained to 
buy a t the new price the quanti ty he would have bought a t 
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tha t pr ice in the absence of compensation. 
3 . Equivalent variation (EV) is the amount of compensation, paid 
or received, tha t will leave the consumer in his subsequent 
welfare position in the absence of the pr ice change if he is 
free to buy any quanti ty of the commodity a t the old pr ice . 
4. Equivalent surplus (ES) is the amount of compensation, paid 
or received, tha t will leave the consumer in his subseauent 
welfare position in the absence of the price change if he is 
constrained to buy a t the old pr ice the quanti ty he would 
have bought a t tha t pr ice in the absence of compensation. 
Hicks also analysed the relationship of these four measures to 
the more readily computable measures of Paasche and Laspeyres 
variat ions. 
The Paasche variation (PV) is the amount the consumer would 
have to be paid to have just enough money to buy the new bundle 
of goods a t the original pr ices . 
The Laspeyres variation (LV) is the amount of compensation that 
could be taken from the consumer while leaving him just able 
to buy the original bundle of goods he bought before the change. 
The fundamental difficulty of measuring utility can be explained 
best by, measuring the seven distinguished consumers ' surpluses 
with the help of an indifference map and corresponding demand 
curves. 
These two diagrammatic representat ions a re depicted below in 
( 9 ) 
the upper and lower graph respectively. 
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In the upper graph the Y-axis represents the amount of money, 
and the X-axis the quanti ty of the commodity in question (assuming 
a normal good). 
The initial price of the commodity is represented by the slope 
P 0 and the new pr ice , assuming a price fall, by the slope of p / 
Since the amount of money is depicted along the Y-axis the various 
consumers ' surpluses a re measured as distances parallel to the 
Y-axis. 
In the lower graph the demand schedules a re derived from the 
indifference map in the upper graph. It follows tha t the various 
consumers ' surpluses are represented here by a reas . 
From the definitions it can be seen tha t : CV = Y^ Y]5 C S ' = BC 
(distance between II and I T a t ^ ) , EV = YQ Y{, ES = AD (distance 
between II and I T a t Xg); PV = BG, and LV = AF. 
1 7 9 
The ordinary demand curve (ODC) through A ' B in the lower 
graph is derived from an offer curve through AB in the upper 
graph. 
The ODC gives the quanti ty tha t a util i ty maximizing consumer 
with a given income level will demand a t each pr ice . 
Marshallian surplus (MS), as derived from the ODC, equals 
P n A 'B ' P J . That the MS may not represent ' t rue ' surplus from 
a price change to a consumer, can now be demonstra ted by derivation 
of the Hicksian compensated demand curve (HCDC). The HCDC 
depicts the quanti ty a consumer will demand a t each pr ice , assuming 
his income is adjusted so tha t he remains on his original indifference 
curve 1 1 . This can be shown in the upper graph by a movement 
from A to E along indifference curve 1 1 . Hence the curve A ' E 
in the lower graph represents the HCDC from the s tar t ing point 
A 'which refers to A on the indifference curve 1 1 . 
When the pr ice is PQ a marginal pr ice decrease benefits the con-
sumer by P Q A ' . As the pr ice drops continously from P Q to 
P j , the to ta l amount tha t could be taken from him while leaving 
him just as well off without the pr ice decrease is just the a rea 
P 0 A ' E ' P r 
Hence, CV equals the a rea under the HCDC and between the 
two pr ices . 
Since by definition the income effects of CV a re zero , CV represents 
an exac t measure of the welfare changes in question. 
The HCDC indicates solely the substitution effect of a price change, 
whereas the ODC ref lec ts both the substitution and the income 
ef fec t s . For this reason MS always contains the danger of over-
or understat ing the ' t rue ' surplus (depending on whether the com-
modity in question is a normal or an inferior good). 
For completeness sake: EV = P Q H 'B 'P , CS = P ^ ' E ' P ^ 
E ' B ' C ' ( 1 0 ) , ES = P Q H ' B' P j + A ' D ' H ' ( H ) , i,V = P g A ' F ' P j , and 
PV = P Q G ' B ' P J ^ . 
If the income effect is zero then the indifference curves a re 
1 8 0 
parallel a t any quanti ty demanded. In consequence, all demand 
curves will then coincide, and the Hicksian and Marshallian surpluses 
will be equal. 
A further theoret ical improvement on Marshall 's theory was the 
finding tha t a constant marginal util i ty of money is not sufficient 
to ensure a zero income effect . Because, in addition, the marginal 
uti l i t ies would have to be independent and the marginal utility 
of the commodity in question would have to be changing. To ensure 
tha t MS is accura te for a price change, the marginal utility of 
money has to be constant with respect to all pr ices . It is not 
the constancy in marginal util i ty of money as income increases 
tha t ma t t e r s , but the constancy in marginal util i ty of money as 
(12) 
prices change . 
Although CV and EV may represent exact measures of changes 
in welfare a major drawback is tha t they are per se unobservable 
(for the indifference cur.ves a re unknown ). 
Nevertheless, i t can be argued tha t the error by using MS in applied 
welfare analysis in stead of the correc t measures CV or EV will 
be insignificant in most cases. 
First , inter alia, Willig ( 1 9 7 6 ) ( 1 3 ) and later Seade ( 1 9 7 8 ) ( 1 4 ) have 
shown tha t under cer ta in conditions, MS can be used to approximate 
CV and EV. 
Secondly, for normal goods we have PV £ EV ^ MS ^ CV > LV. 
It can be demonstrated by using the Taylor series ' approximations 
of the various measures as given by Hicks that in p rac t i ce 
these differences may appear to be quite s m a l l i 1 ^ It is clear 
tha t when the ODC is linear MS equals 1/2 (PV + LV). 
Thirdly, and perhaps most important , if (like we have done) for 
the purpose of cost /benefi t analysis only relat ive welfare changes 
a re approximated by surplus ra t io ' s (MS/4 direct government cost , 
or economic rent / A direct government cost), the resulting bias 
is likely to be negligible as compared to inaccuracies due to s t a -
t is t ical problems. This argument is based on the principle tha t 
when a yard-stick is biassed one can more accurately say e.g. 
a is twice as long as b, than equals k cm and b 2 cm. 
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As far as , the concept of economic rent is concerned, Mishan 
introduced, in analogy with the ODC and HCDC, ordinary and 
compensated supply curves (OSC and CSC) 
Again, the sufficient condition for Mishan's four measures (i.e. 
CV, CS, EV and EV; this t ime refering to the factor owner, his 
initial and subsequent welfare position, and the quanti ty supplied) 
to be equal and the OSC and the CSC to coincide, is tha t the 
indifference curves of the factor owner a re parallel a t any given 
quanti ty of the commodity in question. 
Mishan has also made perfect ly clear tha t the surplus, approximated 
by the area above the supply curve and below the price line, 
results from the owner-ship by the producers of fixed factors 
(18) 
of production . 
Hence, it says basically nothing about the welfare of owners of 
firms. For this reason Mishan urged economists to get rid of the 
Marshallian notion of producer 's surplus and have it replaced by 
economic rent , which may refer to rent of a short-run fixity of 
some factor of production, rent of land, rent of entrepreneurial 
abili ty, e t c . 
The major problems in measuring welfare changes by economic 
surplus re la te to the aggregation of economic surpluses over dif-
ferent commodities and individuals. These problems will be briefly 
discussed below, in (ii) and (iii) respectively. 
We conclude our discussion on the basic difficulty in measuring 
changes in util i ty with the help of economic surplus by emphasizing 
tha t the utmost ca re is needed when dealing with e.g. wage goods 
(consumers) / monocultures (factor owners) and large price changes. 
This is because, from the above discussion and graphs it will be 
understood tha t the inaccuracy, in using MS in stead of CV or 
EV, is an increasing function of the proportion of income spent 
(consumer) / earned (factor owner) and the magnitude of the price 
change. 
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(ii) The Difficulty in the Aggregation of Economic Surplus over 
Goods and Services 
The problem is, how to measure the change in economic surplus 
if the prices of more than one commodity a re to change? 
Already a t first glance, it will be seen, tha t if production/consump-
tion of one good is dependent to tha t of an other, supply/demand 
of the second good generally will not be unaffected as the price 
of the first good changes. 
We s ta ted generally, because this does not hold if e.g. all the 
commodities of concern have an income elast ici ty equal to unity. 
Hence, economic surplus of two or more goods can be measured 
accurately by the sum of the respect ive areas only if the goods 
a re entirely independent. 
(19) 
A further problem is the issue of path dependency. Path de-
pendency refers to the problem tha t the final surplus also depends 
on which path of pr ice changes is followed. For instance, we can 
decrease the price of coffee first, then the price of t ea , then 
the price of coffee again, e t c . Each path will entail a different 
outcome in the change of aggregated economic surplus. 
Several authors have argued, however, tha t the income effects 
will probably offset each other so tha t , while the measure of 
economic surplus may be path dependent, the bias involved will 
be small for most pr ice changes. 
Anyway, we feel tha t in addition to our previous remarks concerning 
the magnitude of the price changes and the proportion of income 
spent or earned, a third element of caution in measuring welfare 
change by means of economic surplus has to be taken into consi-
deration when adding up surpluses over goods or services tha t 
a re highly interdependent . 
(iii) The Difficulty in the Aggregation of Economic Surplus over 
Individuals 
The problem is, can we use the sum of economic surpluses as 
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a measure of welfare change for a group of consumers/factor 
owners as a whole? 
Theoretically speaking, a gain or loss in welfare from a pr ice 
change will never be the same for each individual. Interpersonal 
uti l i ty comparison is per se impossible. However, we a re not in-
te res ted so much in exac t aggregated utili ty measures . What 
we need to know is, whether the assumption can be made, when 
an aggregated economic surplus is posi t ive , t ha t the gainers 
can theoret ical ly compensate the losers and tha t the welfare 
change will then be a t least a potent ia l Pa re to improvement . 
(21) 
Boadway found by his well-known paradox tha t a positive aggre-
gated economic surplus could be thought of where the gainers 
cannot compensate the losers and still be be t t e r off themselves. 
His idea is based on the possibility tha t this compensation between 
gainers and losers may change the equilibrium set of pr ice bundles. 
An impor tant corollary to applied welfare analysis is, t ha t when 
a major commodity or group of commodit ies is to be analysed, 
a compensation between gainers and losers might affect all pr ices 
in such a way tha t the direction of the net welfare change beco-
mes uncer ta in . 
For this reason, a fourth restr ic t ion to applied surplus analysis 
is tha t the value of the goods or services in the aggregated wel-
fare ... analysis , as compared to to ta l GNP, should not be too 
large. 
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TABLE A TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO - COPRA, COCOA, COFFEE AND MILK, 
PRODUCTION AND PRICE 1970 - 1981 
YEAR COPRA COCOA COFFEE MILK 
production 
1000 kg 
TT$/ 
1000 kg 
production 
1000 lbs 
TT$/ 
1000 lbs 
production 
1000 lbs 
TT$/ 
1000 lbs 
production 
1000 litres 
TT$/ 
1000 litres 
1970 11,191 402.60 13,697 720 5,075 610 7,264 270 
1971 12,449 422.32 8.305 580 8,584 690 8,359 240 
1972 12,544 422.32 16,628 570 7,275 640 10,302 240 
1973 11,800 510.40 6,971 760 5,989 790 7,236 * 
360 1974 6,679 510.40 9,173 1,160 4,276 880 7,279 450 
1975 8,907 990.00 * 11,581 1,290 8,871 880 7,741 * 
570 1976 9,106 990.00 * 7,163 1,300 5,888 1,160 6,319 * 
570 1977 9,008 1,188.00 * 7,374 1,880 6,434 1,620 5,868 660 
1978 7,367 1,188.00 7,491 2,110 5,510 2,190 5,927 * 
660 1979 6,838 1,188.00 5,793 2,110 5,505 2,280 6,253 660 
1980 4,417 1,661.36 5,248 2,180 4,937 1,940 5,492 * 
1,250 1981 5,207 2,753.77 6,934 2,260 *' 5,364 2,130 * 7,082 * 
1,470 * Guaranteed prices 
TABLE B TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO - TOMATOES, CABBAGES, SWEET POTATOES AND DASHEEN, 
PRODUCTION AND PRICE 1970 -1981 
YEAR TOMATOES CABBAGES SWEET POTATOES DASHEEN 
production TT$/ production • TT$/ production TT$/ production TT$/ 
1000 kg 1000 kg 1000 kg 1000 kg 1000 kg 1000 kg 1000 kg 1000 kg 
1970 4,047 900 3,191 570 1,486 32,0 4,318 210 
1971 6,348 930 3,661 670 1,411 450 4,364 230 
1972 9,020 1,060 5,727 840 1,391 350 4,773 200 
1973 9,205 1,010 6,136 660 1,425 570 4,864 370 
1974 10,688 990 7,057 600 2,636 510 5,000 370 
1975 9,586 1,450 6,648 880 2,545 680 4,909 460 
1976 6,710 2,270 4,654 1,170 2,545 710 5,000 620 
1977 8,182 2,360 6,136 1,540 2,614 1,150 5,682 770 
1978 7,841 3,310 6,239 1,790 2,568 1,190 5,625 950 
1979 8,011 3,520 6,034 2,140 2,227 1,740 5,114 1,260 
1980 7,500 5,230 5,779 3,090 2,168 1,850 4,659 1,660 
1981 7,295 5,820 5,625 2,200 2,068 1,820 4,545 2,040 
TABLE C TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO - ROOT CROP FARM DATA, 1983 
FARMERS WORKING 40 HOURS AND MORE WEEKLY 
No. ACREAGE EQUIPMENT 
TT$ 
FERTILIZER 
TT$ 
LABOUR 
TT$ 
CHEMICALS 
TT$ 
RETUI 
TT: 
1 200 620 380 660 260 7500 
2 75 36 200 350 - 2100 
3 200 170 145 - - 1800 
4 100 595 200 460 150 3500 
5 100 100 - 70 - 250 
6 100 375 - 120 40 1000 
7 100 13 - 120 - 1000 
8 100 1085 40 - 30 100 
9 25 750 - 110 - 750 
10 50 205 - 120 40 1000 
11 75 296 - 105 - 900 
12 50 73 200 400 140 2400 
13 100 115 400 1100 120 9000 
14 33 427 160 200 125 2000 
15 300 544 240 180 160 1500 
16 100 135 - 120 - 1000 
17 200 695 120 400 120 2500 
18 100 290 _ 420 _ 3000 
No. ACREAGE FERTILIZER IABOUR CHEMICALS RETURNS 
TT$ TT$ TT$ TT$ TT$ 
19 50 337 90 105 - 900 
20 100 1000 75 - - 800 
21 50 235 30 300 - 500 
22 25 - 45 40 - 485 
23 25 808 160 800 - 2000 
24 50 1325 140 300 - 1400 
25 25 140 - 120 - 1000 
26 50 275 140 180 - 1455 
27 100 - - 145 - 447 
28 500 25301 400 - 80 12000 
29 150 41995 200 625 140 2520 
30 400 25300 430 1800 400 10780 
31 200 41995 600 1700 480 15000 
32 300 18000 320 1100 400 ' 9600 
33 300 72 400 1000 130 9000 
3k 700 39150 560 - 480 4800 
35 500 16135. - - - 1200 
36 300 1577 450 , - - 10000 
TABLE C CONTINUED 
No. ACREAGE EQUIPMENT * FERTILIZER LABOUR CHEMICALS RETURNS 
TT$ TT$ TT$ TT$ TT$ 
37 100 49 270 - 200 4500 
38 150 60 100 100 40 1000 
39 500 22250 - 8000 
TABLE D TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO - VEGETABLE FARM DATA, 1983 
FARMERS WORKING 50 HOURS AND MORE WEEKLY 
No, ACREAGE EQUIPMENT 
TT$ 
SEED 
TT$ 
PRICE/SEED 
TT$/LB 
FERTILIZER 
rr$ 
PRICE/FERTILH 
TT$/ 100 LBS 
1 50 176 240 160 34 75 
2 100 4125 400 80 2400 60 
3 400 273 - - 100 100 
4 100 650 80 160 72 72 
5 200 2990 800 40 1120 55 
6 200 - 400 20 1200 50 
7 50 2998 875 35 400 50 
8 50 9550 55 110 33 50 
9 100 17670 500 100 300 60 
10 200 4800 240 60 2080 45 
11 100 2800 60 120 214 60 
12 150 30000 150 100 1500 64 
13 100 1320 180 80 1200 55 
14 50 7160 113 45 - -
15 100 17750 70 140 820 51 
16 100 35607 256 128 300 50 
TABLE D CONTINUED 
No. ACREAGE EQUIPMENT 
TT$ 
SEED 
TT$ 
17 50 1550 60 
18 500 6150 210 
19 300 9700 300 
20 100 2425 23 
21 100 - 45 
22 200 1900 90 
23 150 1155 14 
24 150 31200 75 
25 75 270 68 
26 300 3004 40 
27 50 70 40 
28 200 179900 200 
29 600 315 59 
30 800 1825 500 
31 700 3507 50 
32 500 177 10 
33 250 215 80 
3k 600 100100 622 
PRICE/SEED FERTILIZER PRICE/FERTILIZER 
TT$/LB TT$ TT$/100 LBS 
120 6 60 
120 310 55 
100 620 50 
140 90 56 
140 150 55 
140 129 55 
140 24 56 
90 102 50 
88 8 55 
120 26 55 
40 - -
20 440 49 
59 30 60 
30 3000 45 
100 8 53 
100 - -
80 - -
62 800 55 
TABLE D CONTINUED 
No. ACREAGE EQUIPMENT 
TT$ 
SEED 
TT$ 
PRICE/SEED 
TT$/LB 
FERTILIZER 
TT$ 
PRIC 
TT< 
35 50 17800 80 80 6 64 
36 100 517 60 60 24 80 
37 300 - - - 12 83 
38 200 60 - - 6 60 
39 300 112 40 120 15 55 
40 1100 68000 400 40 4480 55 
41 75 133000 100 60 600 55 
42 50 1300 40 400 40 80 
43 3000 - - - 600 50 
44 100 1670 15 75 50 83 
45 600 4200 3600 60 3600 50 
46 400 118 60 300 14 55 
47 25 105 - - - -
48 200 2000 240 60 650 55 
49 75 70 50 100 6 65 
TABLE D TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO - VEGETABLE FARM DATA, 1983 
FARMERS WORKING 50 HOURS AND MORE WEEKLY 
No CHEMICALS 
$TT 
LABOUR 
$TT 
WAGE 
$TT/HOUR 
PRICE OUTPUT 
$TT/LB 
RETURNS 
$TT 
PROFIT 
$TT 
1 384 120 120 0.70 1190 412 
2 2000 160C 27 1.50 198000 191600 
3 160 900 150 1.25 1725 565 
4 150 80C 100 2.00 5000 3898 
5 2160 3000 75 1.00 20000 12920 
6 2000 600 25 1.50 16000 11800 
7 800 6801 40 1.00 10000 7245 
8 40 520 130 2.00 7300 6077 
9 1350 810 48 3.00 19290 16033 
10 1000 3800 42 1.00 46000 38880 
11 240 1000 200 1.00 7560 6046 
12 5000 1575 26 0.70 11865 3640 
13 600 800 100 1.00 14300 11520 
14 470 2000 50 1.00 12600 10018 
15 518 1120 150 0.50 10000 7472 
16 900 7000 119 3.00 27000 18544 
TABLE D CONTINUED 
No, CHEMICALS 
$TT 
LABOUR 
$TT 
WAGE 
$TT/HOUR 
PRICE OUTPUT 
$TT/LB 
RETURNS 
$TT 
PROFI 
$TT 
17 90 700 700 0.75 - 1500 644 
18 1632 3750 125 0.80 9600 3698 
19 1680 5200 128 1.00 12000 4200 
20 855 960 160 2.00 5000 3073 
21 140 160 177 1.00 3000 2505 
22 600 320 177 1.00 6600 5461 
23 170 225 188 0.35 595 162 
24 200 230 144 1.00 6900 6293 
25 40 500 83 0.35 350 -
26 720 240 100 0.70 7000 5974 
27 770 - - 0.50 9000 8190 
28 - - - 1.00 20000 19360 
29 - 116 116 0.30 6000 5795 
30 1000 540 60 0.28 89600 84560 
31 - 300 150 1.00 500 142 
32 80 - - 0.40 4410 4320 
33 90 - 1.50 750 580 
34 3600 _ - 1.50 15000 9978 
TABLE D CONTINUED 
No CHEMICALS LABOUR WAGE PRICE OUTPUT RETURNS PROFIT 
$TT $TT $TT/HOUR $TT/LB $TT $TT 
35 - - - 1.00 1940 1854 
36 - - - 2.00 3600 3516 
37 4 - - 1.80 540 524 
38 25 525 130 0.89 600 44 
39 40 700 54 2.50 3750 2925 
40 1250 7600 95 0.65 39000 17270 
41 480 1504 62 1.00 96000 93316 
42 40 700 120 1.00 4000 3180 
43 300 3600 120 2.50 16550 12050 
44 22 270 450 1.00 7000 6645 
45 2000 - - 15.00 269700 260500 
46 170 170 170 1.50 1500 1086 
47 10 - - 0.20 60 50 
48 675 776 78 1.00 18990 16649 
49 12 250 125 1.00 1000 682 
TABLE E TRINIDAD - DAIRY FARM DATA, 1983 
FARMERS PRODUCING MORE THAN 20.000 KG MILK IN 1982 
No. HOURS/WEEK FERTILIZER CONCENTRATE ACREAGE CALVING PRODUCTION 
TT$ 
FEED 
no. 25kg-bags 
IMPROVED 
PASTURE 
RATE 
KG 
1 84 560 1,460 15 82 k5,000 
2 56 600 1,040 14.5 72 52,750 
3 56 60 1,04.0 0 60 29,000 
4 56 0 1,040 0 44 36,000 
5 56 336 1,040 0 56 36,500 
6 56 300 780 0 50 13,600 
7 84 600 1,560 16 82 63,500 
8 35 400 1,040 10 43 18,900 
9 56 480 1,040 19 78 60,000 
10 54 0 720 0 45 37,800 
11 56 100 1,260 20 76 59.000 
12 56 150 1,200 19 71 37,037 
13 56 0 960 0 10 21,794 
14 56 0 960 18 42 42,727 
15 24 0 334 0 62 24,000 
16 56 288 576 20 63 50,616 
17 56 300 780 24 54 40,500 
TABLE E CONTINUED 
No* HOURS/WEEK FERTILIZER CONCENTRATE ACREAGE CALVING PRODUCTION 
TT$ 
FEED 
no. 25kg-bags 
IMPROVED 
PASTURE 
RATE 
KG 
18 56 0 1,560 0 55 47,260 
19 77 0 1,300 16.5 73 81,030 
20 70 90 260 0 43 40,000 
21 56 30 780 17 70 37,000 
22 70 600 1,040 0 40 40,516 
23 56 120 1,860 20 80 81,000 
24 56 300 416 0 64 40,290 
25 20 0 1,300 0 54 48,360 
26 56 360 520 19 35 31,750 
27 56 600 390 19 44 27,300 
28 70 0 520 0 61 30,750 
29 56 180 390 19 35 31,750 
30 56 0 600 21 57 57,720 
31 50 0 720 22 67 26,936 
32 56 275 1,440 21 39 53,280 
33 56 0 720 20 46 40,515 
34 56 180 720 27 33 49,950 
35 56 0 1,200 20 51 43,771 
TABLE E CONTINUED 
No, HOURS/WEEK FERTILIZER CONCENTRATE ACREAGE CALVING PRODUCTION 
FEED IMPROVED RATE 
TT$ no. 25kg-bags PASTURE KG 
36 28 40 480 20 74 50,643 
37 56 0 360 23 50 18,518 
38 56 300 960 20 60 26,936 
39 56 0 1,440 20 49 53,690 
40 56 200 480 10 63 50,500 
41 56 2,000 1,440 13 85 30,300 
42 56 1,020 840 14 37 33,670 
43 56 1,200 2,160 14.5 74 67,340 
44 56 3,200 720 10 56 26,936 
45 56 0 1,920 0 31 44,155 
46 56 0 1,200 2 
« 
44 23,310 
47 49 0 600 0 52 17,760 
48 56 1,520 1,440 10 56 71,040 
49 56 900 720 5 27 30,303 
50 56 800 1,200 16 67 37,000 
51 56 1,800 360 0 47 20,202 
52 56 2,700 1,020 22 33 26,936 
TABLE E CONTINUED 
No, HOURS/WEEK FERTILIZER CONCENTRATE ACREAGE CALVING PRODUCTION 
FEED IMPROVED RATE 
TT$ no. 25kg-bags PASTURE KG 
53 56 1,440 730 7 41 27,000 
54 56 3,000 300 15 76 31,700 
55 56 1,600 520 4 52 40,500 
56 63 2,400 1,524 15 77 56,000 
57 70 14,400 1,920 : 34 65 18,900 
58 56 0 720 20 53 33,670 
59 56 1,200 2,600 10 79 64,800 
60 56 2,900 910 9 76 5k,000 
61 56 2,160 1,092 . 17 46 31,750 
62 56 720 1,040 8 78 27,375 
TABLE F TRINIDAD - DAIRY FARM DATA , 1983 
FARMERS PRODUCING LESS THAN 20.000 KG MILK IN 1982 
No. FENCING 
$TT 
HOURS/WEEK CALVING 
RATE 
PRODUC" 
KG 
1 0 56 54 9,855 
2 0 80 22 22,477 
3 0 56 27 10,950 
4 0 56 29 7,300 
5 0 56 30 3,000 
6 750 56 44 19,800 
7 95 56 52 23,310 
8 1900 80 31 31,080' 
9 105 56 43 14,000 
10 0 56 58 31,000 
11 0 64 42 18,000 
12 0 40 33 18,200 
13 0 56 32 13,600 
14 0 56 38 13,000 
15 too 60 40 13,600 
16 2000 70 41 30,000 
17 450 56 61 27,000 
O 
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Samenvatting en beleidsaanbevelingen van het proefschrift "The 
Economics of Agricultural Subsidies" vertaald in het Nederlands. 
Deel Een 
1. Landbouwsubsidies zijn gedefinieerd als een door de overheid ge-
induceerde wijziging van relatieve prijzen van goederen, diensten 
en produktiefactoren in de landbouwsector. 
Deze veranderingen in landbouwprijzen kunnen het gevolg zijn 
van een groot aantal verschillende overheidsmaatregelen varierend 
van directe overdrachtsbetalingen tot handelspolitieke maatregelen. 
Door een verdere indeling in specifieke categorieen van landbouw-
subsidies zijn toepasbare definities afgeleid. 
2. Landbouwsubsidies zijn economisch gerechtvaardigd wanneer door 
afwezigheid van overheidsbemoeienis de algemene welvaart zou 
afnemen. Ze zijn verdedigd op drie gronden, t.w.: de aanwezigheid 
van binnenlandse distorsies, instabiele prijzen en het zgn. infant-
industry argument. 
3. Binnenlandse distorsies zoals monopolie, milieuverontreiniging 
en andere externe effecten kunnen theoretisch weggenomen worden 
door een subsidie-beleid in de richting tegengesteld aan die van 
de distorsie. 
4. Grote schommelingen in voedselprijzen hebben een verwoestend 
effect op de volkshuishouding. Geringe prijsveranderingen daarente-
gen, zijn nodig voor maximale winstvorming en afstemming van 
het aanbod op de vraag. 
Het kernprobleem bij de bepaling van een juiste iandbouwprijs-
politiek is, hoe grote prijsschommelingen voorkomen kunnen worden 
zonder de functie van de prijs als marktsignaal te ondermijnen. 
5. Het "infant-industry" argument kan niet voldoende verdedigd worden 
met argumenten die berusten op de theorieen van Mill, Bastable 
5 
Kemp and Meade. 
In overeenstemming met moderne evenwichtstheorie zou protectie 
gebaseerd moeten zijn op de aanwezigheid van dynamische interne 
welvaartseffecten, met andere woorden: de diffuse welvaartsver-
grotende effecten die het gevolg zijn van het leerproces van de 
geprotegeerde industrie. 
6. Naast de beoogde effecten sorteren subsidies ook ongewenste 
effecten. Oneigenlijk gedrag van gesubsidieerden leidt vaak tot 
welvaartsverlies. Voorts kan de welvaart in niet-gesubsidieerde 
sectoren dalen ten gevolge van een reallocatie van kapitaal en 
hulpstoffen naar de gesubsidieerde sectoren. 
7. Theoretisch kunnen verstoringen en sectoreffecten van landbouwsub-
sidies het best worden bepaald d.m.v. macro-economische modellen. 
Tot op heden echter is de geTntegreerde modelmatige aanpak 
niet erg succesvol geweest, dit voornamelijk vanwege het ontbre-
ken van de noodzakelijke statistische gegevens. 
8. De meting van welvaartseffecten van landbouwsubsidies, vooral 
in ontwikkelingslanden, is doorgaans gebaseerd op partieTe even-
wichtsanalyse. 
De schatting van elasticiteiten en van veranderingen in economisch 
surplus heeft grote analytische waarde, omdat hiermee antwoorden 
gegeven kunnen worden op ex-ante vragen, over wie het meeste 
voordeel heeft van de subsidie en over de financieTe doelmatigheid 
van een produktieverhogende subsidie. 
9. De onnauwkeurigheid van de schatting van de welvaartsveranderin-
gen d.m.v. verschillen in economisch surplus is een toenemende 
functie van: het percentage van het individueel inkomen dat 
verdiend c.q. besteed is aan het betreffende goed; de omvang 
van de geinduceerde prijsverandering; de onderlinge afhankelijkheid 
van de desbetreffende goederen waaruit de surpluseenheid is 
samengesteld; de verhouding van de waarde van de samenstellende 
goederen t .o.v. die van het to ta le bruto nationaal produkt. 
10. Directe landbouw-inkomenssubsidies zijn meer gericht tegen de 
Symptomen dan tegen de fundamentele oorzaken van inkomens-
verschillen. Wanneer echter het voornaamste politieke oogmerk 
is de landbouw-inkomens t e garanderen, dan vormen directe land-
bouw-inkomenssubsidies het mees t geëigende middel, omdat een 
dergelijk beleid minder verstorend en tevens veel goedkoper is 
dan een beleid dat inkomens garandeert d.m.v. directe landbouw-
input- of d i rec te landbouw-outputsubsidies. 
11. Direc te landbouw-outputsubsidies, bezien binnen een par t iee l even-
wichtsmodel, zijn ofwel indirecte overdrachtsbetalingen (i.e. 
belastingen) van consumenten aan boeren zonder extra welvaar ts -
verliezen voor de consumenten, ofwel di recte overdrachtsbetal in-
gen van consumenten aan boeren of overheid met ext ra welvaar ts -
verliezen voor de consumenten. 
12. In het algemeen zal het onzeker zijn of boeren voordeel zullen 
hebben van een s tabüisa t ie van outputprijzen. Wel zullen waarschijn-
lijk door een dergelijk beleid de consumenten meestal een wel-
vaartsverl ies lijden (vooropgesteld dat er geen sprake is van grote 
schommelingen van voedselprijzen). 
13. Gesteid werd, dat de oprichting van ac t ieve verkoopbureaus evenals 
een grondige analyse van markten in ontwikkelde landen door 
deskundigen uit ontwikkelingslanden effectiever kunnen zijn bij 
het st imuleren van landbouwexport dan de instelling van landbouw-
exportsubsidies. 
14. Wanneer d i rec te landbouw-inputsubsidies niet vergezeld gaan van ver-
beterde landbouw-technieken, zal de verschuiving van de landbouw-
aanbodeurve hooguit evenwijdig zijn en met resulterende ne t to 
sociale lasten. 
15. Het verbruik van landbouw-inputs wordt bepaald door een groot 
aanta l verschillende factoren die aan de inputvraag- en aanbod-
zijde een rol spelen. Een landbouw-inputsubsidie daarentegen, 
belnvloedt slechts enkele van deze factoren en bovendien to t 
op zekere hoogte op onvoorspelbare wijze. 
Deel Twee 
16. De empirische raming van de welvaar tseffecten van landbouw-
subsidies is buitengewoon moeilijk wanneer een groot aanta l sub-
sidie-programma's gelijktijdig wordt uitgevoerd. Om deze reden 
is een juiste vaststell ing van de "subsidy-mix" inzake de finan-
ciele doelmatigheid in het bereiken van de doelstellingen alleen 
mogelijk, wanneer het to taa l aanta l s teunmaatregelen beperkt 
is. 
Een tweede reden om met landbouwsubsidies op beperkte schaal 
t e beginnen is gelegen in het feit da t de mees t e nieuwe subsidie-
programma's lijden aan adminis t ra t ieve kinderziektes . De kosten 
van deze kinderziektes kunnen nu zo laag mogelijk gehouden worden 
door subsidie-programma's zo veel mogelijk t e laten profi teren 
van de ervaring opgedaan bij vroegere p rogramma ' s . 
17. Voor de bepaling van de opt imale "subsidy-mix" in een dynamische 
context zijn s ta t i s t i sche gegevens omtren t de betreffende subsidies 
onontbeerlijk. Hierom is het ook aan t e bevelen een deel van 
he t toegewezen subsidiebudget t e bes temmen voor de verzameling 
en verwerking van deze s ta t i s t ieken. 
18. De empirische Studie van arbeids-distorsies in de landbouwsector 
van Trinidad en Tobago heeft la ten zien hoe met behulp van g e -
scha t t e produktiefuncties een onderscheid gemaakt kon worden 
tussen landbouwproduktie met deze distorsie en die zonder deze 
distorsie. 
19. Gesteld werd, dat landbouwsubsidie-programma's alleen succesvol 
kunnen zijn als producenten streven naar een zo hoog mogelijke 
1 winst en dientengevolge r a t i o n e d reageren op geTnduceerde veran-
deringen van rela t ieve prijzen. Een praktische methode om een 
prijsrespons t e meten wanneer men alleen de beschikking heeft 
over een dwarsdoorsnede van agrarische gegevens, is de genorma-
liseerde beperkte winstfunctie (NRPF) benadering. 
20. Een ernst ige beperking van de "NRPF"-aanpak is dat deze bena-
dering niet kan worden toegepast wanneer de landbouwprijzen 
gefixeerd zijn. Hierbij kan worden opgemerkt dat bij rigide land-
bouwprijzen een optimale respons op subsidie toch twijfelachtig 
is . 
21 . Elast ici te i ten die indirect zijn ontleend aan de "NRPF" zijn betrouw-
baarder dan die welke direct zijn afgeleid van uit-een-vergelijking 
bestaande produktiefuncties. Zowel het teken alswel de relat ieve 
groot te van de desbetreffende e las t ic i te i ten kunnen bij de beide 
methodes nie t temin overeenstemmen. 
22. De empirische analyse laat zien dat de landbouw-inputsubsidies 
geen effect hadden op het verbruik van inputs door akker- en 
tuinbouwproducenten. Afgezien van monopolie in het aanbod van 
landbouw-inputs, konden fundamentele administrat ieve gebreken 
die ten grondslag lagen aan de mislukking van het subsidieprogram-
ma geldentificeerd worden. 
23. In de ex-ante analyse van een subsidie op kunstmest werd geraamd 
dat de schaduwprijs van de besparing in deviezen door het subsi-
dieren van uitsluitend locaal geproduceerde kunstmest relatief 
hoog zou zijn geweest . 
24. De berekende ontleding van de produktiewaarde van akker- en 
tuinbouwgewassen in een prijs- en een hoeveelheidscomponent 
leverde steun op voor een pri jsstabil isatie-programma dat voordelig 
zou zijn voor de producenten. 
25. In de ex-ante analyse van landbouw-outputsubsidies werd he t con-
cept van garantiedrempelpri jzen geîntroduceerd. Binnen he t raam 
van een par t iee l evenwichtsmodel werd een sensit ivi tei tsanalyse 
uitgevoerd om de re la t ieve financiële doelmatigheid van een aanta l , 
tegen de distorsie ger ichte , garant iedrempelpri jzen t e kunnen 
vasts te l len. 
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